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ABSTRACT
Wang, Qihua. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2009. Access Control Policy Management.
Major Professor: Ninghui Li.
Access control is the traditional center of gravity of computer security [1]. People
specify access control policies to control accesses to resources in computer systems. The
management of access control policies include policy speciﬁcation and policy analysis. In
this dissertation, we design a new language for policy speciﬁcation, propose a new type
of access control policy, and study the computational complexity of a variety of policy
analysis problems. In particular,
 We design a novel algebra that enables the speciﬁcation of high-level security poli-
cies that combine qualiﬁcation requirements with quantity requirements. Our algebra
contains six operators and is expressive enough to specify many natural high-level
security policies. We study the properties of the algebra, as well as several computa-
tional problems related to the algebra.
 Traditional access control policy analysis focuses on restricting access. However, an
equally important aspect of access control is to enable access. With this in mind, we
introduce the notion of resiliency policies for access control systems. We formally
deﬁne resiliency policies and study computational problems on checking whether
an access control state satisﬁes a resiliency policy. We also study the consistency
between resiliency policies and separation of duty policies.
 The workﬂow authorization system is a popular access control model. We study
fundamental problems related to policy analysis in workﬂow authorization systems,
such as determining whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow in a certain
access control state. In particular, we apply tools from parameterized complexityxi
theory to better understand the complexities of such problems. We also introduce the
notion of resiliency to workﬂow authorization systems.
 Delegation is an important tool to provide ﬂexibility and enforce resiliency in ac-
cess control systems. However, delegation may also allow colluding users to bypass
security policies. We study the security impact of delegation and formally deﬁne
the notion of security with regard to delegation. We propose mechanisms to en-
force delegation security. In particular, we design a novel source-based enforcement
mechanism for workﬂow authorization systems so as to achieve both security and
efﬁciency. Finally, we discuss how to use delegation to meet resiliency requirements.1
1 INTRODUCTION
Access control is the traditional center of gravity of computer security [1]. People specify
access control policies to control accesses to resources in computer systems. A high-level
access control policy states an overall requirement for a sensitive task. A well-known high-
level access control policy is Separation of Duty (SoD), which is widely recognized as a
fundamental principle in computer security [2,3]. In its simplest form, the principle states
that a sensitive task should be performed by two different users acting in cooperation. The
concept of SoD has long existed before the information age; it has been widely used in, for
example, the banking industry and the military, sometimes under the name “the two-man
rule”. More generally, an SoD policy requires the cooperation of at least k different users
to complete a task. SoD has been identiﬁed as a high-level mechanism that is “at the heart
of fraud and error control” [2].
In many situations, however, it is not enough to require only that k different users be
involved in a sensitive task; there are also minimal qualiﬁcation requirements for these
users. For example, one may want to require users involved in a task to be physicians,
certiﬁed nurses, certiﬁed accountants, or directors of a company. It is thus desirable to
introduce a concise language that enables the formal speciﬁcation of high-level policies
that combine requirements on users’ attributes with requirements on the number of users
motivated by separation of duty considerations.
Furthermore, while policy speciﬁcation and analysis has been a main research area in
access control for several decades, almost all existing work focuses on properties which
ensure that users who should not have access do not get access. Such focus on safety
properties probably stems from the fact that access control has been mostly viewed as
a tool for restricting access. However, an equally important aspect of access control is
to enable access (selectively). In this dissertation, we introduce the notion of resiliency2
policies for access control systems, which require an access control system to be resilient
to the absence of users.
Both SoD policies and resiliency policies are high-level security policies. They state
an overall requirement without referring to individual steps in the task. High-level secu-
rity policies are enforced by lower-level schemes such as workﬂow authorization systems
and the delegation of users’ privileges. Workﬂows are used in numerous domains, includ-
ing production, purchase order processing, and various management tasks. A workﬂow
divides a task into a set of well-deﬁned sub-tasks (called steps here). Workﬂow autho-
rization systems manage access control in workﬂows and have gained popularity in the
research community [4–8]. Security policies in workﬂow authorization systems are usu-
ally speciﬁed using authorization constraints. One may specify, for each step, which users
are authorized to perform it. In addition, one may specify the constraints between users
who perform different steps in the workﬂow. For example, one may require that two steps
must be performed by different users for the purpose of separation of duty [2]. For another
example, one may need two steps be performed by the same user so to enforce binding of
duty policies [6]. As we can see in the two examples, equality and inequality are two binary
relations widely used in constraints of workﬂow authorization systems. In this dissertation,
we introduce and study more complex workﬂow constraints that support user-deﬁned bi-
nary relations, such as “be supervisor of” and “no conﬂict of interests”.
We have discussed workﬂow authorization system as a mechanism to enforce high-
level security policies, such as SoD policies. To enforce resiliency policies, one may intro-
duce enough redundancy of human resources in the system conﬁguration. An alternative
approach is to use user-to-user delegation (or delegation for short). Delegation is a mech-
anism that allows a user A to act on another user B’s behalf by making B’s access rights
available to A. It is well recognized as an important mechanism to provide fault-tolerance
and ﬂexibility in access control systems, and has gained popularity in the research commu-
nity [9–17].
Essentially, a delegation operation temporarily changes the access control state so as
to allow a user to use another user’s access privileges. While delegation can make an3
access control system more resilient to the absence of users, it may lead to violation of
security policies, especially static separation of duty policies. For instance, if role r1 and
role r2 are mutually exclusive, then a user who is a member of r1 should not be allowed to
receive r2 from others through delegation. In contrast to normal access right administration
operations, which are performed centrally, delegation operations are usually performed in a
distributed manner. That is to say, users have certain control on the delegation of their own
rights. As we will see in Section 5.1.1, delegation may introduce security breaches into an
access control system, which allow colluding users to circumvent security policies. Due to
the decentralized nature of delegation and the fact that not all the users in the system are
trusted, collusion is a threat that must not be overlooked. In this dissertation, we study the
security impact of delegation on access control systems in detail.
Thesis Statement
The goal of this dissertation is to improve the state-of-the-art of access control policy
management. More speciﬁcally, our goal is to design new types of access control policies
that are useful in practice, propose formal languages to specify such policies, and study
effective mechanisms to enforce such policies.
Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
 We propose a novel algebra that enables the speciﬁcation of high-level security poli-
cies that combine qualiﬁcation requirements with quantity requirements. Our alge-
bra contains six operators and is expressive enough to specify many natural high-
level security policies. For example, the term (AccountanttTreasurer)+ requires
that all participants must be either an Accountant or a Treasurer; while the term
((Physician t Nurse) 
 (Manager ^ :Accountant)) requires two different users,
one of who is either a Physician or a Nurse, and the other is a Manager but not4
an Accountant. We study the algebraic properties of the algebra, as well as several
computational problems related to the algebra.
 We formally deﬁne resiliency policies, which require an access control system to be
resilient to the absence of users. In its general form, a resiliency policy states that
upon removal of any s users, there should still exist d disjoint sets of users such that
the users in each set together possess certain permissions of interest. We study com-
putational problems on checking whether an access control state satisﬁes a resiliency
policy. We study the consistency between resiliency policies and separation of duty
policies.
 We propose the role-and-relation-based access control (R2BAC) model for workﬂow
authorization systems. In R2BAC, in addition to a user’s role memberships, the user’s
relationships with other users help determine whether the user is allowed to perform
a certain step in a workﬂow. For example, a constraint may require that two steps
must not be performed by users who have conﬂicts of interests. R2BAC is a natural
step beyond Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [18], especially in the setting of
workﬂows. As a role deﬁnes a set of users, which can be viewed as a unary relation
among the set of all users, a binary relation is the natural next step.
 We study fundamental problems in workﬂow authorization systems, such as deter-
mining whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow and checking whether a
workﬂow is resilient to the absence of users. In particular, we apply tools from pa-
rameterized complexity theory to better understand the complexities of some of these
problems.
 We study the impact of delegation on the security of workﬂow authorization systems.
We formally deﬁne the notion of security with respect to delegation and propose
mechanisms to enforce delegation security in workﬂow authorization systems. We
also discuss how to use delegation to meet resiliency requirements.5
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose an algebra for
high-level security policy speciﬁcation. In Chapter 3, we introduce the notion of resiliency
policy for access control systems. We then study the satisﬁability and resiliency problems
in workﬂow authorization systems in Chapter 4. After that, we study delegation, which is
an important mechanism to enforce delegation, in Chapter 5. Finally, we discuss related
work in Chapter 6 and conclude in Chapter 7.6
2 AN ALGEBRA FOR HIGH-LEVEL ACCESS CONTROL
POLICY SPECIFICATION
As the focus of the ﬁrst step of secure task design, a high-level access control policy (or
equivalently, a high-level security policy) states an overall requirement that must be satis-
ﬁed by any set of users that together complete a task. As stated in Chapter 1, a well-known
high-level security policy is Separation of Duty (SoD), which requires the cooperation of
at least k different users to complete a task.
In many situations, however, it is not enough to require only that k different users be
involved in a sensitive task; there are also minimal qualiﬁcation requirements for these
users. For example, one may want to require users involved in a task to be physicians,
certiﬁed nurses, certiﬁed accountants, or directors of a company. Partly due to the lack of
a concise-yet-expressive language for specifying such high-level security policies, people
usually skip the formal speciﬁcation of high-level security policies (perhaps expressing
high-level security policies in a natural language) and specify qualiﬁcation requirements at
the level of enforcement mechanism. For example, if a designer believes that a task should
involve a manager and two clerks, she may create a workﬂow with three steps and require
two clerks to each perform Step 1 and Step 3, and a manager to perform Step 2.
However, formal speciﬁcation of high-level security policies provides a number of im-
portant advantages. First of all, formal speciﬁcation minimizes the possibility of misunder-
standing between policy designers and system designers. Using a natural language could
lead to ambiguity and misinterpretation, and are thus inappropriate to specify security poli-
cies, as a ﬂaw in a policy could lead to major security breaches. Second, formal spec-
iﬁcation facilitates the analysis of security policies. Given a formal policy speciﬁcation
language, we may develop tools to analyze formally-speciﬁed policies, such as checking
whether certain groups of users satisfy a policy, so as to detect policies that are too restric-
tive or too permissive when compared to actual needs in practice. It is beneﬁcial to detect7
design ﬂaws at an early stage, because low-level enforcement schemes, which contain exe-
cution details of tasks, are usually more difﬁcult to analyze than high-level policies. As we
will see in Example 2 in Section 5.2.2, low-level enforcement schemes such as workﬂows
with security constraints may involve other factors in addition to security requirements,
which complicates the analysis on those enforcement schemes. Finally, formal speciﬁca-
tion of high-level policies allows us to develop tools to verify whether a low-level enforce-
ment scheme is compliant with a high-level security policy. For example, a workﬂow may
contain branches and loops; it is important to verify that no route in the workﬂow bypasses
the high-level security policy. As manual veriﬁcation is time-consuming and error-prone,
formal veriﬁcation tools are highly desirable.
In this chapter, we introduce a novel algebra that enables the formal speciﬁcation of
high-level policies that combine qualiﬁcation requirements with quantity requirements mo-
tivated by separation of duty considerations. A term in our algebra speciﬁes a require-
ment on sets of users (we call these usersets). A high-level policy, which associates a
task with a term in the algebra, requires that all sets of users that complete an instance
of the task satisfy the term. Our algebra has four binary operators: t;u;;
, and two
unary operators :;+. An SoD policy that requires 3 different users can be expressed using
the term (All 
 All 
 All), where All is a keyword that refers to the set of all users. A
policy that requires either a manager or two different clerks is expressed using the term
(Manager t (Clerk 
 Clerk)).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the syntax and
semantics of the algebra in Section 2.1. We then discuss different enforcement mechanisms
for policies speciﬁed in the algebra in Section 2.2. In Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, we study
computational problems related to analysis and enforcement of policies. In Section 2.6, we
discuss extensions to the syntax of the algebra, the relationship between the algebra and
regular expressions, as well as limitations of the expressive power of the algebra. Proofs
not included in the main body are included in the appendices unless otherwise stated.8
2.1 The Algebra
In this section, we introduce an algebra for expressing high-level security policies.
2.1.1 Syntax, Semantics, and Examples
In our deﬁnition of the algebra, we use the notion of roles. We use a role to denote a
set of users that have some common qualiﬁcation or common job responsibility. We em-
phasize, however, that the algebra is not restricted to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
systems [18]. In our algebra, a role is simply a named set of users. The notion of roles can
be replaced by groups or user attributes. We use U to denote the set of all users, and R to
denote the set of all roles.
Deﬁnition 2.1.1 (Terms in the Algebra) Terms in the algebra are deﬁned as follows:
 An atomic term takes one of the following three forms: a role r 2 R, the keyword
All, or a set S  U of users.
 An atomic term is a unit term; furthermore, if 1 and 2 are unit terms, then :1,
(1 u 2) and (1 t 2) are also unit terms.
 A unit term is a term; if  is a unit term, then + is a term; if 1 and 2 are terms,
then (1 t 2), (1 u 2), (1 
 2), and (1  2) are also terms.
The unary operator : has the highest priority, followed by the unary operator +, then by
the four binary operators (namely u, t, , 
), which have the same priority.
We now give several simple example terms to illustrate the intuition behind the oper-
ators in the algebra. The term “(Manager u Accountant)” requires a user that is both a
Manager and an Accountant. The term “(Manageru:fAlice;Bobg)” requires a user that
is a manager, but is neither Alice nor Bob; here, the sub-term “:fAlice;Bobg” implements
a blacklist. The term “(Physician t Nurse)” requires a user that is either a Physician
or a Nurse. The term “(Manager  Clerk)” requires a user who is a Manager and a user9
who is a Clerk; in particular, when one user is both a Manager and a Clerk, that user by
himself also satisﬁes the requirement. The term “((All
All)
All)” requires three different
users. The keyword All allows us to refer to the set of all users. The term “Accountant+”
requires a set of one or more users, where each user in the set is an Accountant.
To formally assign meanings to terms, we need to ﬁrst assign meanings to the roles
used in the term. For this, we introduce the notion of conﬁgurations.
Deﬁnition 2.1.2 (Conﬁgurations) A conﬁguration is given by a pair hU;URi, where U
denotes the set of all users in the conﬁguration, and UR  U  R determines role mem-
berships. When (u;r) 2 UR, we say that u is a member of the role r.
Note that in a conﬁguration hU;URi, UR should not be confused with the user-role
assignmentrelationUAinRBAC.WhenanRBACsystemhasbothUAandarolehierarchy
RH, the two relations UA and RH together determine UR.
When describing the UR relation, we often use Ur to denote the set of users assigned
to role r, i.e. Ur = fu j (u;r) 2 URg.
Deﬁnition 2.1.3 (Satisfaction of a Term) Given a conﬁguration hU;URi, we say that a
userset X  U satisﬁes a term  under hU;URi if and only if one of the following holds1:
 The term  is the keyword All, and X is a singleton set fug such that u 2 U.
 The term  is a role r, and X is a singleton set fug such that (u;r) 2 UR.
 The term  is a set S of users, and X is a singleton set fug such that u 2 S.
 The term  is of the form :0 where 0 is a unit term, and X is a singleton set that
does not satisfy 0.
 The term  is of the form 
+
0 where 0 is a unit term, and X is a nonempty userset
such that for every u 2 X, fug satisﬁes 0.
 The term  is of the form (1 t 2), and either X satisﬁes 1 or X satisﬁes 2.
1We sometimes say X satisﬁes , and omit “under hU;URi” when the conﬁguration is clear from the context.10
 The term  is of the form (1 u 2), and X satisﬁes both 1 and 2.
 The term  is of the form (1 
 2), and there exist usersets X1 and X2 such that
X1 [ X2 = X, X1 \ X2 = ;, X1 satisﬁes 1, and X2 satisﬁes 2.
 The term  is of the form (1  2), and there exist usersets X1 and X2 such that
X1 [ X2 = X, X1 satisﬁes 1, and X2 satisﬁes 2. This differs from the deﬁnition
for 
 in that it does not require X1 \ X2 = ;.
For example, given the term (Manager  Clerk), and the conﬁguration hU =
fAlice;Bobg; URi, in which UR is such that: UManager = fAliceg and UClerk =
fAlice;Bobg, we have fAliceg satisﬁes the term and fAlice,Bob g also satisﬁes the term.
Intuitively, a conﬁguration hU;URi represents the access control state of an organiza-
tional unit, a term  deﬁnes the security requirement of a sensitive task T, and X  U
is a set of users in the organizational unit who are about to perform T. X satisfying 
indicates that the set of users meet the security requirement of T. Also, it is clear from
Deﬁnition 2.1.3 that no term can be satisﬁed by an empty set.
The following examples help illustrate that one can express sophisticated policies in the
algebra.
 fAlice;Bob;Carlg 
 fAlice;Bob;Carlg
This term is satisﬁed by any two users out of the list of three.
 (Accountant t Treasurer)+
This term requires that all participants must be either an Accountant or a
Treasurer. But there is no restriction on the number of participants except that
the number is non-zero.
 ((Manager  Accountant) 
 Treasurer)
This term is satisﬁed by a userset consisting of a Manager, an Accountant, and a
Treasurer; the ﬁrst two requirements can be satisﬁed by a single user.11
 ((Physician t Nurse) 
 (Manager u :Accountant))
This term is satisﬁed by a userset consisting of two different users, one of who is
either a Physician or a Nurse, and the other is a Manager, but not an Accountant.
 ((Manager  Accountant  Treasurer) u (Clerk u :fAlice;Bobg)+)
This term is satisﬁed by a userset consisting of a Manager, an Accountant and a
Treasurer. In addition, everybody in the userset must be a Clerk and must not be
Alice or Bob.
2.1.2 Satisfaction Trees
When a userset X satisﬁes a term  under a conﬁguration hU;URi, some subterms of
 are satisﬁed by subsets of X. We formalize this by the notion of a satisfaction tree. A
satisfaction tree serves as an evidence of X satisfying  that can be easily veriﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2.1.4 (Satisfaction Tree) Given a term  and a conﬁguration hU;URi, we say
that T is a satisfaction tree of  under hU;URi if and only if the following three conditions
hold.
1. T is a syntax tree of , where each inner node of T denotes a binary operator in ,
and each leaf node denotes a sub-term of  that is either a unit term or takes the form

+
0 . That is, sub-terms of the form 
+
0 are not not further decomposed in T and are
represented as leaves.
2. Each node N in T is labeled with a (possibly empty) set of users, which is denoted
as LT(N), and the following rules hold for every node N in T. We denote N1 and
N2 as the left and right children of N, respectively.
 When N is a leaf node representing a unit term 0: either LT(N) = ; or
LT(N) = fug satisﬁes 0 under hU;URi.
 When N is a leaf node representing a sub-term 
+
0 : either LT(N) = ; or
LT(N) = X satisﬁes 
+
0 under hU;URi.12
 When N represents t: either (LT(N) = LT(N1)^LT(N2) = ;) or (LT(N) =
LT(N2) ^ LT(N1) = ;).
 When N represents u: LT(N) = LT(N1) = LT(N2).
 When N represents : LT(N) = LT(N1) [ LT(N2), and (LT(N) 6= ;) )
(LT(N1) 6= ; ^ LT(N2) 6= ;), where ) denote logic implication.
 When N represents 
: LT(N) = LT(N1) [ LT(N2), LT(N1) \ LT(N2) = ;,
and (LT(N) 6= ;) ) (LT(N1) 6= ; ^ LT(N2) 6= ;).
3. LT(Nr) 6= ;, where Nr is the root of the tree T.
According to the conditions in the above deﬁnition, it can be easily shown that
LT(N)  LT(N0), when N0 is an ancestor of N in the satisfaction tree T.
Intuitively, in a satisfaction tree T, a node is either labeled with a userset that satisﬁes
the sub-term represented by the sub-tree of T rooted at the node, or labeled with ;, indicat-
ing that the node is in a branch connected by t and the sub-term represented by that branch
does not need to be satisﬁed (because the other branch is satisﬁed). The following lemma
formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 2.1.1 Let T be a satisfaction tree of  under hU;URi, for each node N in T, if
LT(N) 6= ;, then LT(N) satisﬁes the sub-term of  represented by the sub-tree of T rooted
at N.
The following theorem relates the existence of a satisfaction tree for a term  with the
satisﬁability of .
Theorem 2.1.2 Given a conﬁguration hU;URi and a term , a userset X satisﬁes  under
hU;URi if and only if there exists a satisfaction tree of  such that LT(Nr) = X, where
Nr is the root of T.
The proofs of Lemma 2.1.1 and Theorem 2.1.2 are given in Appendix A.1.13
2.1.3 Evaluating a Term to a Set of Usersets
Given a conﬁguration hU;URi and a term ,  may be satisﬁed by multiple usersets,
thus we can say that  evaluates to a set of usersets.
Deﬁnition 2.1.5 (Value of a Term) Given a conﬁguration hU;URi and a term ,
ShU;URi() denotes the set of all usersets that satisfy  under hU;URi, and is called the
value of term  under the conﬁguration.
Example 1 Consider the term  = ((Manager  Accountant 
Treasurer) u (Clerk u :fAlice;Bobg)+) and the conﬁguration hU =
fAlice;Bob;Carl;Doris;Elaine;Frankg; URi, in which UR is such that:
UManager = fAlice;Doris;Elaineg
UAccountant = fDoris;Frankg
UTreasurer = fBob;Carl;Dorisg
UClerk = fAlice;Bob;Carl;Doris;Frankg:
The sub-term (Clerk u :fAlice;Bobg)+ blacklists Alice and Bob so that only subsets of
fCarl;Doris;Frankg may satisfy . We have
ShU;URi() = f fDorisg; fCarl;Dorisg; fDoris;Frankg;fCarl;Doris;Frankg g
That is, there are four usersets that satisfy the term .
2.1.4 Algebraic Properties
We now introduce the notion of equivalence among terms, which enables us to study
the algebraic properties of the operators in the algebra.
Deﬁnition 2.1.6 (Term Equivalence) We say that two terms 1 and 2 are equivalent (de-
noted by 1  2) when for every userset X and every conﬁguration hU;URi, X satisﬁes
1 under hU;URi if and only if X satisﬁes 2 under hU;URi. In other words, 1  2 if
and only if 8hU;URi

ShU;URi(1) = ShU;URi(2)

.14
Using a straightforward induction on the structure of terms, one can show that if 1 
2, then, for any term  in which 1 occurs, let 0 be the term obtained by replacing in 
one or more occurrences of 1 with 2, we have   0.
Theorem 2.1.3 The operators have the following algebraic properties:
1. The operators t;u;;
 are commutative and associative. That is, for each op 2
ft;u;;
g, and any terms 1, 2, and 3, we have (1 op 2)  (2 op 1) and
((1 op 2) op 3)  (1 op (2 op 3)).
2. The operators t and u distribute over each other. That is, (1 t (2 u 3))  ((1 t
2) u (1 t 3)) and (1 u (2 t 3))  ((1 u 2) t (1 u 3)).
3. The operator  distributes over t. That is, (1(2t3))  ((12)t(13)).
4. The operator 
 distributes over t. That is, (1
(2t3))  ((1
2)t(1
3)).
5. No other ordered pair of binary operators has the distributive property. (There are 12
such pairs altogether; the four of them listed above have the distributive property.)
6. (1 u 2)+  (
+
1 u 
+
2 )
7. DeMorgan’s Law: :(1 u 2)  (:1 t :2), :(1 t 2)  (:1 u :2)
See Appendix A.1 for the proof of the above theorem, which also gives a counterexam-
ple for each case that the distributive property does not hold.
Because of the associativity properties, in the rest of this chapter we omit parentheses
in a term when doing so does not cause any confusion.
We now describe some other facts about the operators, to further illustrate the operators
and their relationships.
 Any userset that satisﬁes (1 u 2) also satisﬁes (1 t 2), but not the other way
around.
 Any userset that satisﬁes (1 u 2) also satisﬁes (1  2), but not the other way
around.15
 Any userset that satisﬁes (1 
 2) also satisﬁes (1  2), but not the other way
around.
 Any userset that satisﬁes 
+
1 t 
+
2 also satisﬁes (1 t 2)+, but not the other way
around.
Proofs to the ﬁrst three relationships are straightforward. Here, we prove the last one. If
X satisﬁes (
+
1 t
+
2 ), then X satisﬁes either 
+
1 or 
+
2 . Without loss of generality, assume
that X satisﬁes 
+
1 . Then, for every u 2 X, fug satisﬁes 1 and thus satisﬁes (1 t 2).
Hence, X satisﬁes (1 t 2)+. For the other direction, if fu1g satisﬁes 1 but not 2, and
fu2g satisﬁes 2 but not 1, then fu1;u2g satisﬁes (1 t 2)+ but not 
+
1 t 
+
2 .
2.1.5 Rationale of the Design of the Algebra
We now discuss the rationale underlying some of the decisions we made in designing
the algebra.
Monotonicity. SoD policies satisfy the property of monotonicity; that is, if an SoD policy
requires two users to perform a task, then having three or more users certainly satisﬁes this
policy. Similarly, one may want a security algebra like ours to also satisfy the monotonicity
property; that is, if a userset X satisﬁes a term , then any superset of X also satisﬁes .
McLean [19] adopts this property in his security algebra for N-person policies.
Our algebra is designed to support both monotonic policies and policies that are not
monotonic. For example, the term (Accountant 
 Accountant) can be satisﬁed only by
a set of two users; a set that contains more than two users cannot satisfy the term. More
generally, in Deﬁnition 2.1.3, term satisfaction is deﬁned in such a way that every user in
the userset is used to satisfy certain component of the term. No “extra” user is allowed.
We have considered a design having the monotonicity property, in which we call the
notion of satisfaction in Deﬁnition 2.1.3 “strict satisfaction” and deﬁne that a userset X
satisﬁes a term  if and only if X contains a subset that strictly satisﬁes . We chose our
current design over the one that has the monotonicity property because the current design16
is more expressive. Consider the following example. When one says that “a task requires
two Accountants”, this may mean one of the following three policies:
1. The task must be performed by a set of two users, both of whom are Accountants.
A group containing more (or less) than two people is not allowed.
2. The task must be performed by a set that contains two Accountants. In particular, a
userset that contains two Accountants and a third user who is not an Accountant
is allowed to perform the task.
3. The task must be performed by a set of two or more Accountants. In particular, a
set of three Accountants can perform the task, but a set of two Accountants and
one non-Accountant cannot. This ensures that everyone involved in the task has the
qualiﬁcation of an Accountant.
Policies 1 and 3 cannot be expressed using an algebra that has the monotonicity prop-
erty. Suppose that one tries to use a term  to express policy 1 (or policy 3) in an algebra
that has the monotonicity property, then a set X of two Accountants satisﬁes . By mono-
tonicity property, any superset of X also satisﬁes . This violates the intention of policies 1
and 3. More generally, a monotonic algebra cannot express policies that disqualify usersets
that contain extra users, nor can it express security requirements in the form of “all involved
users must meet certain qualiﬁcation requirements”.
By dropping the monotonicity property, our algebra is able to express all the three
policies. Policy 1 is expressed using the term (Accountant 
 Accountant). Policy 2 is
expressedusingtheterm((Accountant
Accountant)All
+). NotethatthetermAll
+ can
be satisﬁed by any nonempty userset. Policy 3 is expressed using the term (Accountant

Accountant+).
Restrictionson“:”and“+”. Thesyntaxofouralgebra(Deﬁnition2.1.1)restrictsthatthe
twooperators“:”and“+”beappliedonlytounitterms, i.e., thosetermsthatdonotcontain
, 
, or +. The motivation for this design decision is the psychological acceptability
principle [3]. We would like each operator to have a clear and intuitive meaning so that17
when one writes down a policy as a term, there is less chance to make mistakes and one is
more conﬁdent that the term expresses the intended policy.
When : is applied to a unit term, it expresses negative qualiﬁcation about a single user;
this has a clear meaning; the term :0 means a user that does not satisfy 0. However,
if : is applied to a term that involves , 
, or +; then the meaning becomes less clear.
Consider the term :(Accountant  Manager). Any userset of size three does not satisfy
(Accountant  Manager); therefore, it should satisfy :(Accountant  Manager), even
if every user in the userset is both an Accountant and a Manager. It is unclear to us what
kind of real-world security policies such a term expresses.
The term 
+
0 , when 0 is a unit term, has a clear meaning; it means that every user must
satisfy 0. The same term, when 0 involves operators such as  and 
, has at least two
possible meanings. One is to interpret + as the closure operator of , that is, a userset X
satisﬁes 
+
0 if and only if X can be divided into a number of (possibly overlapping) subsets
such that each subset satisﬁes 0. The other is to interpret + as the closure operator for 
,
that is, a userset X satisﬁes 
+
0 if and only if X can be divided into a number of mutually
disjoint subsets such that each subset satisﬁes 0. The two meanings coincide when 0
is a unit term. We could use two operators, one for each meaning, and allow them to be
applied to non-unit terms. However, this adds complexity to the algebra and we have not
seen a need for this. For simplicity and usability, we chose to allow + only be applied to
unit terms. The algebra can be extended to have two closure operators that can be applied
to non-unit terms, if a need for them arises in other application domains.
2.2 Enforcing Policies Speciﬁed in the Algebra
Once a high-level security policy has been speciﬁed in the algebra, we may proceed to
enforcement design step. Before doing so, it is beneﬁcial to perform certain analyses on
the high-level policy to detect design ﬂaws at an early stage.
A basic level of sanity check is to determine whether a term is satisﬁable at all, as a term
that cannot be satisﬁed in any conﬁguration is probably not what a policy author intended.18
We deﬁne the Term Satisﬁability (TSAT) problem for such an analysis. A problem similar
to TSAT is the Term-Conﬁguration Satisﬁability (TCSAT) problem, which asks whether a
term is satisﬁable under a given conﬁguration. This is useful when determining whether a
term is meaningful in the current conﬁguration of an organization. Formal deﬁnitions of
TSAT and TCSAT are given in below, and we will study their computational complexity in
Section 2.3.
Deﬁnition 2.2.1 (TSAT) Given a term , the Term Satisﬁability (TSAT) problem deter-
mines whether there exists a conﬁguration hU;URi and a userset X such that X satisﬁes 
under hU;URi.
Deﬁnition 2.2.2 (TCSAT) Given a term  and a conﬁguration hU;URi, the Term-
Conﬁguration Satisﬁability (TCSAT) problem determines whether there exists a userset X
that satisﬁes  under hU;URi.
Besides basic sanity checks on satisﬁability, it is useful to select a number of targeted
usersets and determine whether these usersets satisfy the term. If a set of users who are
expected to perform the task guarded by the policy does not satisfy the term, the policy
is too restrictive; if a set of users who should not be able to perform the task satisﬁes
the term, the policy is too permissive. In either case, the policy is ﬂawed and must be
redesigned. We deﬁne the Userset-Term Satisfaction (UTS) problem for such an analysis.
The computational complexity of UTS will be studied in Section 2.4.
Deﬁnition 2.2.3 (UTS) Given a term , a conﬁguration hU;URi, and a userset X, the
Userset-Term Satisfaction (UTS) problem determines whether X satisﬁes  under hU;URi.
It is worth mentioning that UTS and TCSAT are related problems: given a conﬁgura-
tion and a term, UTS is a decisional problem which asks whether a given userset satisﬁes
the term, while TCSAT can be solved by searching for a userset in the conﬁguration that
satisﬁes the term.
If a high-level security policy passes all the tests, we need to enforce the policy cor-
rectly. A high-level security policy can be enforced statically or dynamically. In static en-
forcement, one ensures that in a conﬁguration, any set of users who together have enough19
permissions to perform the task satisfy the high-level policy. In dynamic enforcement, one
records the history of who performs which steps in a task instance and determines whether
the set of users involved in the task instance satisﬁes the policy. In the rest of this section,
we discuss these two enforcement approaches.
2.2.1 Static Enforcement
Static enforcement can be achieved either directly or indirectly. In direct static en-
forcement, one veriﬁes whether an access control state is safe with respect to a high-level
security policy. In indirect static enforcement, one speciﬁes constraints so that any access
control state satisfying the constraints is safe with respect to the policy.
Direct static enforcement of SoD policies, which are a subclass of the policies that
can be speciﬁed in the algebra, has been studied in [20]. It has been shown that checking
whether an access control state statically satisﬁes an SoD policy, i.e., whether every set of
users who together have all the permissions for the task contains at least k users, is coNP-
complete [20]. As SoD policies can be speciﬁed in the algebra, direct statement enforce-
ment of policies in the algebra requires solving an intractable problem. Computationally
expense notwithstanding, we argue that the study of direct enforcement of static high-level
policies is necessary for the following reasons. First, direct static enforcement is the most
simpleandstraightforwardenforcementmechanismforhigh-levelsecuritypolicies. Itsper-
formance will be used as a benchmark for comparison when evaluating other enforcement
mechanisms. Second, even though direct static enforcement is computationally intractable
in theory, it is interesting and necessary to study its performance for instances that are
likely to occur in practice. Third, direct enforcement cannot be entirely replaced by indi-
rect enforcement. It is oftentimes difﬁcult or even impossible to create efﬁciently-veriﬁable
constraints to precisely capture a high-level policy. For example, Li et al. studied indirect
enforcement by using Static Mutually Exclusive Roles (SMER) to enforce SoD policies in
the context of role-based access control (RBAC), and showed that there exist SoD policies
such that no set of SMER constraints can precisely capture them [20]. Most of the time, the20
set of constraints created for a security policy is more restrictive than the policy itself. That
is to say, some access control states that are safe with respect to the security policy will
be ruled out by the constraints. In situations where precise enforcement is desired, direct
enforcement may be the only option.
Direct static enforcement requires solving the Static Safety Checking (SSC) problem,
which we formally deﬁne through the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2.2.4 (State) An access control system state is given by a triple hU;UR;UPi,
where UR  U  R determines user-role memberships and UP  U  P determines
user-permission assignment, where P is the set of all permissions.
Note that a state hU;UR;UPi uniquely determines a conﬁguration hU;URi used by
term satisfaction. Hence, we may discuss term satisfaction in a state without explicitly
mentioning the corresponding conﬁguration. Note also that a user may be assigned a per-
mission directly or indirectly (e.g. via role membership), and the relation UP has taken
both ways into consideration.
We say that a userset X covers a set P of permissions if and only if the following holds:
f p j 9u 2 X[(u;p) 2 UP]g  P:
Next, we deﬁne the notion of safety in direct static enforcement. As we mentioned
earlier, the idea of static enforcement is that, by careful design of access control states, one
can guarantee that every set of users who together have enough permissions to complete
a task satisﬁes the security policy of the task, and thus runtime checking is unnecessary.
While introducing no runtime overhead, static enforcement has a limitation, that is, only
monotonic security policies can be enforced statically. The reason is that permission cover-
age is monotonic with respect to usersets. In other words, if X covers P, then any superset
of X also covers P. However, as we emphasized in Section 2.1.5, term satisfaction does
not have the monotonicity property. In order to specify monotonic policies, we may use
terms in the form of (  All
+). A userset U satisﬁes (  All
+) if and only if U contains
a subset that satisﬁes .21
When static enforcement is the only enforcement approach, all policies need to be im-
plicitly monotonic to be enforceable. We thus introduce the notion of static safety, which
implicitly assumes each term means its monotonic closure.
Deﬁnition 2.2.5 (Static Safety) A high-level security policy is given as a pair sphP;i,
where P  P is a set of permissions and  is a term in the algebra. An access control state
hU;UR;UPi is statically safe with respect to sphP;i, if and only if, for every userset X
that covers P, X satisﬁes the monotonic closure of  (i.e. X satisﬁes (All
+)). If a state
is statically safe with respect to a policy, we say that it satisﬁes the policy.
Note that in the above deﬁnition, we require that, for each userset X that covers P, X
satisﬁes the monotonic closure of  rather than  itself. Equivalently, an access control
state is statically safe with respect to sphP;i if and only if for every userset X that covers
P, there exists X0  X, such that X0 satisﬁes .
The problem of checking static safety is deﬁned as follows; its computational complex-
ity will be studied in Section 2.5.1.
Deﬁnition 2.2.6 (SSC) Given a static safety policy sphP;i, the problem of determining
whether a given state hU;UR;UPi is statically safe with respect to sphP;i is called the
Static Safety Checking (SSC) problem.
Note also that Deﬁnition 2.2.5 does not require hU;UR;UPi to contain a userset that
covers P in sphP;i. If a state does not contain any userset that covers P, then it trivially
satisﬁes sphP;i. Checking whether there exists a userset in hU;UR;UPi that covers P
can be done in linear time with respect to the size of UP.
To check static safety, one needs to determine whether a set of users contains a subset
that satisfy a term. This problem is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2.7 (SAFE) Given a term , a conﬁguration hU;URi, and a userset X, a user-
set X is safe with respect to a term  under conﬁguration hU;URi, if and only if there exists
X0  X such that X0 satisﬁes  under hU;URi.
The Userset-Term Safety (SAFE) problem determines whether X is safe with respect to
a term  under conﬁguration hU;URi.22
SAFE can be viewed as a special case of UTS, because X is safe with respect to  if and
only if X satisﬁes (All
+); however, it may be solved more efﬁciently when treated as a
separate problem. The computational complexity of SAFE will be studied in Section 2.5.
We point out that SAFE is technically the same problem as TCSAT, even though they
are motivated by different purposes. In SAFE, we ask whether a userset X contains a sub-
set that satisﬁes  under hU;URi, where X  U. Since users in U=X are irrelevant in
answering such a question, the problem is equivalent to whether X contains a subset that
satisﬁes  under hX;URi, which is the same as whether there is a userset in the conﬁgura-
tion hX;URi that satisﬁes .
As we mentioned earlier, static enforcement can only enforce security policies with
the monotonicity property. To enforce non-monotonic policies, we may use a dynamic
enforcement scheme.
2.2.2 Dynamic Enforcement
Similar to static enforcement, dynamic enforcement can be achieved either directly or
indirectly as well.
To directly enforce a policy htask;i, one identiﬁes the steps in performing the task.
The system maintains a history of each instance of the task, which includes information
on who have performed which steps. For any task instance, one can compute the set of
users (denoted as Upast) who have performed at least one step of the instance. Before
a user u performs a step of the instance, the system checks to ensure that there exists a
superset of Upast [ fug that can satisfy  upon ﬁnishing all steps of the task. In particular,
if u is about to perform the last step of the task instance, it is required by the policy that
Upast[fug satisﬁes . As we will see in Section 2.4, checking whether a userset satisﬁes a
term is computationally expensive. In practice, people usually use workﬂows with security
constraints to indirectly enforce high-level security policies.
In the rest of this section, we give an example of the secure task design process. The
example demonstrates how to use a workﬂow as an indirect dynamic enforcement scheme23
for a high-level security policy speciﬁed in the algebra. We would like to point out that
in the design of workﬂows, a designer may take efﬁciency, quality of service, and other
practical restrictions into account in addition to security requirements.
Example 2 Company XYZ newly established a plan to share some of its classiﬁed docu-
ments with its business partners. As the task (denoted as Ts) involves disclosure of clas-
siﬁed documents, it is considered to be sensitive by XYZ and has to go through a security
design procedure. The ﬁrst step is the high-level policy design, which is performed by a
security ofﬁcer Alice. After evaluating the risks and effects of Ts, Alice decides that at least
two Managers must be involved in the task. She then creates a high-level security policy
(Manager 
 Manager)  All
+ for Ts.
The second step is to design a workﬂow to model Ts in compliance with the high-
level security policy. This is performed by a system designer Bob. Ts consists of four
physical steps: 1) a business partner coordinator (denoted as Coordinator) receives a
request from a business partner; 2) a document administrator (denoted as DocAdmin) re-
trieves the document from company archives; 3) a DocAdmin performs pre-releasing prepa-
ration on the document, such as anonymizing certain items; 4) a Coordinator sends
the post-preparation document to the business partner. To begin with, Bob creates a
workﬂow W1 with the four physical steps of Ts, which is shown in Figure 2.1-a. He
then introduces two additional steps into W1 so as to comply with the security policy
(Manager 
 Manager)  All
+. He adds two steps to W1 so that a classiﬁed document
will not be retrieved until two Managers have approved the request on disclosure. Further-
more, in order to provide better quality of service, Bob adds a binding of duty constraint
to the workﬂow so that the coordinator who received the request is responsible to send
the document to the business partner. The ﬁnal workﬂow W2 modeling Ts is shown in
Figure 2.1-b. It can be veriﬁed that any team of users who completes W2 must satisfy
(Manager 
 Manager)  All
+.
It is interesting future work to study how to verify whether a workﬂow is compliant
with a high-level security policy speciﬁed in the algebra. In the upcoming sections, we will24
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a.    A workflow (W1) consisting of physical steps of the task on releasing classified documents to 
corporate  partners.    Request  and  Send  are  authorized  to  the  role  Coordinator,  while 
Retrieval and Preparation are authorized to DocAdmin. 
Constraint 1: Approve_A and Approve_B must be performed by different users 
Constraint 2: Request and Send must be performed by the same user 
b.    A  workflow  (W2)  consisting  of  physical  steps,  security-oriented  steps  and  constraints  in 
compliance with a high-level security policy.    Approve_A and Approve_B are authorized to 
Manager and may be performed in parallel.    Constraint 2 is specified for the purpose of 
quality of service. 
Figure 2.1. Workﬂows in Example 2
study the computational problems (i.e. TSAT, TCSAT, UTS, SAFE and SSC) deﬁned in
thissection. Aswehaveseen, theseproblemsareimportantintheanalysisandenforcement
of high-level security policies, and are of both theoretical and practical interest.
2.3 Two Term Satisﬁability Problems
In this section, we study the computational complexities of TSAT and TCSAT.
2.3.1 The Term Satisﬁability (TSAT) Problem
As the algebra supports negation, it is not surprising that unsatisﬁable terms exist.
A simple example of a term that is not satisﬁable is (r u :r). Another source of un-
satisﬁable terms is the use of explicit sets of users in a term. For example, the term
(fAlice;Bobg u fCarlg) is not satisﬁable. However, even if a term does not contain nega-25
tion or explicit sets of users, it may still be unsatisﬁable. An example of such a term is
 = (r1 u(r2 
 r3)), where r1;r2 and r3 are roles. In the example, r1 is satisﬁable only by
a singleton userset, and (r2
r3) is satisﬁable only by a userset of cardinality 2. Therefore,
there does not exist a userset that satisﬁes .
We now show that TSAT is NP-complete in general. We identify the source of
intractability by identifying two special cases that are NP-hard. One special case
(Lemma 2.3.1 below) involves the negation operator, and the other (Lemma 2.3.2 below)
involves explicit sets of users. In Section 2.3.2, we show that for terms that are free of
negation and explicit sets of users, TSAT can be efﬁciently solved.
Lemma 2.3.1 TSAT over terms built using only roles and the operators :, u, and t is
NP-hard.
Lemma 2.3.2 TSAT over terms built using only explicit sets of users and the operators u,
t, and  is NP-hard.
To show that TSAT is in NP, we need the following lemma, which shows that if a term
is satisﬁable, then there exists an evidence of polynomial size.
Lemma 2.3.3 If a term  is satisﬁable, then there exists a userset U and a conﬁguration
hU;URi, such that U satisﬁes  under hU;URi, jUj  jj and jURj  jj2, where jj is
the number of occurrences of atomic terms in .
Theorem 2.3.4 TSAT is NP-complete.
Please refer to Appendix A.2 for the proofs of Lemmas 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and Theo-
rem 2.3.4.
2.3.2 TSAT for the Sub-Algebra Free of Negation and Explicit Sets of Users
Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show that if a term involves negation or explicit sets of users,
then determining whether it is satisﬁable or not may be intractable. We now study the26
term satisﬁability problem for terms that are free of explicit sets of users and negation. For
convenience, we call such terms SNF (Set-and-Negation Free) terms. The following lemma
states an important property of terms that are free of negation.
Lemma 2.3.5 Let  be a term that does not contain the operator :. If userset X satisﬁes
 under conﬁguration hU;URi, then X satisﬁes  under conﬁguration hU;UR
0i, where
UR  UR
0.
Lemma 2.3.5 essentially states that, for terms that are free of negation, satisfaction is
monotonic with respect to user-role assignment. The proof of the lemma is straightforward
and is omitted.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.6 Checking whether an SNF term is satisﬁable is in P.
To prove Theorem 2.3.6, we ﬁrst introduce the notion of characteristic sets for SNF
terms in Deﬁnition 2.3.1. Deﬁnition 2.3.1 essentially gives an algorithm to compute the
characteristic set of a given SNF term. Then, we show that the algorithm given in Def-
inition 2.3.1 is a polynomial time algorithm. Finally, we prove an important property of
characteristic set, that is, an SNF term is satisﬁable if and only if its characteristic set is
non-empty. To determine whether an SNF term is satisﬁable, we can run a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute its characteristic set and check whether the characteristic set is
empty or not.
To begin with, we introduce the notion of characteristic sets. A key observation is that,
in order to satisfy a term, a userset must be of certain size. For example, (r1(r2
r3)) can
be satisﬁed by a set of 2 or 3 users, but not by a set containing 1 or 4 or any other number
of users. We thus call f2;3g the characteristic set of the term (r1  (r2 
 r3)).
Deﬁnition 2.3.1 (Characteristic Set) The characteristic set of an SNF term , which is
denoted as C(), is a set of natural numbers computed as follows:
 C(All) = C(r) = f1g, where r is a role27
 C(1 t 2) = C(1) [ C(2)
 C(1 u 2) = C(1) \ C(2)
 C(+) = fi j i 2 [1;1)g, where  is a unit term free of explicit sets of users and
negations
 C(1  2) = fi j 9 c1 2 C(1) 9 c2 2 C(2)[ max(c1;c2)  i  c1 + c2 ]g
 C(1 
 2) = f c1 + c2 j c1 2 C(1) ^ c2 2 C(2) g
An integer k is called a characteristic number of  if and only if k 2 C().
Note that the above deﬁnition states how to compute the characteristic set of a given
SNF term. As examples, we give the characteristic sets of some terms in below.
 C(All 
 All 
 All) = f3g
 C(Manager  Accountant) 
 Treasurer) = f2;3g
The term (Manager  Accountant) can be satisﬁed by two users as well as by a
single user who is both a Manager and an Accountant. An additional user is needed
to satisfy Treasurer.
 C((Clerk t Accountant) 
 (Clerk u Manager)) = f2g
One user is required for (Clerk t Accountant), and for (Clerk u Manager), and
the 
 mandates that the two terms be satisﬁed by different users.
 C((ManagerAccountantTreasurer)uClerk+) = f1;2;3g\fiji 2 [1;1)g =
f1;2;3g
Given a term , computing C() requires at most 2jj   1 steps according to the algo-
rithm in Deﬁnition 2.3.1, where jj is the number of occurrences of atomic terms in  and
 contains jj   1 binary operators. A step in the algorithm may require such operations:
set union, set intersection, computing the sums of all pairs of elements from two different
sets. If the size of intermediate results (which are sets) is bounded by jj, then each step28
can be performed in polynomial time, and thus the algorithm ﬁnishes in polynomial time.
However, when a term contains +, its characteristic set could be an inﬁnite set. Fortunately,
the following Lemma 2.3.7 shows that if C() is an inﬁnite set, it must always contain all
the numbers that are greater than jj. In this case, we do not have to deal with inﬁnitely
many elements in a characteristic set individually, as fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g can be treated
as one unit during computation.
Lemma 2.3.7 Let  be an SNF term and jj be the number of occurrences of atomic terms
in . One of the following two cases holds:
 C()  f1;2;:::;jjg
 C() = W [ fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g, where W  f1;2;:::;jjg
With Lemma 2.3.7, we can prove the following lemma. The proofs of Lemmas 2.3.7
and 2.3.8 are given in Appendix A.2.2.
Lemma 2.3.8 Given an SNF term , C() can be computed in polynomial time with re-
spect to jj.
The following theorem states an important property of characteristic sets.
Theorem 2.3.9 Given an SNF term  and a positive integer k, there exists a userset U of
size k and a conﬁguration such that U satisﬁes  under the conﬁguration, if and only if k is
a characteristic number of  (i.e. k 2 C()).
The proof of Theorem 2.3.9 is given in Appendix A.2.2.
Corollary 2.3.10 An SNF term  is satisﬁable if and only if C() 6= ;
With Lemma 2.3.8 and the above corollary, we can see that TSAT over SNF terms is in
P.
Another usage of characteristic set is to determine whether a term satisﬁes some mini-
mal SoD requirements. If the smallest characteristic number of the term is k, then no k  1
users can satisfy the term.29
Finally, we can extend the notion of characteristic set to non-SNF terms by deﬁning
C(:) = f1g, where  is a unit term, and C(S) = f1g, where S is an explicit set of users.
But in that case, it is no longer true that for every integer k 2 C(), there is a userset
of size k that satisﬁes . For example, C (fAlice;Bobg u fCarlg) = C(fAlice;Bobg) \
C(fCarlg) = f1g, even though the term (fAlice;Bobg u fCarlg) is not satisﬁable. But it
remains true that for any userset X that satisﬁes a term , jXj 2 C().
2.3.3 The Term-Conﬁguration Satisﬁability (TCSAT) Problem
We have discussed the TSAT problem, which asks whether a term is satisﬁable at all.
We now examine the TCSAT problem, which asks whether a term is satisﬁable under a
certainconﬁguration. Whenasecurityofﬁcercomesupwithatermforahigh-levelsecurity
policy of a task, he/she may want to know whether there exists a set of users that satisﬁes
the term and hence is able to perform the task under the current conﬁguration.
Observe that TCSAT is equivalent to TSAT for terms using only explicit sets of users
but not roles or the keyword All. Given an instance of TCSAT, which consists of a term
 and a conﬁguration hU;URi, one can replace each role (or the keyword All) in  with
the corresponding set of users in the conﬁguration, which results in a new term 0. In this
case, 0 is independent of conﬁguration, and  is satisﬁable under hU;URi if and only if
0 is satisﬁable. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 2.3.2 and Theorem 2.3.4 that TCSAT is
NP-complete; this is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.11 TCSAT is NP-complete.
We mentioned earlier that TCSAT is equivalent to SAFE. In Section 2.5 we will ex-
amine the computational complexities of SAFE when only some subsets of operators are
allowed. Those results for SAFE apply to TCSAT as well.30
Table 2.1
Various sub-cases of the Userset Term Satisfaction (UTS) problem and the
corresponding time-complexity
: + t u  
 Complexity Reduction
X X X X X X NP-complete
X X NP-complete Set Covering
X X NP-complete Set Packing
X X NP-complete Set Covering
X X NP-complete Set Covering
X X NP-complete Domatic Number
X X X X P
X X X P
X X X P
2.4 The Userset-Term Satisfaction (UTS) Problem
In this section, we study the computational complexities of the Userset-Term Satisfac-
tion (UTS) problem, which asks: Given a conﬁguration hU;URi, a userset X, and a term
, whether X satisﬁes  under hU;URi? We will show that UTS in the most general case
(i.e., arbitrary terms in which all operators are allowed) is NP-complete. In order to under-
stand how the operators affect the computational complexities, we consider sub-algebras in
which only some subset of the six operators f:;+;u;t;;
g is allowed. For example,
UTSh:;+;t;ui denotes the sub-case of UTS where  does not contain operators  or

, while UTSh
i denotes the sub-case of UTS where 
 is the only kind of operator in
. UTSh:;+;t;u;;
i denotes the general case. Observe that unlike in the case of
TSAT, whether to allow explicit sets of users in a term or not does not affect the computa-
tional complexities of UTS, because a ﬁxed conﬁguration is given in UTS, and one can thus
replace each occurrence of a role in the term with the explicit set of the role’s members.31
Theorem 2.4.1 The computational complexities of UTS and its subcases are given in Ta-
ble 2.1.
The proof of Theorem 2.4.1 is done in two parts. First, in Appendix A.3.1, we prove
that the ﬁve cases UTSht;i, UTShu;i, UTSht;
i, UTShu;
i, and UTSh;
i are
NP-hard by reducing the NP-complete problems SET COVERING, DOMATIC NUMBER,
and SET PACKING to them. Second, in Appendix A.3.2, we prove that the general case
UTSh:;+;t;u;;
i is in NP. In Section 2.4.1, we identify a wide class of syntactically
restricted terms for which the UTS problem is tractable. The class of restricted terms
subsumes all the cases listed as in P in Table 2.1.
2.4.1 UTS is Tractable for Terms in Canonical Forms
From Table 2.1, UTS is NP-complete in all but one sub-algebras that contain at least
two binary operators; however, using any one binary operator by itself remains tractable. In
this subsection, we show that if a term satisﬁes certain syntactic restrictions, then even if all
operators appear in the term, one can still efﬁciently determine whether a userset satisﬁes
the term.
Deﬁnition 2.4.1 (Canonical Forms for Terms) The canonical forms for terms are deﬁned
as follows:
 A term is in level-1 canonical form (called a 1CF term) if it is t or t+, where t is a
unit term. Recall that a unit term can use the operators :, u, and t. We call t the
base of the 1CF term.
 A term is in level-2 canonical form (called a 2CF term) if it consists of one or more
sub-terms that are 1CF terms, and these sub-terms are connected only by the operator
u.
 A term is in level-3 canonical form (called a 3CF term) if it consists of one or more
sub-terms that are 2CF terms, and these sub-terms are connected only by the operator

.32
 A term is in level-4 canonical form (called a 4CF term) if it consists of one or more
sub-terms that are 3CF terms, and these sub-terms are connected only by the operator
.
 A term is in level-5 canonical form (called a 5CF term) if it consists of one or more
sub-terms that are 4CF terms, and these sub-terms are connected only by operators
in the set ft;ug.
We say that a term is in canonical form if it is in level-5 canonical form. Observe that any
term that is in level-i canonical form is also in level-(i+1) canonical form for any i 2 [1;4].
To check whether a term  is in canonical form, one parses  into a syntax tree and
then traverses the tree in a depth-ﬁrst manner to see if any syntactical restriction described
in Deﬁnition 2.4.1 is violated. This can be done in polynomial time in the size of .
Theorem 2.4.2 Given a term  in canonical form, a set X of users, and a conﬁguration
hU;URi, checking whether X satisﬁes  under hU;URi can be done in polynomial time.
Proof Recall that, by deﬁnition, X satisﬁes 1 u 2 if and only if X satisﬁes both 1 and
2, and X satisﬁes 1t2 if and only if X satisﬁes either 1 or 2. Therefore, to determine
whether X satisﬁes a 5CF term, one can ﬁrst determine whether X satisﬁes each of the 4CF
sub-terms, and then combine these results using logical conjunction and disjunction.
For a 1CF term , if it is a unit term, then it is straightforward to determine whether X
satisﬁes , because a unit term can be satisﬁed only by a singleton set, and because of the
deﬁnitions of u and t. If  is of the form t+, where t is a unit term, then one just needs to
determine whether each user in X satisﬁes t. Therefore, one can efﬁciently check whether
X satisﬁes a 1CF term.
Given a 2CF term, if at least one sub-term is a unit term, then one can get an equivalent
1CF term by removing all occurrences of +. For example, (t1 ut
+
2 ) is equivalent to t1 ut2.
Given a 2CF term where all sub-terms have +, it may be rewritten as an equivalent 1CF
term, according to algebraic properties. For example, (t
+
1 u t
+
2 ) is equivalent to (t1 u t2)+.
Hence, any 2CF term can be transformed into an equivalent 1CF term. We assume that the33
transformation is performed whenever applicable so that we don’t need to consider 2CF
terms explicitly.
Given a 3CF term P = (1 
  
 m), where each i is a 1CF term. Let us ﬁrst
consider a special case that each i is a unit term ti. In this case, one can determine whether
X satisﬁes i by solving the following bipartite graph maximal matching problem. One
constructs a bipartite graph such that one set of nodes consists of users in X and the other
consists of the m unit terms t1;t2;:::;tm; and there is an edge between u 2 X and ti if and
only if fug satisﬁes ti. One then computes a maximal matching of the graph (which can be
done in polynomial time); if the size of the matching is max(jXj;m), then X satisﬁes P;
otherwise, X does not satisfy P.
The case that a 3CF term contains + is more complicated, as is the case for a 4CF term.
The proof for the 4CF case (which subsumes the 3CF case) is long and offers limited new
insights. We thus leave the proof in Appendix A.3.3.
Terms in canonical forms appear to be general enough to specify many high-level se-
curity policies in practice. We arrive at these canonical forms by excluding the intractable
cases used in the NP-hardness proofs, and by studying how to efﬁciently handle terms
involving the binary operators.
2.5 The Userset-Term Safety (SAFE) Problem and the Static Safety Checking (SSC)
Problem
In this section, we study the Userset-Term Safety (SAFE) problem and the Static Safety
Checking (SSC) problem. As we have pointed out in Section 2.3.3, SAFE is technically
equivalent to TCSAT, even though the two problems are motivated by different purposes.
Since TCSAT is NP-complete, SAFE is NP-complete in general.
Also, SAFE is related to yet different from UTS. SAFE asks whether X is safe with
respect to a term  under a conﬁguration; this is monotonic in that if X is safe, then any
superset of X is also safe. However, UTS is not monotonic. This difference has subtle
but important effects. For example, under SAFE, the operator  is equivalent to logical34
conjunction, that is, X is safe with respect to 1  2 if and only if X is safe with respect
to both 1 and 2. This is because X is safe with respect to 1  2 if and only if X
contains a subset X0 that is the union of two subsets X1 and X2 such that X1 satisﬁes
1 and X2 satisﬁes 2. This is equivalent to X containing two subsets X1 and X2 such
that X1 satisﬁes 1 and X2 satisﬁes 2. In contrast, the operator  is different from logical
conjunction under UTS. That X satisﬁes 12 does not imply X satisﬁes both 1 and 2.
For example, fu1;u2g satisﬁes AllAll, but does not satisfy All, because term satisfaction is
not monotonic. Another difference regards the operator u. The operator u is equivalent to
logical conjunction under UTS, by deﬁnition of term satisfaction. However, u is stronger
than logical conjunction under SAFE. That X is safe with respect to 1 u 2 implies that
X is safe with respect to both 1 and 2, but the other direction is not true. For example,
given UR = f(u1;r1);(u2;r2)g, X = fu1;u2g is safe with respect to both r1 and r2, but is
not safe with respect to r1 u r2.
Because of these and other differences, the computational complexity results about
UTS do not imply computational complexity results for SAFE. In the rest of this section,
we give the computational complexities of SAFE and its subcases, and compare them with
those of UTS. Similar to the discussion of UTS in Section 2.4, we consider all sub-algebras
in which only some subset of the six operators in f:;+;u;t;;
g is allowed.
Theorem 2.5.1 The computational complexities of SAFE and its subcases are given in
Table 2.2.
Please refer to Appendix A.4 for proofs of the above theorem. In the appendix, we ﬁrst
prove that the three cases SAFEh:;+;u;ti, SAFEh:;+;t;i, and SAFEh:;+;
i
are in P. As we mentioned at the beginning of the section, SAFE is NP-complete in
general, which implies that all of its subcases are in NP. Hence, to prove all the NP-
completeness results, it sufﬁces to prove that the four cases SAFEhu;i, SAFEht;
i,
SAFEhu;
i, and SAFEh;
i are NP-hard.
Comparing Table 2.2 with Table 2.1, we found that the computational complexities of
all subcases of SAFE are the same as those of UTS except for the subcase in which only35
Table 2.2
Various sub-cases of the Userset-Term Safety (SAFE) problem and the
corresponding time-complexity
: + t u  
 Complexity Reduction
X X X X X X NP-complete
X X NP-complete Set Packing
X X NP-complete Set Covering
X X NP-complete Set Covering
X X NP-complete Domatic Number
X X X X P
X X X X P
X X X P
operators in f:;+;t;g are allowed. SAFEh:;+;t;i is in P, while UTSht;i is
NP-hard. Intuitively, UTSht;i is computationally more expensive than SAFE ft;g
for the following reason: given a term  = (1    m) and a userset U, U is safe
with respect to  if and only if U is safe with respect to i for every i 2 [1;m]. In other
words, for SAFE, one may check whether U is safe with respect to i independently from
j (i 6= j). However, when it comes to UTS, such independency no longer exists and one
has to take into account whether every user in U is used to satisfy some i in the term .
2.5.1 Static Safety Checking (SSC) Problem
Given a high-level security policy sphP;i, the Static Safety Checking (SSC) problem
asks whether a given state hU;UR;UPi is statically safe with respect to sphP;i. We
study the computational complexities of SSC, and consider all subcases where only some
subset of the operators in f:;+;u;t;;
g is allowed. We show that the general case of
SSC is both NP-hard and coNP-hard and is in coNP
NP, which is a complexity class in
Polynomial Hierarchy. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A.5.36
Table 2.3
Various sub-cases of the Static Safety Checking (SSC) problem and the
corresponding time-complexity
: + t u  
 Complexity Reduction
X X X X X X NP-hard, coNP-hard, in coNPNP
X X coNP-hard Validity
X X NP-hard SAFEhu;i
X coNP-complete Set Covering
X X X X P
X X X P
Theorem 2.5.2 The computational complexities of SSC and its subcases are given in Ta-
ble 2.3.
2.6 Discussions
In this section we discuss potential extensions to the syntax of the algebra, the rela-
tionship between the algebra and regular expressions, and the limitations of the algebra’s
expressive power.
2.6.1 Extensions to the Syntax of the Algebra
In this chapter, we have deﬁned the basic operators in the algebra and examined their
properties. We now discuss some additional operators that could be added to the algebra as
syntactic sugars.
As discussed in Section 2.1.5, SoD policies are monotonic, as are policies in McLean’s
formulation of N-person policies [19]; our algebra supports both monotonic policies and
policies that are not monotonic. To express a monotonic policy that requires a task to be37
performed by a userset that either satisﬁes a term  or contains a subset that satisﬁes , one
can use (  All
+). As monotonic policies may be quite common, we introduce a unary
operator 5 as a syntactic sugar. That is, 5 is deﬁned to be (  All
+).
Besides monotonic policies, another type of policy mentioned in Section 2.1.5 states
that every user involved in a task must satisfy certain requirements and there need to be
at least a certain number of users involved. Let  be a unit term that expresses the re-
quirements. A policy that requires two or more users that satisfy  can be expressed as
(( 
 )  +). To simplify the expression of these policies, we deﬁne 2+ as a syntactic
sugar for (( 
 )  +). In general, k+ means that at least k (k  2) users are required
and every user involved must satisfy .
Similar to the above, k is a syntactic sugar for a term using operator 
 to connect
k unit terms . For instance, Accountant3 is deﬁned as (Accountant 
 Accountant 

Accountant). More generally, k states that exactly k users are required and every user
involved must satisfy . Writing a term in k rather than ( 
  
 ) explicitly states
that all the k sub-terms connected together by 
 are the same. This makes the policy more
succinct and easier to process.
2.6.2 Relationship with Regular Expressions
Thesyntaxoftermsinouralgebramayremindreadersofregularexpressions. Aregular
expression is a string that describes or matches a set of strings, while a term in the algebra
is a string that describes or matches a set of sets. Given an alphabet, a regular expression
evaluates to a set of strings. Given a conﬁguration, a term in our algebra evaluates to a set
of sets. In the following, we compare our algebra with regular expressions.
For example, the regular expression “a(bjc)[^abc]+” matches all strings that start with
the letter a, followed by either b or c, and then by one or more symbols that are not in
fa;b;cg. A term that is close in spirit to the regular expression is fag 
 (fbg t fcg) 

(:fa;b;cg)
+, which is satisﬁed by all sets that contain a, either b or c, and one or more
symbols that are not in fa;b;cg.38
From the example, one can draw some analogies between the operators in regular ex-
pressions and the ones in our algebra. The operator j in regular expressions is similar to
t. Concatenation in regular expression may seem to be related to 
. One clear difference
is that concatenation is order sensitive, whereas 
 is not, because a string is order sensi-
tive but a set is not. A more subtle difference comes from the property that 
 requires
the two sub-terms be satisﬁed by disjoint sets. For instance, fag 
 fag cannot be satis-
ﬁed by any set. The usage of negation in regular expressions is similar to negation in the
algebra; in both cases, negation can be applied only to an expression corresponding to a
single element. In regular expression, the closure operator ( or +) can be applied to arbi-
trary sub-expressions. Our algebra requires that repetition (using operator +) can only be
applied to unit terms. As we discussed in Section 2.1.5, since the algebra is proposed for
security policy speciﬁcation, we impose such restriction so as to clearly capture real-word
security requirements. If the algebra is used in areas other than security policy speciﬁca-
tion, it is certainly possible to release such restriction so that the algebra can deﬁne a wider
range of sets. The remaining binary operators  and u have the ﬂavor of set intersection,
which does not have counterparts in regular expressions.
Observe that determining whether a string satisﬁes a regular expression is in NL-
complete, where NL stands for Nondeterministic Logarithmic-Space, and is contained in
P. On the other hand, determining whether a userset satisﬁes a term is NP-complete, even
if the term uses only t and 
 or only t and . It appears that this increase in complexity
is due to the unordered nature of sets. Checking a string against a regular expression can
be performed from the beginning of a string to its end; on the other hand, there is no such
order in checking a set against a term in the algebra.
As a fundamental tool for deﬁning sets of strings, regular expression is used in many
areas. Analogically, because our algebra is about the fundamental concept of deﬁning
sets of sets, we conjecture that, besides expression of security policies, the algebra could
be used in other areas where set speciﬁcation is desired. For example, we may use the
algebra to specify some sorts of reaction formula, in which each element must have certain
properties and in some cases we may be able to choose among several properties. For39
another example, our algebra could be used to specify digital-right-management licenses
that entitle users to play a set of songs. An example of such licenses is, Alice can play
a song in Album A once, and two other songs in either Album B or Album C. Barth and
Mitchell studied how to specify such licenses using linear logic in [21].
2.6.3 Limitations of the Algebra’s Expressive Power
It is well-known that using regular expression, one cannot express languages that re-
quire counting to an unbounded number; for example, one cannot express all strings over
the alphabet fa;bg that contain the same number of a’s as of b’s.
Similarly, the algebra as deﬁned in Section 2.1.1 cannot express a policy that requires
a set of users in which the number of members of r1 equals the number of members of
r2. The proof is similar to that of the Pumping Lemma in regular language. We illustrate
the sketch of the proof here. Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that there exists a
term  in the algebra that is satisﬁed only by usersets with an equal number of members
of r1 and members of r2. Let X1 be a userset consisting of n users who are members of
r1 but not r2, and X2 be another userset consisting of n users who are members of r2 but
not r1, where n > jj. Let X = X1 [ X2. By assumption, X satisﬁes . Let T be the
satisfaction tree of , whose root is labeled with X. Since jXj > jj, T must have leaves
corresponding to sub-terms in the form of 
+
0 . Also, since n > jj, there must exist a leaf
N1 with 1 = 
+
2 and LT(N1) contains a user u 2 X1 that does not appear in usersets
labeling leaves without +. We may now “pump” (i.e. add) another m copies of u to every
node in T whose associated userset contains u. By following the rules in Deﬁnition 2.1.4,
it can be proved that the tree T 0, which is acquired from T after pumping, is a satisfaction
tree of . Note that the root of T 0 is labeled with X0, which contains n + m members of r1
and n members of r2. According to Theorem 2.1.2, X0 satisﬁes , which is a contradiction
to the assumption.
If we allow the application of + to non-unit terms and deﬁne it as follows:

+ def
=  t ( 
 ) t ( 
  
 ) t :::40
then we can express the policy that requires an equal number of members of r1 and mem-
bers of r2 using the term
[(r1 u r2) t ((r1 u :r2) 
 (r2 u :r1)) t (:r1 u :r2)]
+
Note that the subterm ((r1 u :r2) 
 (r2 u :r1)) matches one user who is a member of r1
but not r2 with a user who is a member of r2 but not r1.
Even with the extension, however, there are sets of usersets that cannot be expressed.
For example, one cannot express a policy that requires that the number of users who are r1
equals the square of the number of users who are r2. 2 Further discussions of expressive
power and more general algebras are interesting future research topics.
2Intuitively, since + does not record the number of users, there is no way for a term to compute the square of
the number of users in a userset.41
3 RESILIENCY POLICIES IN ACCESS CONTROL
In the last chapter, we have introduced an algebra for high-level security policy speciﬁca-
tion. Similar to most existing work on access control policy speciﬁcation and analysis, our
work on the algebra focuses on security properties which ensure that users who should not
have access do not get access. However, an equally important aspect of access control is to
enable access (selectively).
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of resiliency policies which state properties
about enabling access in access control. Resiliency policies require that the access control
state is resilient to absent users. For example, the access control system of an institution has
three separate permissions regarding release of funds: one permission is an endorsement
that the request for funds is legitimate, the second permission is the issuance of a check, and
the third one is for logging the transaction. The institution’s ﬁnancial ofﬁce, which takes
charge of funding, is composed of a senior treasurer and a number of junior treasurers.
In compliance of the separation of duty principle, the senior treasurer has all permissions
except the one for logging, while each of the junior treasurers has only one of the three
permissions. As issuing funds is a critical task, the institution would like to ensure that
even if a few (e.g., two) treasurers (that may include the senior treasurer) are absent (e.g.,
due to sickness), the remaining personnel in the ﬁnancial ofﬁce still have enough privileges
to release funds.
Another example resiliency policy requirement is as follows: There must exist three
mutually disjoint sets of users such that each set has no more than four users and the users
in each set together have all permissions to carry out a critical task. Such a policy would
be needed when one needs to be able to send up to three teams of users to different sites to
perform a certain task, perhaps in response to some events. One needs to ensure that each
team has enough permissions to perform the task, and each team consists of no more than
four users (e.g., due to the limit of transportation means).42
Such policies are particularly useful when evaluating whether the access control conﬁg-
uration of a system is ready for emergency response. These policies ensure that even when
emergency situations cause some users to be absent, there still exist independent teams of
users that have the necessary permissions for carrying out critical tasks. In other words,
these policies mandate that there is a certain level of redundancy in assigning permissions
to users so that the system can tolerate some users being absent.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we deﬁne re-
siliency policies and the Resiliency Checking problem. We present computational com-
plexities of the Resiliency Checking problem in Section 3.2. Finally, we explore the policy
consistency problem, in Section 3.3
3.1 Resiliency Policies and the Resiliency Checking Problem
Deﬁnition 3.1.1 (Resiliency Policies) A resiliency policy takes the form
rphP;s;d;ti
where rp is a keyword, P = fp1;:::;png is a set of permissions, s  0 and d  1 are
integers, and t is either a positive integer or the special symbol 1.
We say that an access control state satisﬁes such a resiliency policy if and only if upon
removal of any set of s users, there still exist d mutually disjoint sets of users such that each
set contains no more than t users and the users in each set together are authorized for all
permissions in P.
Example 3 Consider the access control state from Figure 3.1. To issue funds, all three
permissions Endorse; Issue and Log must be possessed by a set of users. In our resiliency
policy, we set P = fEndorse; Issue; Logg. If we set s = 1 in our policy, then we want
the system to be resilient to the absence of any (one) user. If we set d = 2, this means that
we require two sets of users such that users in each set together possess all permissions. If
we set t = 1, this means that the set of users that together possess all permissions can be
of any size.43
Endorse Issue Log
Bob Doris
Alice Carl Earl
Figure 3.1. An example of an access control state with ﬁve users and three permissions
We observe that in our example, rphP;1;2;1i is satisﬁed. For instance, after remov-
ing Alice, the two users Carl and Earl together have all three permissions, as are Bob
and Doris. The cases in which another user is removed can be veriﬁed similarly. How-
ever, rphP;2;2;1i is not satisﬁed because if Alice and Bob are absent, the only user
that possesses Endorse is Carl, and one user cannot belong to two disjoint sets. Similarly,
rphP;2;1;1i is satisﬁed, but rphP;3;1;1i is not satisﬁed because if Alice; Bob and Carl
are absent, then no user possesses Endorse. And ﬁnally, we observe that rphP;1;1;2i is
satisﬁed, but not rphP;1;1;1i because for the latter case, there exists no single user that
has all three permissions.
Intuitively, a resiliency policy rphP;s;d;ti speciﬁes a fault tolerance requirement with
respect to a certain critical task. The set P includes all permissions that are needed to carry
out the task. The faults that we would like to tolerate are absent users. The parameter s
speciﬁes the number of absent users that we want to be able to tolerate. The parameter
d is motivated by the requirement that several teams may be needed to carry out multiple
instances of the task. If only one team is needed, then d can be set to 1. The parameter
t speciﬁes the size limit of each team. This is motivated by limitations on the maximal
number of users that can be involved in any instance of task. If no such limitation exists,
then t can be set to 1.44
The two parameters s and d are related. If an access control state satisﬁes rphP;s;d;ti,
then it also satisﬁes rphP;s+i;d i;ti for any i such that 0 < i < d. For example, if, after
removing any 2 users, there exist 3 mutually disjoint sets of users such that each set covers
all permissions in P, then after removing any 3 users, there are at least 2 sets left. However,
if a state satisﬁes rphP;s + 1;d   1;ti, it may not satisfy rphP;s;d;ti. For our example
shown in Figure 3.1, we observe that rphP;1;2;1i is satisﬁed. However rphP;0;3;1i
is not satisﬁed because we need the 3 users Alice; Bob and Carl that possess Endorse to
belong to distinct sets; this still leaves one permission that needs to covered by each set,
and we have only two users that remain.
Resiliency policies can be deﬁned in any access control system in which there are users
and permissions. This includes almost all access control systems, including Discretionary
Access Control systems [22,23] and Role Based Access Control systems [18]. We assume
that an access control state is given by a binary relation UP  U  P, where U represents
the set of all users, and P represents the set of all permissions. Note that by assuming that
a state is given by a binary relation UP  U  P, we are not assuming permissions are
directly assigned to users; rather, we assume only that one can calculate the relation UP
from the access control state.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2 (Resiliency Checking Problem (RCP)) Given a resiliency policy r and
an access control state UP, determining whether UP satisﬁes r is called the Resiliency
Checking Problem (RCP).
A resiliency policy has three parameters: s, d, and t. In some situations, one may need
to consider only those policies with one or more of these parameters degenerated. The
parameter s, which denotes the number of absent users that the system needs to tolerate,
may be degenerated to always be 0. The parameter d, which denotes the number of sets of
users required, may be degenerated to always be 1. Finally, the parameter t, which denotes
the size bound on each set, may be degenerated to always be 1. There are eight cases
where some of the three parameters are degenerated. For example, a resiliency policy in
the subcase RCPhs = 0;d = 1i has the form rp(P;0;1;t), which asks whether there exists45
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Figure 3.2. Time complexity of the Resiliency Checking Problem (RCP)
and its various subcases.
a set of users of size at most t that together have all permissions in P; while the subcase
RCPht = 1i asks whether there exist several distinct sets of users (d sets) each of whose
users together have all permissions in P, even after any set of s users is removed from the
state. In particular, RCPh i is the general case of the problem.
3.2 Computational Complexities of the Resiliency Checking Problem
The following theorem summarizes the computational complexity results for RCP and
its various subcases. These results are also shown in Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.2.1 The computational complexities of the Resiliency Policy Checking prob-
lem are as follows.
 RCPh i, the most general case, is NP-hard and is in coNP
NP, as are the two
subcases RCPhd = 1i and RCPht = 1i.
 RCPhs = 0;d = 1i, RCPhs = 0;t = 1i, and RCPhs = 0i are NP-complete.
 RCPhd = 1;t = 1i and RCPhs = 0;d = 1;t = 1i can be solved in linear time.46
Our complexity results show that RCP is in coNP
NP. This means that the complement
of RCP can be solved by a nondeterministic Oracle Turing Machine that has oracle access
to a machine that can answer any NP queries. Intuitively, given an access control state
and a resiliency policy r = rp(P;s;d;t), to decide nondeterministically that the state does
not satisfy r, one can guess a set of s users to be removed, and then query the NP oracle
whether the remaining users contain d mutually disjoint sets of users such that each set is
of size at most t and the users in each set together have all the permissions in P.
Another way to understand the computational complexity of RCP is to observe that an
RCP instance has the form 8 size-s subset, 9d sets of users that satisfy some requirements
thatcanbeefﬁcientlyveriﬁed. ProblemsinNPhavetheformof9anevidencethatsatisﬁes
some polynomial-time veriﬁable requirements. Problems in coNP has the form 8 choices,
some polynomial-time veriﬁable requirements hold. RCP has one alternation of 8 followed
by 9, which makes it in coNP
NP.
We have shown that RCP (and its two subcases RCPhd = 1i and RCPht = 1i)
are NP-hard and are in coNP
NP. It remains open whether these three problems are
coNP
NP-complete or not. Readers who are familiar with computational complexity the-
ory will recognize that coNP
NP is a complexity class in the Polynomial Hierarchy. Be-
cause the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses when P = NP, showing that an NP-hard de-
cision problem is in the Polynomial Hierarchy, although is not equivalent to showing that
the problem is NP-complete, has the same consequence: the problem can be solved in
polynomial time if and only if P =NP.
In the rest of this section, we prove the results in Theorem 3.2.1. The following lemmas
prove that RCPhs = 0i is in NP, RCPhs = 0;d = 1i and RCPhs = 0;t = 1i are
NP-hard, RCPh i is in coNP
NP, and RCPhd = 1;t = 1i is in P. The complexities of
other subcases can be implied from these results.
Lemma 3.2.2 RCPhs = 0i is in NP.
Proof An instance consists of an access control state UP and a policy rphP;0;d;ti. UP
satisﬁes rphP;0;d;ti if and only if there exist d mutually disjoint sets of users such that the47
users in each set together cover all permissions in P and each set has at most t users. If
these d sets are given, they can be veriﬁed in polynomial time. Therefore, RCPhs = 0i is
in NP.
Lemma 3.2.3 RCPhs = 0;d = 1i is NP-hard.
Proof We reduce the NP-complete SET COVERING problem [24] (also referred to as
MINIMUM COVERING problem in [25]) to RCPhs = 0;d = 1i. In SET COVERING,
we are given a set S, n subsets of S: S1;:::;Sn, and a budget K, and need to determine
whether the union of K subsets is the same as S. An instance of RCPhs = 0;d = 1i asks
whether an access control state UP satisﬁes a policy rphP;0;1;ti. In our reduction, each
element in S is mapped to a permission in P and each subset Si is mapped to a user ui. In
other words, if the subset Si contains an element, then ui is authorized for the permission
corresponding to the element. We now argue that the mapping ensures that there exists a
set of users of size at most K together have all the permissions in P if and only if K subsets
cover S. Assume that a set of users of size at most K exists such that those users together
have all the permissions in P. Then, we pick the subsets that are mapped to those users,
and their union gives us S. For the other direction, assume that K subsets cover S. Then,
the K users to which the subsets are mapped together have all the permissions in P.
Lemma 3.2.4 RCPhs = 0;t = 1i is NP-hard.
Proof We reduce the NP-complete DOMATIC NUMBER problem [25] to RCPhs =
0;t = 1i. Given a graph G(V;E), the DOMATIC NUMBER problem asks whether V
can be partitioned into k disjoint sets V1;V2; ;Vk, such that each Vi is a dominating set
for G. V 0 is a dominating set for G = (V;E) if for every node u in V   V 0, there is a node
v in V 0 such that (u;v) 2 E. An instance of RCPhs = 0;t = 1i asks whether an access
control state UP satisﬁes a policy rphP;0;d;1i. Given a graph G = (V;E), we construct
an access control state UP with n users u1;u2; ;un and n permissions p1;p2; ;pn,
where n is the number of nodes in V . Each user corresponds to a node in G, and v(ui)
denotes the node corresponding to user ui. In UP, user ui is authorized for the permission48
pj if and only if either i = j or (v(ui);v(uj)) 2 E. Let P denote the set fp1;p2; ;png.
A dominating set in G corresponds to a set of users that together have all the permissions
in P. UP satisﬁes rphP;0;k;1i if and only if V contains k disjoint dominating sets.
Lemma 3.2.5 RCPh i is in coNP
NP.
Proof We show that the complement of RCPh i is in NP
NP. Assume that we have an
oracle that decides the Resiliency Checking problem when s = 0, which, as we know,
is NP-complete. We construct a nondeterministic oracle Turing machine M that accepts
UP and rphP;s;d;ti when UP does not satisfy rphP;s;d;ti. M nondeterministically re-
moves s users, and then queries the oracle. If the oracle machine returns “yes”, M rejects;
otherwise, M accepts, because it has found a set of users, the removal of which violates
the Resiliency policy. The construction of M shows that the complement of RCPh i is in
NP
NP. Therefore, RCPh i is in coNP
NP.
Lemma 3.2.6 RCPhd = 1;t = 1i can be solved in linear time.
Proof An instance in RCPhd = 1;t = 1i asks whether an access control state satisﬁes
a policy rphP;s;1;1i. We observe that the answer is “no” if and only if some permission
in P is assigned to no more than s users. In this case, removing the s users who have
that permission would result in no user having that permission. On the other hand, if each
permission is assigned to at least s + 1 users, after removing any set of s users, each
permission is still assigned to at least one user, which means that the set of all remaining
users together have all the permissions in P.
Deﬁnition 3.2.1 (The Tolerance Bound) Given an access control state UP and a set
fp1; ;pmg of permissions, we deﬁne the tolerance bound of UP and fp1; ;pmg,
denoted by tb(UP;fp1; ;pmg), to be min1im #(pi), where #(pi) denotes the number
of users who are authorized for pi in the state UP.
Given an RCPhd = 1;t = 1i instance that asks whether UP satisﬁes rphP;s;1;1i,
the answer is yes if and only if the tolerance bound is at least s + 1. More generally, given49
an RCP instance that asks whether UP satisﬁes rphP;s;d;ti, if s + d > tb(UP;P), then
the answer is “no”. On the other hand, when d  2 and s + d  tb(UP;P), we do not
immediately know whether UP satisﬁes rphP;s;d;ti or not.
We now give a linear-time algorithm for calculating the tolerance bound. This, together
with the above observations, sufﬁces to prove Lemma 3.2.6. The algorithm maintains a
counter for each permission. It ﬁrst goes through all pairs in UP to count how many users
each permission is assigned to. It then returns the minimal value among the counters.
3.3 The Consistency of Resiliency and Separation of Duty Policies
As we have discussed earlier, resiliency policies are a natural complement to traditional
safety policies in access control. Consequently, a question arises regarding the consistency
of resiliency policies with other policies. In this section, we explore the consistency of
resiliency policies and static separation of duty (SSoD) policies.
The intent of an SSoD policy is to preclude any group of users from possessing too
many permissions. We adopt the concrete formulation of such policies from Li et al. [26].
An SSoD policy is of the form ssodhP;ki, where P is a set of permissions and 1 < k  jPj
is an integer. An access control state satisﬁes the policy if there exists no set of fewer than
k users that together possess all permissions in P. In the policy ssodhP;ki, P denotes the
set of permissions that are needed to perform a sensitive task, and k denotes the minimal
number of users that are allowed to perform the task. If the policy is satisﬁed, then no set of
k 1 users can together perform the task, because they do not have all the permissions; thus
at least k users need to be involved, achieving the goal of separation of duty. For example,
the policy ssodhfp1;p2g;2i means that no single user is allowed to have both p1 and p2.
In many cases, it is desirable for an access control system to have both resiliency and
SSoD policies. If an access control system has only resiliency policies, then they can be
satisﬁed by giving all permissions to all users, resulting in each single user can perform
any task. Similarly, if an access control system has only SSoD policies, then they can be
satisﬁed by not giving any permission to any user, resulting in no task can be performed.50
It is clear that neither kind of policies by itself is sufﬁcient to capture the security require-
ments. When both kinds of policies coexist, safety and functionality requirements can all
be speciﬁed.
Due to their opposite focus, resiliency policies and separation of duty policies can con-
ﬂict with each other. For example, a separation of duty policy ssodhP;2i requires that no
user possess all permissions in P. A resiliency policy rphP;s;d;1i requires the existence
of a user that has all permissions in P. Clearly, the two policies cannot be satisﬁed si-
multaneously. We formally deﬁne our notion of consistency amongst such policies in the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1 Given a set F of resiliency and separation of duty policies, the policies in
F are consistent if and only if there exists an access control state UP such that UP satisﬁes
every policy in F. Determining whether F is consistent is called the Policy Consistency
Checking Problem (PCCP).
The following lemma asserts that the actual value of s and d in a resiliency does not
affect its compatibility with SSoD policies. This enables us to replace all resiliency policies
in the form of rphPi;si;di;tii in F with the special form rphPi;0;1;tii when studying
PCCP. This greatly simpliﬁes the problem.
Lemma 3.3.1 F is a set of policies and R = rphP;s;d;ti 2 F. Let R0 = rphP;0;1;ti and
F 0 = (F   fRg) [ fR0g. F is consistent if and only if F 0 is consistent.
Proof It is clear that if F is consistent then F 0 is consistent. In the following, we prove
that if F 0 is consistent then F is consistent. Assume that state UP
0 satisﬁes all policies in
F 0. UP
0 satisfying R0 implies that there is a set U of no more than t users together have
all the permissions in P. We then construct a new state UP by adding s + d   1 copies
of all users in U to UP
0. Note that adding copies of existing users in UP
0 will not lead to
violation of SSoD policies in F 0. In this case, UP satisﬁes R plus all policies in F 0. In
other words, UP satisﬁes all policies in F and F is consistent.51
The following theorem gives the computational complexity results about general cases
of PCCP. Observe that the case with one SSoD policy and an arbitrary number of resiliency
policies is coNP-hard, and the case with one resiliency policy and an arbitrary number of
SSoD policies is NP-hard. Therefore, it is unlikely that the general case is in NP or in
coNP; however, we show that the problem is in NP
NP.
Theorem 3.3.2 The computational complexities for PCCP are as follows:
1. PCCP h1;ni is coNP-hard, where PCCP h1;ni denotes the subcase that there is a
single SSoD policy, and an arbitrary number of resiliency policies.
2. PCCP hm;1i is NP-hard, where PCCP hm;1i denotes the subcase that there is an
arbitrary number of SSoD policies, and a single resiliency policy.
3. PCCP hm;ni, i.e., the most general case of PCCP, is in NP
NP.
We prove Theorem 3.3.2 by proving Lemmas 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.3.5. Without loss
of generality, we assume that for any static separation of duty policy sodhP;ki, we have
k  jPj. We also assume that in any resiliency policy rphP;s;d;ti, we have either t = 1
or t  jPj.
Lemma 3.3.3 PCCP h1;ni is coNP-hard, where PCCP h1;ni denotes the subcase that
there is a single SSoD policy, and an arbitrary number of resiliency policies.
Proof We reduce the NP-complete SET COVERING problem [24] (also referred to as
MINIMUM COVERING problem in [25]) to the complement of PCCP. In SET COVERING,
we are given a set X = fe1; ;emg, n subsets of X: X1;:::;Xn, and a budget b, and
need to determine whether the union of b subsets is the same as X. Given an instance of
the SET COVERING problem, we construct one SSoD policy S = sodhP;b + 1i and b rp
policies Ri = rphPi;0;1;1i (1  i  b), where P = fp1; ;pmg corresponds to X and
Pi = fpj j ej 2 Xig corresponds to Xi. Let F = fS;R1; ;Rng. In the following, we
prove that F is inconsistent if and only if the answer to the SET COVERING problem is
“yes”.52
On the one hand, if F is inconsistent, there does not exist any state that satisﬁes all
polices in F. In other words, if a state satisﬁes all resiliency policies in F, there exists
no more than b users in the state who together have all the permission in P. Let UP be a
state with n users u1; ;un such that (ui;pj) 2 UP if and only if pj 2 Pi. It is clear
that UP satisﬁes all resiliency policies in F, and hence there exist no more than b users
together have all the permissions in P. In other words, there exist no more than b elements
in fP1; ;Png whose union is P. Thus, the answer to the set covering problem is “yes”.
On the other hand, if the answer to the set covering problem is “yes”, then there exist no
more than b elements in fP1; ;Png whose union is P. For any state UP that satisﬁes all
resiliency policies in F, let U be the set of users that satisfy at least one resiliency policy.
u 2 U if and only if there exists Pi such that u has all permissions in Pi. In this case, there
exist no more than b users in U who together have all the permissions in P. Hence, UP
does not satisfy S, which implies that no state satisﬁes all policies in F.
Lemma 3.3.4 PCCP hm;1i is NP-hard, where PCCP hm;1i denotes the subcase that
there is an arbitrary number of SSoD policies, and a single resiliency policy.
Proof We reduce the NP-complete SET SPLITTING problem to PCCP. In the SET
SPLITTING problem, we are given a set X = fe1; ;eng, m subsets of X: X1;:::;Xm,
and need to determine whether there exist Y1 and Y2 such that Y1 [ Y2 = X and there
does not exist Xi (1  i  m) such that Xi  Y1 or Xi  Y2. Given an instance of
the SET SPLITTING problem, construct a resiliency policy R = rphP;0;1;2i and m SSoD
policies Si = sodhPi;2i (1  i  m), where P = fp1; ;png corresponds to X and
Pi = fpj j ej 2 Xig corresponds to Xi. Let F = fR;S1; ;Smg. In the following, we
prove that F is consistent if and only if the answer to the SET SPLITTING problem is “yes”.
On the one hand, if F is consistent, then there exists a state UP that satisﬁes all policies
in F. UP satisfying R implies that there exist two users u1 and u2 in UP such that u1
and u2 together have all the permissions in P. Furthermore, UP satisfying Si implies
that neither u1 nor u2 has all permissions in Pi. Let Y1 = fei j (u1;pi) 2 UPg and
Y2 = fei j (u2;pi) 2 UPg. We have Y1 [ Y2 = X and neither Y1 nor Y2 is a superset of
any Xi. The answer to the set splitting problem is “yes”.53
On the other hand, if the answer to the set splitting problem is “yes”, then such Y1
and Y2 exist. We construct a state UP containing only two users u1 and u2 such that
(ui;pj) 2 UP (1  i  2) if and only if pj 2 Yi. Since Y1 [ Y2 = X, u1 and u2 together
have all the permissions in P. Furthermore, since there does not exist Xi such that Xi is
a subset of Y1 or Y2, neither u1 nor u2 has all permissions in Pi, which implies that UP
satisﬁes Si. Therefore, UP satisﬁes all policies in F.
Lemma 3.3.5 Let F = fS1;S2;Sm;R1; ;Rng, where Si = sodhPi;kii (1  i 
m) and Rj = rphQj;sj;dj;tji (1  j  n). Checking whether policies in F are consistent
is in NP
NP.
Proof We construct a set of policies F 0 by replacing every Ri (1  i  n) in F with
rphPi;0;1;tii. From Lemma 3.3.1, F is consistent if and only if F 0 is consistent.
We construct a nondeterministic Oracle Turing machine M that makes use of an NP
oracle machine to determine whether F 0 is consistent. M ﬁrst nondeterministically selects
an integer a such that max(k1; ;km)  a  n
i=1jQij and then generates a users. Note
that at least max(k1; ;km) users are needed to satisfy all SSoD policies in F 0, and
at most n
i=1jQij users are needed to satisfy all resiliency policies in F 0. (The state can
have more than n
i=1jQij users, but in order to show that all resiliency policies in F 0 are
satisﬁed, at most n
i=1jQij users need to be involved.) Then M constructs a state UP by
nondeterministically assigning a subset of Q to u, where Q =
Sn
i=1 Qi is the set of all
permissions that appear in the resiliency policies. Next, M nondeterministically construct
n sets U1; ;Un of users in UP, and then, for every i 2 [1;n], checks whether users
in Ui together have all the permissions in Pi and jUij  ti. If the answer is “no”, then M
returns False. Finally, M invokes the NP oracle to check whether UP violates any SSoD
policy. (In order to prove that a state violates a static separation of duty policy sodhP;ki,
we just need to present a set of no more than k users in the state who together have all the
permissions in P. Therefore, checking whether a state violates an SSoD policy is in NP.)
If the oracle machine answers “yes”, M returns False. Otherwise, M returns True,
which means that UP satisﬁes all policies in F 0 and hence F 0 is consistent. It is clear that54
M terminates in polynomial time if the oracle machine returns an answer instantaneously.
Therefore, PCCP is in NP
NP in general.55
4 SATISFIABILITY AND RESILIENCY IN WORKFLOW
AUTHORIZATION SYSTEMS
In the last two chapters, we have discussed high-level access control policies, such as poli-
cies speciﬁed by the algebra and resiliency policies, that apply to general access control
systems. In this chapter, we study a lower-level access control scheme, the workﬂow au-
thorization system.
Workﬂows are used in numerous domains, including production, purchase order pro-
cessing, and various management tasks. A workﬂow divides a task into a set of well-
deﬁned sub-tasks (called steps here). Workﬂow authorization systems manage access con-
trol in workﬂows and have gained popularity in the research community [4–8]. As stated
in Chapter 1, security policies in workﬂow authorization systems are usually speciﬁed us-
ing authorization constraints. One may specify, for each step, which users are authorized
to perform it. In addition, one may specify the constraints between users who perform
different steps in the workﬂow. For example, one may require that two steps must be per-
formed by different users for the purpose of separation of duty [2]. Oftentimes, constraints
in workﬂow authorization systems need to refer to relationships among users. For example,
the rationale under a separation of duty policy that requires 2 users to perform the task is
that this deters and controls fraud, as the collusion of 2 users are required for a fraud to
occur. However, when two users are close relatives, then collusion is much more likely.
To achieve the objective of deterring and controlling fraud, the policy should require that
two different steps in a workﬂow must be performed by users who are not in conﬂict of
interest with each other. In different environments, the conﬂict-of-interest relation need to
be deﬁned differently. For instance, inside an organization’s system, relationships such as
close relatives (e.g., spouses and parent-child) can be maintained and users who are close
relatives may be considered to be in conﬂict of interest. In a peer-review setting, conﬂict
of interest may be based on past collaborations, common institutions, etc. For another ex-56
ample on user relations, one university may have a policy that a graduate student’s study
plan must be ﬁrst approved by the student’s advisor and then by the graduate ofﬁcer in
the student’s department. To specify such constraints, one needs to deﬁne and refer to the
advisor-student binary relation as well as the in-the-same-department binary relation.
In this chapter, we introduce the role-and-relation-based access control (R2BAC) model
for workﬂow authorization systems. The model is role-based in the sense that individual
steps of a workﬂow are authorized to roles. The model is relation-based in the sense that
user-deﬁned binary relations can be used to specify constraints and an authorized user is
prevented from performing a step unless the user satisﬁes these constraints. R2BAC is a
natural step beyond Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [18], especially in the setting of
workﬂows. As a role deﬁnes a set of users, which can be viewed as a unary relation among
the set of all users, a binary relation is the natural next step.
A fundamental problem in workﬂow authorization systems is the workﬂow satisﬁability
problem (WSP), which asks whether a workﬂow can be completed in a certain access con-
trol state. We show that WSP is NP-complete in R2BAC. Furthermore, we show that the
intractability is inherent in any workﬂow authorization systems that support some simple
kinds of constraints. In particular, we show that WSP is NP-hard in any workﬂow system
that supports either constraints that require two steps must be performed by different users
or constraints that require one step must be performed by a user who also performs at least
one of several other steps. Such intractability results are somewhat surprising and discour-
aging, because the constraints involved are simple and natural. It is also unsatisfying as
such results do not shed light on the computation cost one has to pay to enhance expres-
sive power by introducing user-deﬁned binary relations such as conﬂict-of-interest relation,
since WSP is NP-complete with or without user-deﬁned relations. Finally, the practical
signiﬁcance of such intractability results is unclear, as in real world, certain aspects such
as the number of steps in a workﬂow should be small. To address these issues, we apply
tools from parameterized complexity [27] to WSP. Parameterized complexity is a measure
of computational complexity of problems with multiple input parameters. Parameterized57
complexity enables us to perform ﬁner-grained study on the computational complexity of
WSP.
In many situations, it is not enough to ensure that a workﬂow can be completed in
the current access control state. In particular, when the workﬂow is designed to complete
a critical task, it is necessary to make sure that the workﬂow can be completed even if
certainusersbecomeabsentinemergencysituations. Inotherwords, resiliencyisimportant
in workﬂow authorization systems. Resiliency in workﬂow authorization systems differs
from the resiliency policies proposed in Chapter 3 in two major aspects. First, due to
the existence of authorization constraints, even if a set of users together are authorized
to perform all steps in a workﬂow, it is still possible that they cannot complete the task.
Second, as a workﬂow consists of a sequence of steps and ﬁnishing all these steps may
take a relatively long time, it is possible that certain users become absent at some point and
come back later. In other words, the set of available users may change during the execution
of a workﬂow. Therefore, more reﬁned notions of resiliency for workﬂow authorization
systems are needed. In this chapter, we introduce three levels of resiliency in workﬂow
authorization systems and study the complexity of resiliency checking.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the R2BAC model
in Section 4.1. After that, we study the workﬂow satisﬁability problem in Section 4.2 and
study parameterized complexity of the problem in Section 4.3. Finally, we deﬁne and study
resiliency problems in workﬂow systems in Section 4.4.
4.1 The Role-and-Relation-Based Access Control Model for Workﬂow Systems
In this section, we introduce the Role-and-Relation-Based Access Control (R2BAC)
model for workﬂow systems. We start with a motivating example.
Example 4 In an academic institution, submitting a grant proposal to an outside sponsor
via the sponsor program services (SPS) is modeled as a workﬂow with ﬁve steps1 (see
Figure 4.1).
1This is a simpliﬁed version of the process in the authors’ institution, which also requires signatures of the
department head and the dean’s ofﬁce.58
  Prepare budget
(Account Clerk)       (Faculty)
Prepare proposal    Submit proposal
(Account Manager)
   Account review
(Account Manager)
     (Expert)
Expert review
Figure 4.1. A workﬂow for grant proposal submission to outside sponsor
via the sponsor program services (SPS).
1. Preparation: A faculty member prepares a proposal and sends it to the business
ofﬁce of his or her department.
2. Budget: An account clerk prepares the budget, checks the proposal, and submits it
to the SPS ofﬁce.
3. Expert Review: A regulation expert in the SPS ofﬁce reviews the proposal to
check whether the proposal satisﬁes various regulations, e.g., those governing export
control and human subject research.
4. Account Review: An account manager reviews the proposal and the budget.
5. Submission: An account manager submits the proposal to the outside sponsor.
In the workﬂow, steps expert review and account review may be per-
formed concurrently while all other steps must be carried out sequentially. The step
preparation can be performed by any personnel who can serve as a primary inves-
tigator, while the step budget must be carried out by an account clerk. A regulation
expert is authorized to review the proposal in the step expert review. The privilege to
perform steps account review and submission is granted to account managers.
The workﬂow has the following constraints.59
1. Steps preparation, budget, expert review and account review must
be performed by four different users.
2. The account clerk who signs the proposal must be in the same department as the
faculty member who prepares the proposal.
3. The persons who review the proposal must not have a conﬂict of interest with the one
submitting the proposal.
4. The account manager who reviews the proposal is responsible to submit it to the
outside sponsor.
In the above, Constraint 2 reﬂects certain procedural and duty requirements, while Con-
straint 1 enforces the principle of separation of duty. Constraint 3 follows the spirit of
separation of duty and goes beyond that. Rather than simply requiring that the two steps
must be performed by different people, the constraint requires that the people who perform
the two steps must not have a conﬂict of interest. Constraint 4 enforces a binding-of-duty
policy [6] by requiring two tasks be performed by the same user.
As security and practical requirements vary from tasks to tasks, speciﬁcation of con-
straints plays a crucial role in expression of workﬂows. As demonstrated in Example 4,
binary relations play an important role in expressing authorization constraints. Most exist-
ing workﬂow authorization models support only a few pre-deﬁned binary relations, which
limits the expressive power of these models. For example, the model proposed in [7] sup-
ports only six pre-deﬁned binary relations f=;6=;<;;>;g between users and roles.
Hence, there is no way to express relations like “in the same department” or “is a family
member”. The model in [6] supports user-deﬁned relations. Our role-and-relation-based
access control (R2BAC) model for workﬂow systems extends the model in [6] by explicitly
combining roles and relations and by supporting more sophisticated forms of constraints
using these relations.
We now introduce formal deﬁnitions for R2BAC. Note that U, R and B are names of
all possible users, roles and binary relations in the system, respectively.60
Deﬁnition 4.1.1 (Access Control State) An access control state is given by a tuple
hU;UR;Bi, where U  U is a set of users, UR  U  R is the user-role mem-
bership relation and B = f1; ;mg  B is a set of binary relations such that
i  U  U (i 2 [1;m]). For convenience, we assume that when  is in B,  is also
in B, and (u1;u2) 2  if and only if (u1;u2) 62 . Also,  is the same as . Furthermore,
we assume that B contains two predeﬁned binary relations “=” and “6=”, which denote
equality and inequality, respectively.
An access control state hU;UR;Bi deﬁnes the environment in which a workﬂow is to
be run. In particular, B should deﬁne all the binary relations that appear in any constraint
in workﬂows to be run in the environment.
Deﬁnition 4.1.2 (Workﬂow and Constraints) A workﬂow is represented as a tuple hS;
;SA;Ci, where S is a set of steps,  S  S deﬁnes a partial order among steps in S,
SA  RS, and C is a set of constraints, each of which takes one of the following forms:
1. h(s1;s2)i: the user who performs s1 and the user who perform s2 must satisfy the
binary relation .
2. h(9X;s)i: there exists a step s0 2 X such that h(s0;s)i holds, i.e., the user who
performs s0 and the user who performs s satisfy .
3. h(s;9X)i: there exists a step s0 2 X such that h(s;s0)i holds.
Intuitively, in a workﬂow hS;;SA;Ci, that si  sj (i 6= j) indicates that step si must
be performed before step sj. Steps si and sj may be performed concurrently, if neither
si  sj nor sj  si. SA is called role-step authorization and (r;s) 2 SA indicates that
members of role r are authorized to perform step s.
Also, we may introduce a new type of constraint h(8X)i to require that for any two
steps si;sj 2 X, h(si;sj)i must hold. Such a constraint can be equivalently represented
using jXj2 constraints in the form of h(s1;s2)i. The new constraint is a syntactic sugar
when we would like to express a requirement that users who perform certain steps must61
have relation  with each other. For instance, the constraint h6= (8X)i states that no user
may perform more than one steps in X. Similarly, we may deﬁne another syntactic sugar
h(s;8X)i which requires that the user who performs s has relation  with every user who
performs a step in X.
Example 5 Consider the workﬂow for submitting a grant proposal in Example 4. Let
sprepare, sbudget, sxp review, sac review and ssubmit denote the ﬁve steps in the workﬂow. The
constraints of the workﬂow can be represented in tuple-based speciﬁcation as follows.
1. h6= (8fsprepare;sbudget;sxp review;sac reviewg)i
These require that the ﬁrst four steps in the workﬂow must be performed by four
different users.
2. hsame dept(sbudget;sprepare)i
(ux;uy) 2 same dept when ux and uy are in the same department. The constraint
requires that the person who signs the proposal must be in the same department as
the person who prepares it.
3. hconflict interest(sxp review;sprepare)i
hconflict interest(sac review;sprepare)i
(ux;uy) 2 conflict interest when ux and uy have a conﬂict of interest. The constraint
requires that the person who reviews the proposal must not have a conﬂict of interest
with the person who prepares it.
4. h= (ssubmit;sac review)i
The constraint requires that account review and submission must be per-
formed by the same person.
Deﬁnition 4.1.3 (Plans and Partial Plans) A plan P for workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci is
a subset of U  S such that, for every step si 2 S, there is exactly one tuple (ua;si) in P,
where ua 2 U.62
A partial plan PP for W is a subset of U  S such that, for every step si 2 S, there is
at most one tuple (ua;si) in PP, where ua 2 U. And (ua;si) 2 PP implies that, for every
sj  si, there exists ub 2 U such that (ub;sj) 2 PP.
Intuitively, a plan assigns exactly one user to every step in a workﬂow, while a partial
plan does this for only a portion of the steps in the workﬂow. Furthermore, if a step is in a
partial plan, then its prerequisite steps must also be in the partial plan.
Deﬁnition 4.1.4 (Valid Plan) Given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, and an access con-
trol state  = hU;UR;Bi, we say that a user u is an authorized user of a step s 2 S under
 if and only if there exists a role r such that (u;r) 2 UR and (r;s) 2 SA.
We say that a plan P is valid for W under  if and only if for every (u;s) 2 P, u is an
authorized user of s, and no constraint in C is violated. We say that W is satisﬁable under
 if and only if there exists a plan P that is valid for W under .
Note that there can be multiple valid plans for a workﬂow W in an access control
state. In fact, it is the existence of multiple valid plans that makes it possible for W to
be completed even if a number of users are absent. In situations where the access control
state changes during the execution of a workﬂow instance (e.g. users become absent), we
will have to change our plan at runtime and thus constraints need to be checked at runtime
as well. Constraints are checked before the last step restricted by the constraint is to be
executed.
Deﬁnition 4.1.5 (Valid Partial Plan) Given a workﬂow hS;;SA;Ci and an access con-
trol state hU;UR;Bi, let s1; ;sm be a sequence of steps such that si 6 sj when i > j. A
partial plan PP is valid with respect to the sequence s1; ;si if it assigns one user to each
step in s1; ;si and no constraint that is checked before the execution of si is violated by
PP.63
4.2 The Workﬂow Satisﬁability Problem
A fundamental problem in workﬂow authorization systems is the Workﬂow Satisﬁa-
bility Problem (WSP), which checks whether a workﬂow W is satisﬁable under an access
control state . Note that, given an access control state hU;UR;Bi, checking whether W
is satisﬁable under  is equivalent to checking whether there is a valid plan for W under .
In this section, we study the computational complexity of WSP.
4.2.1 Computational Complexity of WSP for R2BAC
Theorem 4.2.1 WSP is NP-complete in R2BAC.
The proof of Theorem 4.2.1 consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part is Lemma 4.2.2, which
shows that WSP is in NP in R2BAC. In the second part, Lemma 4.2.3 and Lemma 4.2.4
show that WSP is NP-hard in two restricted cases.
Lemma 4.2.2 WSP is in NP in R2BAC.
Proof The length of a plan is bounded by the number of steps in the workﬂow. Given a
plan for a workﬂow, checking whether a user is authorized to perform a step can be done
in linear time. Also, checking whether a constraint is satisﬁed by the plan can be done in
polynomial time. Hence, checking whether a plan is valid can be done in polynomial time.
A nondeterministic Turing machine can thus guess a plan and check whether it is valid in
polynomial time.
Lemma 4.2.3 WSP is NP-hard in R2BAC, if the workﬂow uses constraints of the form
h6= (s1;s2)i.
Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof of the above lemma. In the proof, we use
a reduction from the NP-complete GRAPH K-COLORABILITY problem. In the reduction,
vertices in a graph are mapped to steps in the workﬂow, while colors are mapped to users.
In the GRAPH K-COLORABILITY problem, the number of vertices is normally much larger64
than the number of colors. Hence, the number of steps in the constructed workﬂow is much
larger than the number of users, which is rarely the case in practice. Such a phenomenon
indicates that classical complexity framework is inadequate to study the complexity of
WSP in a real-word setting. This motivates us to apply the tool of parameterized complex-
ity to perform ﬁner-grained study of the complexity of WSP, which will be discussed in
Section 4.3.
Lemma 4.2.4 WSP is NP-hard in R2BAC, if the workﬂow uses constraints of the form
h= (s;9X)i.
Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof of the above lemma. In the proof, we use a
reduction from the NP-complete HITTING SET problem.
Although WSP is intractable in general in R2BAC, the problem is in P for certain
special cases. Lemma 4.2.5 states a tractable case of WSP.
Lemma 4.2.5 WSP is in P in R2BAC, if the workﬂow only has constraints in the forms of
h= (s1;s2)i.
Proof Given a step s, let AU(s) be the set of users authorized to perform step s. A
constraint h= (s1;s2)i requires s1 and s2 be performed by the same user. In this case, if
AU(s1) \ AU(s2) = ;, then it is impossible to perform the two steps without violating
the constraint and the answer to the WSP instance is “no”. Otherwise, we replace AU(s1)
and AU(s2) with AU(s1) \ AU(s2) and then repeat the process for another constraint
in the workﬂow until all constraints in the workﬂow have been processed. If we ﬁnish
processing all constraints without answering “no”, the answer to the WSP instance is “yes”.
Since set intersection can be done in polynomial time and we need to compute at most jCj
intersections, a given WSP instance can be answered in polynomial time.
4.2.2 The Inherent Complexity of Workﬂow Systems
In Section 4.2.1, we show that WSP is NP-hard in R2BAC in general. In this section,
we point out that the intractability of WSP is inherent to certain fundamental features of65
workﬂow authorization systems and is independent of modeling approaches. We say that
a workﬂow system supports the feature of user-step authorization if it allows one to spec-
ify (either directly or indirectly) which users are allowed to perform which steps in the
workﬂow. User-step authorization is probably the most fundamental feature and almost all
workﬂowsystemsfoundinexistingliteraturesupportsuchafeature. Auser-inequalitycon-
straint states that certain two steps cannot be performed by the same user, i.e., h6= (s1;s2)i
in R2BAC. An existence-equality constraint states that a certain step must be performed by
a user who performs at least one step in a given set of steps, i.e., h= (s;9X)i in R2BAC.
Theorem 4.2.6 Checking whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow is NP-hard for
any workﬂow system that supports user-step authorization and user-inequality constraints.
Proof The reduction from GRAPH K-COLORABILITY in the proof of Lemma 4.2.3 only
makes use of user-step authorization and user-inequality constraints offered by R2BAC.
Therefore, the reduction also applies to the satisﬁability problem for any workﬂow system
that supports these two features.
Note that user-inequality constraints are widely used in existing literature to enforce
separation of duty in workﬂow systems. Many workﬂow models [5–7] support such type
of constraints.
Theorem 4.2.7 Checking whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow is NP-hard
for any workﬂow system that supports user-step authorization and existence-equality con-
straints.
Proof The reduction from HITTING SET in the proof of Lemma 4.2.4 only makes use
of user-step authorization and existence-equality constraints offered by R2BAC. Therefore,
the reduction also applies to the satisﬁability problem for any workﬂow system that sup-
ports these two features.
Note that existence-equality constraint is a natural way to enforce the general form of
binding of duty policies, which require a step be performed by one of those users who have
performed some prerequisite steps.66
4.3 Beyond Intractability of WSP
InSection4.2, wehaveshownthatWSPisNP-completeinR2BACforthegeneralcase
as well as the two special cases where only a simple form of constraints are used. Such
results, however, are unsatisfying, as they do not shed light on the computation cost associ-
ated with introducing additional expressive features such as user-deﬁned binary relations,
since the complexity of WSP is NP-complete in all the three cases. Such a phenomenon
indicates that classical computational complexity does not precisely capture the computa-
tional difﬁculty of different cases of WSP. Furthermore, the practical signiﬁcance of such
intractability results is unclear. The input to WSP consists of many aspects, such as the
number of steps in the workﬂow, the number of constraints and the number of users in the
access control state etc. In practice, some aspects of the input do not take a large value.
For instance, even though the number of users may be large, the number of steps in the
workﬂow is expected to be small. An interesting question that arises is whether WSP can
be solved efﬁciently given the restriction that the number of steps is small.
To address these issues, we apply tools from the theory of parameterized complex-
ity [27] to WSP.
4.3.1 Why Parameterized Complexity?
Parameterized complexity is a measure of complexity of problems with multiple input
parameters. The theory of parameterized complexity was developed in the 1990s by Rod
Downey and Michael Fellows. It is motivated, among other things, by the observation that
there exist hard problems that (most likely) require exponential runtime when complex-
ity is measured in terms of the input size only, but that are computable in a time that is
polynomial in the input size and exponential in a (small) parameter k. Hence, if k is ﬁxed
at a small value, such problems can still be considered ‘tractable’ despite their traditional
classiﬁcation as ‘intractable’.
In classical complexity, a decision problem is speciﬁed by two items of information: (1)
the input to the problem, and (2) the question to be answered. In parameterized complexity,67
there are three parts of a problem speciﬁcation: (1) the input to the problem, (2) the aspects
of the input that constitute the parameter, and (3) the question to be answered. Normally,
the parameter is selected because it is likely to be conﬁned to a small range in practice.
The parameter provides a systematic way of specifying restrictions of the input instances.
Some NP-hard problems can be solved by algorithms that are exponential only in a ﬁxed
parameter while polynomial in the size of the input. Such an algorithm is called a ﬁxed-
parameter tractable algorithm. More speciﬁcally, an algorithm for solving a problem is a
ﬁxed-parameter tractable algorithm, if when given any input instance of the problem with
parameter k, the algorithm takes time O(f(k)n), where n is the size of the input, k is the
parameter,  is a constant (independent of k), and f is an arbitrary function.
If a problem has a ﬁxed-parameter tractable algorithm, then we say that it is a ﬁxed-
parametertractableproblemandbelongstotheclassFPT. Forexample, theNP-complete
VERTEX COVER asks, given a graph G and an integer k, whether there is a size-k set V 0 of
vertices, such that every edge in G is adjacent to at least one vertex in V 0. This problem is in
FPT when taking k as the parameter, as there exists a simple algorithm with running time
of O(2kn), where n is the size of G. Note that not all intractable problems are in FPT.
For instance, the NP-complete DOMINATING SET problem is ﬁxed-parameter intractable.
Given a graph G and an integer k, DOMINATING SET asks whether there is a size-k set V 0
of vertices such that every vertex in G is either in V 0 or is connected to a vertex in V 0 by an
edge. For DOMINATING SET, there is no signiﬁcant alternative to trying all size-k subsets
of vertices in G and there are O(nk) such subsets, where n is the number of vertices.
Finally, we would like to point out that a problem in FPT does not necessarily mean
that it can be efﬁciently solved as long as the parameter is small. Note that f(k) may be
a function that grows very fast over k. For instance, an O(kkkn) algorithm is not practi-
cal even if k is as small as 5, just as we cannot claim that a problem in P can be solved
efﬁciently when the best algorithm takes time O(n100). However, showing that a prob-
lem is in FPT has signiﬁcant impact as experiences have shown that improvement on
ﬁxed-parameter tractable algorithms are oftentimes possible. For instance, when VERTEX
COVER was ﬁrst observed to be solvable in O(f(k)n3), f(k) was such a function that the68
algorithm is utterly impractical even for k = 1. An O(2kn) algorithm was proposed later,
and then an algorithm with running time O(kn+(4=3)kk2) was revealed. Right now, VER-
TEX COVER is well-solved for input of any size, as long as the parameter value is k  60.
Parameterized complexity offers a fresh angle into designing algorithms for such problems.
In this dissertation, we only study which subcases of WSP are in FPT and which are
not. Improvement on the ﬁxed-parameter tractable algorithms for the FPT cases is beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
4.3.2 Fixed Parameter Tractable Cases of WSP
As the number of steps in a workﬂow is likely to be small in practice, we select the
number of steps as the parameter for WSP. We ﬁrst show that a special case of WSP in
which only the 6= relation is allowed is in FPT. The proof gives a ﬁxed-parameter tractable
algorithm and illustrates the intuition why this problem is in FPT.
Lemma 4.3.1 WSP in R2BAC is in FPT, if 6= is the only binary relation used by con-
straints in the workﬂow. In particular, given a workﬂow W and an access control state ,
WSP can be solved in time O(kk+1n), where k is the number of steps in W and n is the
size of the entire input to the problem.
Proof A constraint using binary relation 6= requires a certain step to be performed by a
user who does not perform certain other step(s). Since there are k steps in W, if step s
is authorized to no less than k users in U, then we can always ﬁnd an authorized user of
s, who is not assigned to any other steps in W. In other words, we only need to consider
those steps that are authorized to less than k users in U, and there are at most k such steps.
We construct partial plans for these steps by trying all combinations of authorized users
and there are no more than kk such combinations. Verifying whether a plan is valid can be
done in O(kn), as there are O(n) constraints and each constraints restricts at most k steps.
Therefore, checking whether U can complete W can be done in time O(kk+1n).69
The following Theorem subsumes Lemma 4.3.1.
Theorem 4.3.2 WSP is in FPT in R2BAC, if = and 6= are the only binary relations used
by constraints in the workﬂow.
Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof of Theorem 4.3.2. In the proof of Theo-
rem4.3.2, wefocusonshowingthattheproblemisinFPT. Improvingtheﬁxed-parameter
tractable algorithm in the proof is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
4.3.3 WSP Is Fixed Parameterized Intractable in General
A natural question to ask is whether WSP is still in FPT when user-deﬁned binary
relations are allowed in the workﬂow. We show that the answer is “no”. Similar to proving
a problem is intractable in classical complexity framework, we prove that a problem is
ﬁxed-parameter intractable by reducing another ﬁxed-parameter intractable problem to the
target problem. To preserve ﬁxed-parameter tractability, we need to use a kind of reduction
different from the classical ones used in NP-completeness proofs. We say that L reduces
to L0 by a ﬁxed-parameter reduction if given an instance hx;ki for L, one can compute
an instance hx0 = g1(hx;ki);k0 = g2(k)i in time O(f(k)jxj) such that hx;ki 2 L if and
only if hx0;k0i 2 L0, where g1 and g2 are two functions and  is a constant. Note that
many classical reductions are not ﬁxed-parameter reduction as they do not carry enough
structure, which leads to lose of control for the parameter.
Under parameterized complexity, each problem falls somewhere in the hierarchy: P 
FPT  W[1]  W[2]    W[P]  NP. If a problem is W[1]-hard, then it is
believed to be ﬁxed-parameter intractable. To understand the classes W[t], we can start
by viewing a 3CNF formula as a (boolean) decision circuit, consisting of one input for
each variable and structurally a large and gate taking inputs from a number of small or
gates. (Some wires in the circuit may include a negation.) The or gates are small in
that each of them takes 3 inputs, and the and gate is large in that it takes an unbounded
number of inputs. The weft of a decision circuit is the maximum number of large gates on
any path from the input variable to the output line. The weighted satisﬁability problem for70
decision circuits asks whether a decision circuit has a weight k satisfying assignment (i.e., a
satisfying assignment in which at most k variables are set to true). The class W[t] includes
all problems that are ﬁxed parameter reducible to the weighted satisﬁability problem for
decision circuits of weft t.
The following theorem states that WSP is ﬁxed-parameter intractable in R2BAC when
user-deﬁned binary relations are allowed in the workﬂow. The proof of the theorem is in
Appendix B.1.
Theorem 4.3.3 WSP is W[1]-hard in R2BAC if user-deﬁned binary relations are used in
constraints.
We conclude from Theorem 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3 that supporting user-deﬁned bi-
nary relations introduces additional complexity to WSP in R2BAC. Parameterized com-
plexity reveals such a fact that is hidden by classical complexity framework and allows us
to better understand the source of complexity of WSP in R2BAC. We point out that a naive
algorithm solving WSP for R2BAC, which enumerates all possible plans and veriﬁes each
of them, takes time O(knk+1), which may be acceptable when k and n are small. We also
note that it is possible to develop algorithms with heuristic optimizations that can solve
WSP efﬁciently for practical instances; the study of such algorithms is beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
Finally, we provide an upperbound of the complexity of WSP in R2BAC in the param-
eterized complexity framework.
Theorem 4.3.4 WSP in R2BAC is in W[2].
Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof of Theorem 4.3.4. It remains open whether
WSP is W[1]-complete or W[2]-complete.
4.4 Resiliency in Workﬂow Systems
We have studied the workﬂow satisﬁability problem (WSP) in previous sections. In
many situations, it is not enough to ensure that a workﬂow is satisﬁable in the current71
access control state. In particular, when the workﬂow is designed to complete a critical
task, it is necessary to guarantee that even if certain users are absent unexpectedly, the
workﬂow can still be completed. Resiliency is a property of those system conﬁgurations
that can satisfy the workﬂow even with absence of some users.
In this section, we deﬁne and study resiliency in workﬂow systems. The workﬂow
model we use is R2BAC. Before giving formal deﬁnitions of resiliency in workﬂow sys-
tems, let’s consider three scenarios.
1. The execution of instances of a workﬂow is done in a relatively short period of time,
say within ﬁfteen minutes. Although it is possible that certain users are absent before
the execution of a workﬂow instance, it is unlikely that available users become absent
during the execution of the workﬂow instance. In other words, the set of users who
are available for a workﬂow instance is stable.
2. The execution of instances of a workﬂow takes a relatively long period of time, say
within one day. Some users may not come to work on the day when a workﬂow
instance is executed. Furthermore, some users may have to leave at some point (e.g.
between the execution of two steps) before the workﬂow instance is completed and
will not come back to work until the next day. In such a situation, the set of users
available to the workﬂow instance becomes smaller and smaller over time. Such a
scenario would also be possible in potentially hazardous situations such as battleﬁeld
and ﬁre-ﬁghting.
3. The execution of instances of a workﬂow takes a long period of time. For example,
only a single step of the workﬂow is performed each day. Since the set of users who
come to work may differ from day to day, the set of available users may differ from
step to step.
Wecapturetheabovethreescenariosbyproposingthreelevelsofresiliencyinworkﬂow
systems. They are static (level-1) resiliency, decremental (level-2) resiliency and dynamic
(level-3) resiliency. In static resiliency, a number of users are absent before the execution72
of a workﬂow instance, while remaining users will not be absent during the execution; in
decremental resiliency, users may be absent before or during the execution of a workﬂow
instance, and absent users will not become available again; in dynamic resiliency, users
may be absent before or during the execution of a workﬂow instance and absent users may
become available again. In all cases, we assume that the number of absent users at any
point is bounded by a parameter t. We now give formal deﬁnitions of the three levels of
resiliency.
Deﬁnition 4.4.1 (Static Resiliency) Given a workﬂow W and an integer t  0, an access
control state hU;UR;Bi is statically resilient for W up to t absent users if and only if for
every size-t subset U0 of U, W is satisﬁable under h(U   U0);UR;Bi.
Intuitively, an access control state is statically resilient for a workﬂow if the workﬂow
is still satisﬁable after removing t users from the access control state.
Deﬁnition 4.4.2 (Decremental Resiliency) Given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an
integer t, an access control state hU;UR;Bi is decrementally resilient for W up to t absent
users, if and only if Player 1 can always win the following two-person game when playing
optimally.
Initialization: PP   ;, U0   U, S0   S, t0   t and i   1.
Round i of the Game:
1. Player 2 selects a set U0
i 1 such that jU0
i 1j  ti 1.
Ui   (Ui 1   U0
i 1) and ti   (ti 1   jU0
i 1j).
2. Player 1 selects a step sai 2 Si 1 such that 8sb(sb  sai ) sb 62 Si 1).
Player 1 selects a user u 2 Ui.
PP   PP [ f(u;sai)g and
Si   (Si 1   fsaig).
If PP is not a valid partial plan with respect to the sequence sa1; ;sai, then Player
1 loses.73
3. If Si = ;, then Player 1 wins; otherwise, let i   (i + 1) and the game goes on to the
next round.
In each round, Player 2 may remove a certain number of users and then Player 1 has to pick
a remaining step that is ready to be performed and assign an available user to it. The total
number of users Player 2 may remove throughout the game is bounded by t. An access
control state is decrementally resilient for a workﬂow if there is always a way to complete
the workﬂow no matter when and which users are removed, as long as the total number of
absent users is bounded by t.
Also, in Deﬁnition 4.4.2, we assume that Player 1 plays optimally, which implies that
in each round, Player 1 has to consider not only the next step but also all future steps.
Example 6 There is a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an access control state
hU;UR;Bi, where S = fs1;s2g, s1  s2, C = fh6= (s1;s2)ig, SA =
f(r1;s1);(r2;s2)g, and UR = f(Alice;r1);(Alice;r2);(Bob;r1);(Carl;r2)g. All users in
U = fAlice;Bob;Carlg are available before the execution of s1. Consider the following
two choices of user assignment for s1.
1. Alice is assigned to perform s1: If Carl becomes absent after the execution of s1,
then Alice is the only user authorized to perform s2. However, assigning Alice to
s2 violates the constraint h6= (s1;s2)i. That is to say, the remaining users cannot
complete the workﬂow.
2. Bob is assigned to perform s1: In this case, no matter which single user becomes
absent after the execution of s1, we can always ﬁnd an authorized user (either Alice
or Carl) to perform s2 without violating the constraint h6= (s1;s2)i.
Thus it is clear that having Bob perform s1 is a better choice than having Alice with respect
to resiliency. Actually, it can be proved that this access control state is decrementally
resilient for W up to one absent user.
Deﬁnition 4.4.3 (Dynamic Resiliency) Given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an in-
teger t, an access control state hU;UR;Bi is dynamically resilient for W up to t absent74
users, if and only if Player 1 can always win the following two-person game when playing
optimally.
Initialization: PP   ;, S0   S and i   1.
Round i of the Game:
1. Player 2 selects a set U0
i 1 of up to t users.
Ui   (U   U0
i 1).
2. Player 1 selects a step sai 2 Si 1 such that 8sb(sb  sai ) sb 62 Si 1).
Player 1 selects a user u 2 Ui.
PP   PP [ f(u;sai)g and
Si   (Si 1   fsaig).
If PP is not a valid partial plan with respect to the sequence sa1; ;sai, then Player
1 loses.
3. If Si = ;, then Player 1 wins; otherwise, let i   (i + 1) and the game goes on to the
next round.
Intuitively, Player 2 may temporarily remove up to t users from the access control state
at the beginning of each round. Then, Player 1 has to select a remaining step that is ready
to be performed and assign an available user to it. After that, the access control state is
restored and the next round of the game starts.
Thefollowingtheoremstatesarelationshipamongthethreelevelsofresiliencyinwork-
ﬂow systems: dynamic (level-3) resiliency is stronger than decremental (level-2) resiliency,
which is in turn stronger than static (level-1) resiliency.
Theorem 4.4.1 Given a workﬂow W, an access control state  and an integer t, the fol-
lowing are true.
 If  is dynamically resilient for W up to t absent users, then it is also decrementally
resilient for W up to t absent users.75
 If  is decrementally resilient for W up to t absent users, then it is also statically
resilient for W up to t absent users.
But the reverse of either of the above statements is not true.
Proof The game deﬁning dynamic resiliency allows Player 2 to play any strategy he/she
can in the game deﬁning decremental resiliency. The same relation holds between the
game deﬁning decremental resiliency and the deﬁnition of static resiliency. Therefore, the
theorem holds.
4.4.1 Computational Complexities of Checking Resiliency
Theorem 4.4.2 Checking whether an access control state  is statically resilient for a
workﬂow W up to t users, which is called the Static Resiliency Checking Problem (SRCP),
is NP-hard and is in coNP
NP.
Proof When t = 0, SRCP degenerates to WSP. Since WSP is NP-complete, SRCP is
NP-hard.
Next, we prove that the problem is in coNP
NP. From Lemma 4.2.2, checking whether
a workﬂow is satisﬁable under an access control state hU;UR;Bi is in NP. We now
construct a nondeterministic oracle Turing machine M that decides the complement of the
problem. Assume that M has access to an NP oracle N which checks whether a workﬂow
is satisﬁable under an access control state. M nondeterministically selects a set U0 of t
users and asks N whether the workﬂow is satisﬁable under h(U   U0);UR;Bi. If the
answer is “yes”, M returns “no”; otherwise, M returns “yes”. In this case, M returns “yes”
if and only if the answer to the SRCP instance is “no”. In general, SRCP is in coNP
NP.
It remains open whether SRCP is coNP
NP-complete or not. Readers who are familiar
with computational complexity theory will recognize that coNP
NP is a complexity class
in the Polynomial Hierarchy. Because the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses when P = NP,
showing that an NP-hard decision problem is in the Polynomial Hierarchy, although is not76
equivalent to showing that the problem is NP-complete, has the same consequence: the
problem can be solved in polynomial time if and only if P =NP.
Theorem 4.4.3 Checking whether an access control state  is decremental resilient for a
workﬂow W up to t users, which is called the Decremental Resiliency Checking Problem
(CRCP), is PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 4.4.4 Checking whether an access control state  is dynamically resilient for
a workﬂow W up to t users, which is called the Dynamic Resiliency Checking Problem
(DRCP), is PSPACE-complete.
Please refer to Appendix B.2 for proofs of Theorem 4.4.3 and 4.4.4. In the proofs,
we reduce the PSPACE-complete QUANTIFIED SATISFIABILITY problem to CRCP or
DRCP. Intuitively, we use user-step assignments in workﬂow to simulate truth assignments
for boolean variables.
Note that given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, there may not exist an access control
state that is decrementally or dynamically resilient for W even just up to one absent user,
when the equality relation is used in constraints. For instance, assume that S = fs1;s2g,
s1  s2 and C = fh= (s1;s2)ig. Constraint h= (s1;s2)i requires s1 and s2 be performed
by the same user. (Such constraints appear in [6] under the name binding-of-duty con-
straints.) If the user who executed s1 becomes absent before the execution of s2, then there
is no way to ﬁnish the workﬂow without violating the constraint no matter which users re-
main available. This illustrate that bind-of-duty constraints can make it difﬁcult to achieve
decremental or dynamic resiliency. This problem can be addressed either by not using such
constraints in settings where such resiliency is desirable, or by introducing mechanisms
such as delegation.77
5 DELEGATION IN WORKFLOW AUTHORIZATION SYSTEMS
In the last chapter, we have studied satisﬁability and resiliency in workﬂow authorization
systems. There are a couple of ways to enforce resiliency policies in workﬂow authoriza-
tionsystems. Oneapproachistohaveenoughredundancyofhumanresourcesinthesystem
conﬁguration. However, this approach leads to high costs. An alternative approach is to
use user-to-user delegation (or delegation for short). Delegation is a mechanism that allows
a user A to act on another user B’s behalf by making B’s access rights available to A. It
is well recognized as an important mechanism to provide fault-tolerance and ﬂexibility in
access control systems, and has gained popularity in the research community [9–17].
Essentially, a delegation operation temporarily changes the access control state so as to
allow a user to use another user’s access privileges. While delegation can make an access
control system more resilient to absence of users, it may lead to violation of security poli-
cies, especially static separation of duty policies. For instance, if role r1 and role r2 are
mutually exclusive, then a user who is a member of r1 should not be allowed to receive
r2 from others through delegation. In contrast to normal access right administration op-
erations, which are performed centrally, delegation operations are usually performed in a
distributed manner. That is to say, users have certain control on the delegation of their own
rights. In order to prevent abuse, some delegation models support speciﬁcation of autho-
rization rules, which control who can delegate what privileges to other users as well as who
can receive what privileges from others.
Delegation may be viewed as a module that introduces additional functionalities into
access control systems. To enhance existing access control systems with delegation, one
needs to incorporate a delegation module into those systems. A naive approach is to place
the delegation module on top of the access control module, and let the delegation module
handle delegation operations and manipulate access control conﬁguration. For example,
when Alice delegates the role r to Bob, the access control conﬁguration is modiﬁed so that78
Bob is authorized for r in the new conﬁguration. The underlying access control module
consults the access control conﬁguration without concerning delegation. Even though such
a naive approach is simple and allows reusing existing implementation of access control
modules, it introduces security breaches into the system. As we point out in Section 5.1.1,
colluding users could exploit such breaches to circumvent security policies in the access
control system. Due to the decentralized nature of delegation and the fact that not all the
users in the system are trusted, collusion is a threat that must not be overlooked.
Since the naive approach could be insecure, more sophisticated methods are needed to
create a secure system with delegation support. Surprisingly, even though delegation is
well recognized as a very useful component of access control systems, to our knowledge,
no work has performed in-depth study on how to incorporate a delegation module into
access control systems in a secure manner. In this chapter, we formally deﬁne the notion of
security with respect to delegation. Intuitively, if an access control system is secure, then
any group of users cannot “enhance the power” (i.e. become capable to complete more
tasks than before) of the group through mutual delegation within the group. To justify this
intuition, by delegating her privileges to user A, user B allows A to work on her behalf.
This indicates that A gains no more than what B has, and thus, A should not be able to do
more than A and B together can do before the delegation operation. This further implies
that, after the delegation operation, A and B as a group cannot do more than before. If a
system does not have such a property, when A and B collude, they may gain extra power by
delegating privilegesto each other. In thatcase, agroup of colludingusers can domore than
they are supposed to do with the “help” of delegation, and the system is thus considered to
be insecure with respect to delegation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst provide a formal def-
inition of security with respect to delegation in Section 5.1 and then study enforcement
mechanisms for delegation security in Section 5.2. Finally, we discuss how to use delega-
tion to enforce resiliency in Section 5.3.79
5.1 Delegation in Workﬂow Authorization Systems
Delegation is a mechanism that allows a user A to act on another user B’s behalf by
making B’s access rights available to A. Delegation is an effective approach to enforce
resiliency in workﬂow authorization systems. To achieve resiliency, we may delegate the
privileges of absent users to available users so that steps that are only authorized to absent
users can now be completed. We will discuss how to enforce resiliency using delegation in
detail in Section 5.3.
Even though delegation is effective in achieving resiliency, simply adding delegation
support to a workﬂow authorization system may lead to security breaches. In particular,
colluding users may circumvent security constrains in workﬂows using delegation. In this
section, we study the impact of delegation on the security of workﬂow authorization sys-
tems. We ﬁrst provide deﬁnitions related to delegation and formalize delegation operations
as access control state transition operations. Next, in Section 5.1.1, we give examples on
delegation-based attacks on workﬂow authorization systems. Finally, in Section 5.1.2, we
formally deﬁne the notion of security with respect to delegation in access control systems.
Deﬁnition 5.1.1 (Access Control State with Delegation) An access control state  is
given as a tuple hUR;PA;DR;Bi, where UR  U  R is user-role membership relation,
DR  U  U  R  f\g";\t"g is delegation relation, and B is a set of binary relations
between users.
The representation of access control state in Deﬁnition 5.1.1 is similar to that in Deﬁ-
nition 4.1.1, except that a delegation relation DR is included in the new deﬁnition. In the
delegation relation DR, (u1;u2;r;\g") indicates that u1 has delegated the role r to u2 via a
grant operation, while (u1;u2;r;\t") indicates that u1 has delegated the role r to u2 via a
transfer operation. The difference between grant and transfer will be discussed later in this
section.
Given a state , each user has a set of roles for which the user is authorized. A user
is authorized for a role r if and only if he/she is a member of r or he/she received r from80
another user through delegation. We formalize this by deﬁning a function authR : U  !
2R, where   is the set of all states.
authR(u;hUR;PA;DR;Bi) = fr j (u;r) 2 UR
_ 9u0((u
0;u;r;\g") 2 DR _ (u
0;u;r;\t") 2 DR)g
When a user u is authorized for the role r, he/she is authorized for the permissions assigned
to r.
Next, we introduce the notations related to delegation. Assume that Alice delegates
the role Accountant to Bob. In such an operation, Alice, who is the granter of privilege,
is called delegator; Bob, who is the receiver of privilege, is called delegatee; the role
Accountant is the delegated privilege. We assume that each delegation operation has only
one delegated privilege. If a user wants to delegate multiple privileges to the same receiver,
he/she can perform multiple delegation operations.
A delegation operation is essentially an access control state transition operation, which
takes one of the following three forms:
 grant(u1;u2;r): user u1 grants role r to user u2. After the delegation operation, u2
gains r and u1 still keeps r.
 trans(u1;u2;r): user u1 transfers role r to user u2. After the delegation operation,
u2 gains r and u1 (temporarily) loses r.
 revoke(u1;u2;r): user u1 revokes the delegated privilege, role r, from u2.
Note that a user can grant or transfer only the roles he/she is a member of to others.
To simplify delegation relation, we assume that a delegatee cannot further delegate the
delegated privilege to other users, and only the corresponding delegator can revoke the
delegated privilege from the delegatee.
Since delegation is performed in a distributed manner, in the sense that everyone may
perform delegation operations, it is undesirable to allow a user to delegate his/her roles
in a completely unrestricted way. Delegation operations are thus subject to the control of
authorization rules, which takes one of the following three forms:81
 can grant(cond;r): a user who satisﬁes condition cond can grant r to other users,
where cond is an expression formed using roles, the binary operators ^ and _, the
unary operator :, and parentheses.
 can transfer(cond;r): a user who satisﬁes condition cond can transfer r to other
users.
 can receive(cond;r): a user who satisﬁes condition cond can receive r from other
users.
For example, the rule can receive(Clerk ^ :Treasurer;Accountant) states that
anyone who is a member of Clerk but not a member of Treasurer can receive the
role Accountant.
Deﬁnition 5.1.2 (Administrative State) An administrative state consists of a set RL of
authorization rules. Given RL, a delegation operation grant(u1;u2;r) (or similarly,
trans(u1;u2;r)) succeeds in the state hUR;PA;DR;Bi if and only if
(u1;r) 2 UR ^ can grant(c1;r) 2 RL ^ (u1 satisﬁes c1)
^ can receive(c2;r) 2 RL ^ (u2 satisﬁes c2)
Otherwise, the delegation operation fails.
To simplify management, we assume that if a user u1 granted or transferred a role r to
u2 and has not revoked r from u2 yet, then u1 can neither grant nor transfer r to u2 again.
That is to say, at any moment, a user may receive a role from the same user at most once.
But a user may receive the same role from different users.
We use  !RL
op 0 to denote the state transition from  to 0 after applying the delegation
operationop underadministrativestateRL. Let = hUR;PA;DR;Bi. Thestatetransition
rules are described as follows:
 op = grant(u1;u2;r): If op fails, then 0 = . Otherwise, 0 = hUR;PA;DR
0;Bi,
where DR
0 = DR [ f(u1;u2;r;\g")g.82
 If op = trans(u1;u2;r): If op fails, then 0 = . Otherwise, 0 =
hUR
0;PA;DR
0;Bi, where UR
0 = UR=fu1;rg and DR
0 = DR [ f(u1;u2;r;\t")g.
 If op = revoke(u1;u2;r): There are three cases. Let 0 = hUR
0;PA;DR
0;Bi.
– If (u1;u2;r;\g") 2 DR, then UR
0 = UR and DR
0 = DR=f(u1;u2;r;\g")g.
– If (u1;u2;r;\t") 2 DR, then UR
0 = UR [ f(u1;r)g and DR
0 =
DR=f(u1;u2;r;\t")g.
– Otherwise, 0 = . It indicates that u2 did not receive r from u1 in , and thus
the revocation fails.
Note that PA and B are not affected by state transition rules.
With the above state transition rules, we may apply a sequence Q of delegation opera-
tions one by one to  and acquire 0. We say that 0 is reachable from  under administra-
tive state RL, which is denoted as   RL
Q 0.
An access control system with delegation support is deﬁned in below.
Deﬁnition 5.1.3 An access control system is represented as a 3-tuple h;W;RLi, where 
is the initial access control state, W is a set of workﬂows and RL is the administrative state.
We assume that in the initial state  = hUR;PA;DR;Bi of an access control system,
we always have DR = ;. That is to say, no delegation operations have been performed in
the initial state.
5.1.1 Circumventing Security Policies Using Delegation
In this section, we consider how malicious users may collude to circumvent security
policies in access control systems. We present two examples describing two scenarios,
in which colluding users successfully complete those tasks that they would not be able to
complete without the “help” of delegation. After each example, we summarize the charac-
teristic of the attack in the scenario.83
Example 7 In an institution, a sensitive task t must be completed by a single user who is a
member of both roles r1 and r2. Task t is modeled as workﬂow w1 = hS;;SA;Ci, where
S =fs1;s2g;s1  s2
C =fh= (s1;s2)ig
Permissions to perform s1 and s2 are assigned to r1 and r2, respectively. The constraint in
C requires that the two steps must be performed by the same user, which enforces that an
instance of w1 can be completed only by a user who is a member of both r1 and r2.
Alice and Bob are employees of the institution. Alice is a member of r1 but not r2,
while Bob is a member of r2 but not r1. Clearly, neither Alice nor Bob is qualiﬁed to
complete an instance of w1. However, if Alice delegates (either by grant or transfer) r1 to
Bob, then Bob is authorized to perform both s1 and s2 and he is thus able to complete an
instance of w1. In other words, if Alice and Bob collude, they can complete a task which
they should not be able to complete.
In Example 7, Alice “lends” her role membership of r1 to Bob to make him more “pow-
erful” than before. The example demonstrates that, using delegation, a group of colluding
users may create a “more powerful” user by aggregating role memberships of different in-
dividuals in the group. In that case, security policies that require a single user (rather than
multiple users) with multiple role memberships to complete a task could be circumvented.
Example 8 Inacompany, thetaskofissuingchecksismodeledasaworkﬂowconsistingof
two steps spre and sapp, which stand for “check preparation” and “approval”, respectively.
In order to prevent fraudulent transactions, spre and sapp must be performed by two different
members of the role Treasurer (or two Treasurers for short). The workﬂow can be
represented as w2 = hS;;SA;Ci, where
S =fspre;sappg;spre  sapp
C =fh6= (spre;sapp)ig
Also, for the sake of resiliency, the company allows a Treasurer to transfer his/her
role to a Clerk in case he/she is not able to work due to sickness or some84
other reasons. In other words, can transfer(Treasurer;Treasurer) 2 RL and
can receive(Clerk;Treasurer) 2 RL.
Alice and Bob are employees of the company and they decided to collude to issue
checksforthemselves. Alice isaTreasurer, whileBob isaClerkandisthusnotqualiﬁed
to perform any step in w2. To achieve the goal, Alice and Bob do the followings:
1. Alice performs trans(Alice;Bob;Treasurer), which makes Bob a member of the
role Treasurer.
2. Bob performs spre to prepare a check for Alice.
3. Alice performs revoke(Alice;Bob;Treasurer) to revoke Treasurer from Bob and
regains the role.
4. Alice performs sapp to approve the check prepared by Bob.
What the workﬂow system sees is that spre and sapp are performed by two different
users. Thus, the constraint h6= (spre;sapp)i is satisﬁed and the operation succeeds.
After all of the above being done, a check is issued and Alice and Bob may share the
money.
In Example 8, Alice’s role membership of Treasurer is used twice by two different
users in the same workﬂow instance. This example demonstrates that colluding users can
make “copies” of their access privileges using delegation to bypass security constraints that
enforce separation of duty.
5.1.2 Formal Deﬁnition of Security
We have seen examples on how colluding users may circumvent security policies in
access control systems with the help of delegation. It is clear that if an access control
system allows colluding users to bypass security policies, then the system is insecure. But,
how can we tell whether a security policy has been circumvented by delegation operations?85
What should a “secure” system look like? We answer these fundamental questions by
formally deﬁning the notion of security with respect to delegation.
First of all, we present a general deﬁnition of security, which is independent of the
concrete design of access control systems. Given an access control system, we deﬁne the
predicate can complete, such that can complete(t;U1;U2;) is “true” if and only if users
in U1 together can complete task t when the initial access control state is  and only users
in U2 can perform delegation operations. The concrete deﬁnition of can complete depends
on how tasks are modeled and the concrete design of access control systems. We say that a
group of users becomes more powerful (or gain power enhancement) when they eventually
complete a task that they are not able to complete in the initial state (delegation is needed to
change the state in this case). Intuitively, if an access control system is secure with respect
to delegation, then a group of users cannot enhance the power of the group by performing
delegation operations within the group. The following deﬁnition formally states such an
intuition.
Deﬁnition 5.1.4 (Delegation Security) An access control system with initial access con-
trol state  is secure with respect to delegation if and only if the following is true:
8t2T 8UU can complete(t;U;U;) ) can complete(t;U;;;)
where T is the set of all tasks and U is the set of all users in the system.
In the above deﬁnition, can complete(t;U;U;) is “true” if and only if users in U
together can complete t when the initial state is  and delegation is available in such a way:
the users may perform delegation operations to change the access control state, but no user
outside of U is allowed to perform delegation operations. That is to say, users in U cannot
get “help” from outsiders. In contrast, can complete(t;U;;;) is “true” if and only if users
in U together can complete t in state  and no delegation operation is allowed. In general,
Deﬁnition 5.1.4 essentially states that, in a secure access control system, if a set of users
can complete a task without receiving any privilege from outsiders, then they must be able
to compete the task without delegation at all. That is to say, delegation does not enable a
set of users to enhance their own power by themselves.86
The notion of security introduced in Deﬁnition 5.1.4 respects the deﬁnition of delega-
tion. Delegation is deﬁned as a mechanism that allows a user A to act on another user B’s
behalf by making B’s access rights available to A. Let  and 0 be the states before and
after a delegation operation from B to A, respectively. The fact that A is working on B’s
behalf in 0 indicates that A should not be able to do more than A and B together (i.e.
fA;Bg) can do in . Furthermore, since B does not gain anything by delegating his/her
privileges to A, fA;Bg in 0 cannot be more powerful than fA;Bg in . By generaliz-
ing such an argument to groups with arbitrary number of users, we acquire the notion of
security in Deﬁnition 5.1.4.
We now illustrate the effect of delegation in a secure access control system by giving
an example. Assume that Alice grants (or transfers) a role r to Bob. Then, Bob may
become more powerful by acquiring r. Furthermore, every group G such that Bob 2 G and
Alice 62 G may become more powerful as well, because one of its member (Bob) received
a privilege from an outsider (Alice). However, every group G0 such that Alice;Bob 2
G0 should not gain power enhancement. Otherwise, G0 enhances its own power after a
delegation operation between its members and the access control system is insecure by
Deﬁnition 5.1.4. In general, in a secure access control system, a group of users may gain
power enhancement only if they receive privileges from outsiders.
Deﬁnition 5.1.4 is general and independent of concrete access control systems. In this
chapter, tasks are modeled as workﬂows. We provide a more concrete deﬁnition of security
for workﬂow authorization systems in below.
Deﬁnition 5.1.5 (Delegation Security for Workﬂow) An access control system
h;W;RLi is secure with respect to delegation if and only if an adversary can never
win the following one-person game.
Round 0:
The adversary selects a workﬂow w 2 W and a set U of users, such that U cannot
complete w in  without delegation. If such a combination of w and U does not exist,87
then the adversary loses (in this case, the system is trivially secure as everyone is able
to complete every task).
PP   ;andSS   S, wherePP recordspastuser-stepassignmentsandSS records
the remaining steps.
i   1 and 0   .
Round i:
1. The adversary designs a sequence Qi of delegation operations such that every
delegation operation in Qi involves only users in U 1. The adversary applies Qi
to i 1 and acquires a new state i.
2. The adversary selects a step s from SS such that 8s02S(s0  s ) s0 62 SS).
The adversary selects a user u from U as well.
If u is not authorized for s in i, then the adversary loses.
Otherwise, PP   PP [ f(u;s)g and SS   SS=fsg.
3. If SS = ;, then
If no constraint in C is violated by PP, then
The adversary wins;
Otherwise, the adversary loses.
Otherwise, i   i + 1 and the game continues to the next round.
Note that in the above game, the effect of delegation operations is subject to RL. The
adversary can perform a sequence of delegation operations to change the access control
state at the beginning of each round. The game allows delegation operations between the
execution of two steps (i.e. between two rounds) so that users can perform revocation to
regain the roles that were transferred to other users in previous rounds. This gives the
adversary more advantage than allowing the adversary to perform delegation operations
1We may allow users in U delegate privileges to outsiders. But this does not help the adversary to win the
game.88
only at the beginning of the game. In Example 8, delegation operations are performed
between the execution of two steps.
The adversary winning the game indicates that there exit a group of users that can
enhance themselves with the help of delegation. In that case, the access control system is
vulnerable to collusion and is thus insecure with respect to delegation.
5.2 Enforcing the Security of Delegation
We have deﬁned the formal notion of security with respect to delegation. A natural next
step is to study mechanisms to enforce security. In this section, we study three enforcement
approaches. In Section 5.2.1, we study static enforcement, in which security is ensured by
careful design of administrative state. In Section 5.2.2, we discuss dynamic enforcement,
where a veriﬁcation procedure is performed by the end of the execution of each work-
ﬂow instance to ensure that the participants have not enhanced their own power through
delegation. In Section 5.2.3, we propose a third approach, the source-based enforcement
mechanism, which employs a novel security policy evaluation method that is customized
for delegation.
5.2.1 Static Enforcement
Given a set of workﬂows and an initial access control state, a straightforward approach
to enforce security is to carefully design the administrative state RL so that no “dangerous”
delegation operation would succeed. For instance, in Example 7, if RL does not allow
members of r2 to receive r1 and vice versa, the collusion between Alice and Bob could not
succeed. Such an enforcement mechanism is called static enforcement, as the security of
the system relies on (administrative) state conﬁguration and can be veriﬁed in an off-line
manner. An access control system that enforces security via a static enforcement mecha-
nism is called a statically secure system. The following example illustrates the idea of static
enforcement.89
Example 9 The set W consists of a single workﬂow w = hS;;SA;Ci, where
S = fs1;s2;s3g;s1  s2  s3
C = fh6= (s1;s2)ig
Let  be an access control state such that UR = f(Alice;r1);(Bob;r1);(Carl;r2)g and the
permissions to perform s1 and s2 are assigned to r1, while the permission to perform s3 is
assigned to r2.
It is easy to see that fAlice;Bob;Carlg is the only set of users in  that can complete
w. We can have Alice performed s1, Bob performed s2 and Carl performed s3.
An access control system h;W;RLi is statically secure if and only if neither of the
followings is true:
 can grant(r1;r1) 2 RL ^ can receive(r2;r1) 2 RL
 can transfer(r1;r1) 2 RL ^ can receive(r2;r1) 2 RL
To see this, on the one hand, if RL contains both can grant(r1;r1) and can receive(r2;r1),
then Alice (or Bob) can ﬁrst complete s1 and then grant r1 to Carl, who can then complete
s2 and s3. This violates the security requirement, because fAlice;Carlg cannot complete w
in  without delegation. The system is vulnerable to the collusion between Alice and Carl
(or Bob and Carl). Similar argument holds when RL contains both can transfer(r1;r1)
and can receive(r2;r1).
On the other hand, if RL does not contain both rules, then Carl cannot acquire r1 from
Alice (or Bob). In that case, both Alice and Bob must be involved to complete s1 and s2
so as to satisfy the constraint h6= (s1;s2)i. Hence, even if Alice and Carl (or Bob and
Carl collude), they cannot complete w. Also, Alice and Bob together cannot complete w,
because Carl is the only member of r2. Therefore, no size-2 sets of users may enhance
their own power by delegation.
We would like to point out that it is ﬁne that RL contains both can grant(r2;r2) (or
can transfer(r2;r2)) and can receive(r1;r2). In that case, Carl can grant r2 to Alice90
and/or Bob, so that fAlice;Bobg can complete w. This does not violate the security re-
quirement, because Carl is involved through delegation and fAlice;Bob;Carlg can com-
plete w in .
The advantage of static enforcement is that, if we have already implemented an access
control system with delegation support, we just need to modify the administrative state
to enforce security. There is no need to change the existing implementation. However,
static enforcement could make the administrative state more restrictive than necessary. For
instance, assume that there are two workﬂows w1 and w2 in the system. Alice and Bob are
two users who are not supposed to complete w1. But the system setting is such that if Alice
can successfully grant or transfer role r to Bob, then Alice and Bob together can complete
w1. In order to prevent the potential collusion between Alice and Bob, the administrative
state must prevent Alice from delegating r to Bob. But this is too restrictive as Bob may
only intend to perform w2 (instead of w1) after receiving r, which could be allowed. But
static enforcement mechanism does not take the actual usage of delegated privileges into
account. Finally, the design of the administrative state is usually subject to administrative
policies as well as practical considerations. It may be undesirable to dramatically alter the
administrative state due to security concerns, for security should not signiﬁcantly affect the
usability of the system.
5.2.2 Dynamic Enforcement
Static enforcement is too restrictive as it does not take into account how delegatees use
the delegated privileges. This motivates the proposal of dynamic enforcement for delega-
tion security.
To begin with, we describe the high-level idea of dynamic enforcement. In dynamic
enforcement, the initial state  of the access control system is recorded. For every workﬂow
instance X, the system maintains a list UX of the participants for the instance. Every user
who executed a step of X is added to UX. When a user u requests to execute a step s, the
system checks whether he/she needs to use a delegated privilege. If a delegated privilege r91
should be used by u to perform s, then both u and the delegator of the privilege are added
to UX. Note that if u has received r from multiple delegators, u has to specify the delegator
of r for the execution of s. At the end of the instance, the system checks whether the users
in UX can complete the workﬂow in  without delegation. If they can, then the execution
of X is conﬁrmed. Otherwise, the system gives warning that users in UX have enhanced
their own power through delegation. The execution of X is rejected.
The problem of checking whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow in an access
control state without delegation is called the Workﬂow Satisfaction Problem (WSP).
Deﬁnition 5.2.1 (Workﬂow Satisfaction Problem) Given a set U of users, a workﬂow
w = hS;;SA;Ci and an access control state , the Workﬂow Satisfaction Problem (WSP)
asks whether we can assign a user u 2 U to every step s 2 S such that u is authorized for
s in  and no constraint in C is violated by the overall assignments.
An instance of WSP is denoted as wsp(U;w;).
Detailed description of dynamic enforcement is given in Figure 5.1. Dynamic enforce-
ment ensures that a workﬂow instance may be successfully completed only if the partici-
pants (including those users who perform a step and those delegators who contribute nec-
essary privileges through delegation operations) can complete the same workﬂow instance
in the initial state. Hence, the correctness of dynamic enforcement follows directly from
Deﬁnition 5.1.4.
Dynamic enforcement monitors the usage of delegated privileges rather than placing
restrictions on administrative states. It is thus less restrictive and more practical than static
enforcement. However, dynamic enforcement introduces a performance overhead as the
system needs to solve a WSP instance by the end of every workﬂow instance. According
to Theorem 4.2.1, WSP is NP-complete, which indicates that the runtime overhead of
dynamic enforcement for each workﬂow instance could be exponential in the size of the
workﬂow.
In real-world, the number of steps in a workﬂow is normally small. Hence, it is possible
that the performance of dynamic enforcement is acceptable in practice. Also, dynamic92
Let  be the initial state of the access control system. For every workﬂow instance, the
system does the followings. Let X be an instance of workﬂow w.
 When X is created: UX   ;
 When a step s is performed by a user u: Let ps be the permission to perform s and
0 = hUR;PA;DR;Bi be the current state.
– If there exists a role r such that ((u;r) 2 UR ^ (ps;r) 2 PA), then UX  
UX [ fug.
This indicates that u can use his/her own privilege to perform the step.
– Otherwise, u speciﬁes a user u0 such that ((u0;u;r) 2 DR ^ (ps;r) 2 PA).
UX   UX [ fu;u0g.
This indicates that u is using a delegated privilege r received from u0 to perform
the step. When the choice of u0 and r is unique, the system may do the selection
itself rather than asking the user to specify the choice.
 After X is ﬁnished: The system solves wsp(UX;w;). If the answer to
wsp(UX;w;) is “yes”, then the result of X is conﬁrmed; otherwise, the result of
X is voided and necessary roll-back is performed.
Figure 5.1. Description of dynamic enforcement93
enforcement does not require changing existing implementation of workﬂow modules. All
we need to do is to add a module to the system to perform recording and the closing
veriﬁcation procedure for workﬂow instances.
5.2.3 Source-Based Enforcement
We have discussed two mechanisms to enforce delegation security in access control
systems. Even though both approaches have the advantage of allowing the reuse of existing
workﬂow implementation, they have major drawbacks: static enforcement is too restrictive
and dynamic enforcement may introduce large performance overhead. A natural question
is, if we are willing to redo the workﬂow module, can we have a better mechanism to
enforce delegation security?
In this section, we propose the source-based enforcement mechanism, which employs a
novel method to evaluate constraints in workﬂow systems. We describe the idea of source-
based enforcement mechanism by presenting a design of a secure workﬂow system. Our
workﬂow system is secure with respect to Deﬁnition 5.1.5 and introduces almost no per-
formance overhead.
The high-level idea of source-based enforcement is that, when a user Alice requests to
perform a step s of a workﬂow instance, he/she must specify the privilege to be used and
the source of the privilege. For instance, assume that Alice requests to perform a step s with
role r. If Alice is a member of r, then Alice may specify herself as the source of r. If Alice
received r from others, then Alice may pick a delegator of r and specify the delegator as
the source. Note that, even if Alice is a member of r herself, she may still specify another
user as the source of r as long as she has received r from that user.
Given the privilege r and its source uo speciﬁed by Alice, the system checks the con-
straints on s as if it is uo rather than Alice who is performing s. For example, assume that
workﬂow w consists of two steps s1 and s2, both of which can be performed by members of
role Accountant. There is a constraint in w, which states that the users who perform s1 and
s2 must not have conﬂicts of interests. Assume that Alice has executed s1 using her own94
membership of Accountant. Now, Carl tries to use the delegated privilege Accountant
received from Bob to perform s2. Instead of checking conﬂict of interests between Carl
and Alice as what traditional workﬂow systems do, our system checks conﬂict of interests
between Bob and Alice. The intuition is that, since Carl is using a delegated privilege
from Bob, he is working on Bob’s behalf. Hence, Bob and Alice must not have conﬂicts
of interests. By evaluating constraints in this way, we can ensure that the system is secure
with respect to delegation.
Sometimes, in addition to sources of privileges, we want to take the actual performers
into account while evaluating constraints. To achieve this, our system supports two types
of constraints. Type-1 constraint only ensures that the sources of privileges satisfy the
constraint; Type-2 constraint is more restrictive: if either the actual performer or the source
violates the constraint, then the constraint is violated. For instance, if the constraint in the
example in the previous paragraph is a Type-2 constraint, then Alice must not have conﬂict
of interests with either Bob (source) or Carl (actual performer).
Next, we describe the design of a secure workﬂow system, which employs the
source-based enforcement mechanism.
System Description: The system adopts the representations of access control state and the
state transition rules introduced in Section 5.1. The only major change in this system is the
way workﬂow constraints are evaluated.
A workﬂow is represented as hS;;SA;Ci, where S is a set of steps,   S  S
deﬁnes a partial order among steps in S, and C is a set of constraints. s1  s2 indicates
that s1 must be performed before s2.
A constraint takes the form of h(s1;s2;i)i where s1 and s2 are two steps,  is a binary
relation between users and i = 1 or 2. When i = 1, the constraint is of Type-1, while when
i = 2, the constraint is of Type-2.
Let w = hS;;SA;Ci.  = hUR;PA;DR;Bi is the current access control state.
When a user u requests to perform a step s of an instance X of w, u presents a pair huo;ri,95
where uo is a user identity and r is a role. uo is called the source of r. The pair huo;ri is
valid if and only if one of the followings is true:
 u = uo^(u;r) 2 UR. In other words, u is using his own role membership to perform
s.
 u 6= uo^((uo;u;r;\g") 2 DR_(uo;u;r;\t") 2 DR). That is to say, uo has granted
or transferred r to u and u requests to perform s on uo’s behalf.
With the pair huo;ri, u can successfully execute s if and only if both of the followings
hold:
1. u is authorized to perform s with role r. That is, (ps;r) 2 PA, where ps is the
permission to perform s.
2. No constraint is violated. That is, for every constraint c on s:
 Case c = h(s;s0;1)i: (uo;u0
o) 2 
where u0
o is the source of the privilege used to perform s0
 Case c = h(s0;s;1)i: (u0
o;uo) 2 
where u0
o is the source of the privilege used to perform s0
 Case c = h(s;s0;2)i:
(u;u
0) 2  ^ (uo;u
0) 2  ^ (u;u
0
o) 2  ^ (uo;u
0
o) 2 
where u0 is the user who actually performed s0 and u0
o is the source of the privi-
lege used to perform s0.
 Case c = h(s0;s;2)i:
(u
0;u) 2  ^ (u
0;uo) 2  ^ (u
0
o;u) 2  ^ (u
0
o;uo) 2 
where u0 is the user who actually performed s0 and u0
o is the source of the privi-
lege used to perform s0.96
Note that in the ﬁrst two cases, c is a Type-1 constraint and only the sources must
satisfy the constraint. In the latter two cases, c is a Type-2 constraint, and both the
sources and the actual performers are taken into account.
After a step is executed, the system records the identities of both the actual performer
and the source of privilege for future reference.
The following example illustrates how the system works.
Example 10 In a bank, task t is modeled as a workﬂow w = hS;;SA;Ci, where
S =fs1;s2g;s1  s2
C =fh6= (s1;s2;1)ig
The permissions to perform s1 and s2 are assigned to r1 and r2, respectively. Alice is a
member of r1 and Bob is a member of r2.
Alice becomes too busy to work on t and would like to balance the workload with Bob
by delegating r1 to Bob. Let X be an instance of w. Bob performs s1 in X by presenting
hAlice;r1i to the system. The system records that Bob is the actual performer of s1 in X
and Alice is the source of privilege. Next, Bob requests to perform s2 in X by presenting
hBob;r2i, which indicates that himself is the source of r2. The system found that the
constraint h6= (s1;s2;1)i needs to be checked. Since the constraint is of Type-1, the system
only considers the sources of privilege for s1 and s2, which are Alice and Bob respectively.
Because Alice 6= Bob, the constraint is satisﬁed, and Bob completes X. Note that this does
not violate the notion of security, because Alice is involved in X by allowing Bob to work
on her behalf, and Alice and Bob together can complete w before the delegation operation.
Now, assume that the constraint in C is of Type-2 (i.e. h6= (s1;s2;2)i). In this case,
Bob cannot complete w. When h6= (s1;s2;2)i is checked, the system takes both the actual
performers and the sources into account. When the system compares the actual performer
of s1 with the source of privilege (or the actual performer) of s2, it has Bob = Bob, which
indicates that Bob 6= Bob does not hold. Hence, the constraint is violated and Bob is
rejected from performing s2.97
It is clear that Type-2 constraints provide stronger security than Type-1 constraints.
People may wonder why we support the seemingly less secure Type-1 constraints in our
system. First of all, as we will prove later in this section, Type-1 constraints are sufﬁcient
to enforce the notion of security deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.1.5. Secondly, in certain situations,
we may gain ﬂexibility by using Type-1 constraints. For instance, a workﬂow may have a
constraint c stating that s1 and s2 must be performed by the same user. Assume that Alice
has performed s1 in an instance X of the workﬂow but she has to leave before performing
s2. If c is a Type-1 constraint (i.e. c = h= (s1;s2;1)i), then Alice may delegate her
privilege r to another user Bob who may complete s2 in X by presenting the pair hAlice;ri
to the system; but if c is a Type-2 constraint, then s2 of X cannot be completed until Alice
comes back. In situations where it is more beneﬁcial to complete the task, we should
declare c as Type-1. In particular, in order for an access control state to be resilient to
user absence, all binding of duty constraints (i.e. constraints that use =) must be Type-1
constraints. In contrast, in situations where security is given high priority and we would
rather have the task uncompleted than allow another user to involve, we should declare c as
Type-2. The choice between Type-1 and Type-2 constraints can be viewed as a ﬂexibility-
security trade-off. Our system provides the options and leave the decisions to security
policy designers.
Next, we prove that our workﬂow system is secure with respect to delegation. The
overallideaoftheproofisthat, foreveryworkﬂowinstancethatiscompleted, wemodifyits
user-step assignment by replacing the actual performer of each step with the corresponding
source of privilege. Since our constraint evaluation procedure always takes sources into
account, the modiﬁed user-step assignment must be valid for the workﬂow in the initial
state of the system. This implies that the set of sources can complete the workﬂow in the
initial state. Recall that in the initial state of the system, DR = ;. Also, recall that we
assume that a delegatee cannot further delegate the delegated privilege to others. At the
end of this section, we will discuss extending our system to allow further delegation of
privileges.98
Theorem 5.2.1 The workﬂow system employing source-based enforcement mechanism is
secure with respect to delegation.
Proof We show that any workﬂow system, all of whose constraints are of Type-1, is se-
cure with respect to delegation. This is sufﬁcient to prove that workﬂow systems using
only Type-2 constraints or both types of constraints are secure as well, because Type-2
constraints are more restrictive than Type-1 constraints.
Given a workﬂow system in which all constraints are of Type-1, assume for the purpose
of contradiction that the adversary can win the game in Deﬁnition 5.1.5. Let  be the initial
state of the system, w = hS;;SA;Ci be the workﬂow and U be a set of users selected
by the adversary. By Deﬁnition 5.1.5, U cannot complete w in  without delegation (i.e.
wsp(U;w;) is false). The user-step assignment for instance X of w has been stored in
PP. We deﬁne a predicate Source(s;X), which returns the source of the privilege used to
perform step s in workﬂow instance X.
Weconstructanotheruser-stepassignmentPP 0 forw suchthatforeverysteps, (u;s) 2
PP ) (Source(s;X);s) 2 PP 0. Next, we show that PP 0 is a valid user-step assignment
for w in .
First of all, for every step s in w, we show that Source(s;X) is authorized to perform
s in . Let Source(s;X) = uo. (u;s) 2 PP implies that u is authorized to perform
s in an access control 0, which is reachable from . Let  = hUR;PA;DR;Bi and
0 = hUR
0;PA;DR
0;Bi. Ifuo = u, thenthestatementistriviallytrue, becauseUR  UR
0.
Otherwise, there exists a role r, such that (ps;r) 2 PA and (uo;u;r) 2 DR
0, where ps is
the permission to perform s. (uo;u;r) 2 DR
0 implies that (uo;r) 2 UR, because a user
can only delegate the roles which he/she is a member of. In general, uo is authorized to
perform s in .
Second, for every constraint c 2 C, we show that PP 0 satisﬁes c. Let c = h(s1;s2;1)i.
Since c is Type-1, the system takes into account the sources of privileges for s1 and
s2 whenever c is checked. Hence, the fact that PP does not violate c indicates that
(Source(s1;X);Source(s2;X)) 2 . Therefore, PP 0 does not violate c.99
In general, in PP 0, all steps in w are assigned to authorized users and no constraint in C
is violated. That is to say, users in U can complete w in , which contradicts the assumption
that wsp(U;w;) is false. Therefore, the adversary could not have won the game and the
workﬂow system is secure.
The design of our secure workﬂow system is based on a delegation model where a
delegatee cannot further delegate the privileges he/she received to other users. We can
easily extend the design to apply to situations where further delegation is supported. In
those cases, the system maintains chains of delegation operations. For instance, assume
that u1 grants role r to u2, who further grants r to u3. When u3 uses r to perform a step
in a workﬂow instance, u1 is considered to be the source of r, and should be taken into
account in constraint checking so as to ensure security. We may design different types
of constraints that take the actual performer (i.e. u3) and even intermediate users in the
delegation chain (e.g. u2) into consideration. We believe the ideas introduced in the source-
based enforcement mechanism will also be useful in the design of other types of access
control systems that support delegation.
5.3 Enforcing Resiliency Using Delegation
We have studied the security of delegation in workﬂow authorization systems. In this
section, we discuss how to enforce resiliency using delegation.
When Alice is about to be absent, she may select a suitable person based on the current
situations and delegate her privileges to that person so that the latter may perform Alice’s
tasks on her behalf. This may allow the system be resilient to Alice’s absence. Consider
the following example.
Example 11 Task t is modeled as workﬂow w1 = hS;;SA;Ci, where
S =fs1;s2g;s1  s2
C =fh(s1;s2;2)ig100
Permissions to perform s1 and s2 are assigned to r1 and r2, respectively. Bob
and Carl are members of r1, while Alice is a member of r2. Also, we have
(Bob;Alice);(Bob;Dave);(Carl;Alice);(Carl;Elaine) 2 .
Since Alice is the only user in the system who is authorized to perform s2, she would
like to delegate r2 to another user before she leaves. Alice may choose who she should
delegate r2 to based on the situation right before she leaves. If Bob performed step s1 of
the workﬂow instance, Alice may delegate r2 to Dave so that Dave can ﬁnish the workﬂow
without violating the constraint in C, as we have (Bob;Dave) 2  (recall that for type-2
constraint, both the sources of privilege and actual performers must have the corresponding
relation). In contrast, if it was Carl who performed s1, Alice should delegate r2 to Elaine
instead, because (Carl;Elaine) 2 .
Sometimes unexpected events may happen and Alice may be absent without specifying
how to delegate her privileges. A natural solution to handle unexpected absence of users is
to have default delegation plans for users so that when a user is absent, the delegated oper-
ations in the corresponding default delegation plan is executed to delegate the absent user’s
privileges to other users. Certain commercial access control systems employ default dele-
gation plans determined by software developers. For example, using IBM Tivoli Identity
Manager (ITIM) [28], if a user does not perform a task assigned to her after a certain period
of time, her supervisor will be asked to perform the task for her. This can be viewed as the
absent user’s privilege to perform the task is automatically delegated to her supervisor. In
ITIM, one cannot change the default delegation plan. This is problematic in cases where
one’s supervisor is not the right person to perform a task on one’s behalf. In this section,
we consider a more ﬂexible approach by allowing every user to specify her own default
delegation plan.
A default delegation plan of a user, say Alice, is a set of delegation operations which
will be performed automatically when Alice is absent. A delegation operation in the plan
speciﬁes which one of Alice’s privileges will be delegated to whom. The delegation op-
erations in the plan must not violate delegation administrative rules in the system so as to
be valid. Note that Alice may specify more than one delegation operations for the same101
role, and she may choose one of the following three options for the multiple delegation
operations regarding role r: (1) All: all the delegation operations for r will be executed
when Alice is absent; in other words, r will be delegated to multiple users. (2) First: the
delegation operations for r are ordered, and when Alice is absent, the ﬁrst operation whose
delegatee is available will be executed. (3) Any: Alice lets the system to choose which del-
egation operations for r to be executed; the system will make selections based on realtime
situations. For example, if Bob is very busy when Alice is absent, the system may execute
the operation that delegates r to Carl rather than the one that delegates r to Bob.
In this dissertation, we assume that every user designs their own default delegation
plans independently. This is the simplest approach and is easy to carry out in practice.
A more complex approach is to ask users to collaborate in their delegation planning. For
example, assume that Alice and Bob are both members of role r and they would like to
delegate r to either Carl or Dave. If Bob delegates role r to Carl in his plan, it may be
better for Alice to delegate r to Dave rather than to Carl so that even if Alice, Bob, and
Carl are all absent, there is still a member of r (i.e. Dave) in the system. Even though the
collaborative approach can potentially achieve higher level of resiliency, it may be difﬁcult
to carry out in practice due to a number of reasons. First, it takes more effort for a user
to setup her plan as she has to coordinate with others. Second, one may have to give up
her favorite choices to achieve better overall results, and some users may be reluctant to do
so. Third, if a user change her plan later, then multiple related plans of other users’ may
need to be changed as well, which leads to large overhead and inconvenience. Due to such
practical difﬁculties, we leave the collaborative approach as interesting future work.
A natural question arises is how does a user design a “good” default delegation plan
for herself. On the one hand, to be compliant with the principle of least privilege, one may
not want to delegate too many privileges to others. On the other hand, one would like to
have all the necessary delegation operations in her plan to make the system be resilient to
the absence of herself. In the following, we provide a guideline on designing an effective
default delegation plan.102
Assume that Alice would like to design a default delegation plan so as to let the system
be resilient to her absence. Given an access control state hUR;PA;DR;Bi, for every
workﬂow W and every step s in W that Alice is authorized to performed, we ask the
following questions in order. Let r be the role that is authorized to perform s.
1. Is Alice the only one who is authorized to perform s? In other words, is Alice the
only member of role r?
Yes: A delegation operation for role r is recommended to be added to Alice’s default
delegation plan. Otherwise, when Alice is absent, no one is authorized to perform s
and thus W cannot be completed.
No: Go to the next question.
2. Is there any constraint on s?
No: A delegation operation for r may not be necessary. Since there is no constraint
on s, another member of r can perform s even if Alice is absent.
Yes: Go to the next question.
3. For every constraint c = h(s0;s;i)i in W where i = 1 or i = 2, let Us0 and Us be
the set of users who are authorized to perform s0 and s, respectively. Is there a user
u 2 U0 such that Alice is the only one in Us such that (u;Alice) 2 ?
Yes: A delegation operation for role r is recommended. Otherwise, if u performs
s0 and Alice becomes absent before performing s, then no one is able to perform
s without violating c. Recall that a type-1 constraint only requires the sources of
privilege satisfy the relation. So, if i = 1, Alice may delegate r to any user (without
violating administrative rules) and the user who receives r from Alice is able to
perform s while satisfying c. In contrast,if i = 2, then Alice must delegate r to a user
u1 such that (u;u1) 2  so that u1 may perform s when u performs s0.103
Note that c = h= (s0;s;1)i is a special case where we may have u = Alice. And if
c = h= (s0;s;2)i, then delegation cannot help complete W if Alice becomes absent
after performing s0 but not s.
No: No recommendation on whether to setup a delegation operation for r. When
this branch is reached, there must exist a constraint in the form of h(s;9X;i)i or in
the form of h(s0;9X;i)i where s 2 X. Alice may further examine the privileges
and relations of users authorized to perform steps in X and s0 so as to determine
whether a delegation operation for r is necessary to make the system be resilient to
her absence. But the number of users that need to be checked may be large. Thus,
we do not provide a suggestion in this case and leave the decision to the user.
Furthermore, when Alice is considering adding a delegation operation for role r to her
default delegation plan, she may check if existing operations in her plan for role r sufﬁce
to meet her goal. If so, she may avoid setting up another delegation operation for r.
We have provided a guideline for users to design their default delegation plans. In
practice, users may have other considerations when setting up their delegation plans. An
interesting question is to check whether the system meets resiliency requirements after de-
fault delegation plans have been set up for all users. We study such a problem in the rest
of this section. We assume that an absent user does not perform any delegation operation
when the user becomes absent, except that her default delegation plans are automatically
executed. Note that such a problem is computationally at least as difﬁcult as the corre-
sponding resiliency checking problem without delegation, as the latter is a special case of
the former when the default delegation plan for every user is empty.
Static resiliency In static resiliency, the set of absent users is known before the execution
of a workﬂow. To check that if the system is statically resilient to the absence of a certain
set U0 of users with regards to a workﬂow W, we may remove users in U0 and execute
their default delegation plans to change the access control state. We then check whether104
the remaining users can complete W in the new access control state, which is an instance
of the WSP problem.
Decremental resiliency In decremental resiliency, users may become absent during the
execution of a workﬂow instance and absent users will not come back. An algorithm, which
checks whether a system is decrementally resilient to the absence of k users with respect to
workﬂow W, is given in Figure 5.2. Intuitively, we enumerate all possible scenarios of the
absence of k users; when a user u is absent, we execute her default delegation plan and go
on to check if the system is resilient to the absence of k   1 users for the remaining steps
of W in the new access control state.
Dynamic resiliency In dynamic resiliency, up to k users may be absent when a step in the
workﬂow is performed and absent users may return after the step is ﬁnished. An algorithm,
which checks that if a system is dynamically resilient to the absence of k users with respect
toworkﬂowW, isgiveninFigure5.3. Intuitively, wetryeverypossiblewaytoremoveaset
U0 of k users before the execution of a step, execute the default delegation plans for users
in U0, assign a step to an available user, and then repeat such a process for the remaining
steps.
Note that the above algorithms employ a brute-force strategy. In practice, the proba-
bility that multiple users become absent simultaneously or within a short period of time
is small. Hence, we are mostly interested in the case where k = 1. Also, the number of
steps in W is normally small. Hence, the performance of the above algorithms should be
acceptable in real-world scenarios.105
The function check-decremental checks if the access control state  is decrementally re-
silient to the absence of k users with regards to workﬂow W, where U is the set of avail-
able users in , S is the set of incomplete steps in W, and P is the current partial plan.
Auth(s;U;) is the set of users in U that are authorized to perform step s in state .
Function check-decremental(, U, k, W, S, P)
If S = ; Then
Return “yes”;
If exists s 2 S such that Auth(s;U;) = ; Then
Return “no”;
If k > 0 Then
For every ui 2 U Do
Execute the default delegation plan of ui to change  to 0
If (check-decremental(0, U   fuig, k, W, S, P) == “no”) Then
Return “no”;
EndFor;
EndIf;
For every s 2 S that is ready to be executed based on P
For every u 2 Auth(s;U;) Do
P 0 = P [ f(s;u)g;
If (check-decremental(0, U, k   1, W, S   fsg, P 0) == “yes”) Then
Return “yes”;
EndFor;
EndFor;
Return “no”;
End
Figure 5.2. Algorithm for checking decremental resiliency with default delegation plans106
The function check-dynamic checks if the access control state  is dynamically resilient to
the absence of k users with regards to workﬂow W, where U is the set of available users in
 and S is the set of incomplete steps in W. Auth(s;U;) is the set of users in U that are
authorized to perform step s in state .
Function check-dynamic(, U, k, W, S, P)
If S = ; Then
Return “yes”;
For every size-k subset U0 of U Do
Execute the default delegation plans of users in U0 to change  to 0;
If (make-assignment(0;U   U0;k;W;S;P) == “no”) Then
Return “no”;
EndFor;
Return “yes”;
End
Function make-assignment(, U, k, W, S, P)
For every s 2 S that is ready to be executed based on P
For every u 2 Auth(s;U;) Do
P 0 = P [ f(s;u)g;
If (check-dynamic(, U, k, W, S   fsg, P 0) == “yes”) Then
Return “yes”;
EndFor;
EndFor;
End
Figure 5.3. Algorithm for checking dynamic resiliency with default delegation plans107
6 RELATED WORK
6.1 Access Control Policy Speciﬁcation
The concept of SoD has long existed in the physical world, sometimes under the name
“the two-man rule”, for example, in the banking industry and the military. To our knowl-
edge, in the information security literature the notion of SoD ﬁrst appeared in Saltzer and
Schroeder [3] under the name “separation of privilege.” Clark and Wilson’s commercial
security policy for integrity [2] identiﬁed SoD along with well-formed transactions as two
major mechanisms of fraud and error control. Nash and Poland [29] explained the differ-
ence between dynamic and static enforcement of SoD policies. In the former, a user may
perform any step in a sensitive task provided that the user does not also perform another
step on that task. In the latter, users are constrained a-priori from performing certain steps.
Sandhu [30,31] presented Transaction Control Expressions, a history-based mechanism
for dynamically enforcing SoD policies. A transaction control expression associates each
step in the transaction with a role. By default, the requirement is such that each step must
be performed by a different user. One can also specify that two steps must be performed
by the same user. In Transaction Control Expressions, user qualiﬁcation requirements are
associated with individual steps in a transaction, rather than a transaction as a whole.
Li et al [20] studied both direct and indirect enforcement of static separation of duty
(SSoD) policies. They showed that directly enforcing SSoD policies is intractable (NP-
complete). They also discussed using static mutually exclusive roles (SMER) constraints to
indirectly enforce SSoD policies. They deﬁned what it means for a set of SMER constraints
to precisely enforce an SSoD policy, characterize the policies for which such constraints
exist, and show how they are generated. In Section 2.2, we study the enforcement of
policies speciﬁed in our algebra, which include SoD policies as a sub-class; however, our
computational results (those on SSC) are on direct static enforcement only.108
There exists a wealth of literature on constraints in the context of RBAC [32–39]. They
either proposed and classiﬁed new kinds of constraints [35,38] or proposed new languages
for specifying sophisticated constraints [32–34,37,39]. Most of these constraints are moti-
vated by SoD and are variants of role mutual exclusion constraints, which may declare two
roles to be mutually exclusive so that no user can be a member of both roles.
McLean [19] introduced a framework that includes various mandatory access control
models. Security models are instances of the framework; and they differ in which users are
allowed to change the security levels. These models form a boolean algebra. McLean also
looked at the issue of N-person policies, where a policy may allow multiple subjects acting
together to perform some action. McLean adopted the monotonicity requirement in such
N-person policies. McLean [19] does not discuss how to specify N-person policies, and
the examples in the paper list explicitly the usersets that are allowed access. Our algebra, on
the other hand, is about how to deﬁne policies that require multiple users with qualiﬁcation
requirements.
Abadi et al. [40] developed a calculus for access control in distributed systems. The
calculus allows compound principals to be formed from basic ones using two operations
^ (and) and j (quoting). Some principals are groups, when a principal u is a member of
a group g, then u speaks for g. One can express multi-user policies in this calculus. An
access control policy is speciﬁed as an access control list (ACL), where each entry is an
expression in the calculus. The ^ corresponds to  in our algebra. That is, if an ACL entry
contains g1 ^ g2, then a single user that is a member of both g1 and g2 is allowed access,
as are two users such that one is a member of g1 and the other is a member of g2. The t
operator in our algebra can be partially supported in the calculus by having multiple ACL
entries, which has the effect of supporting logical OR, but only at the top level. The other
operators :, +, u and 
 cannot be expressed in the calculus.
Several algebras have been proposed for combining security policies. These include
the work by Bonatti et al. [41,42], Wijesekera and Jajodia [43], Pincus and Wing [44].
These algebras are designed for purpose that are different from ours; therefore, they are
quite different from our algebra. Each element in their algebra is a policy that speciﬁes109
what subjects are allowed to access which resources, whereas each element in our algebra
maps to a user.
The two operators  and 
 in our algebra are taken from the RT family of role-based
trust-management languages designed by Li et al. [45]. In [45], the notion of manifold
roles was introduced, which are roles that have usersets, rather than individual users, as
their members. The two operators 
 and  are used to deﬁne manifold roles. Our work
differs in that we propose to combine these two operators together with four other operators
t, u, :, and + (which are not in RT) in an algebra for specifying high-level security poli-
cies. In addition, we also study the algebraic properties of these operators, the satisfaction
problems, and the term satisﬁability problem related to the algebra.
Readers who are familiar with description logic (DL) may ﬁnd similarities between the
algebra and DL. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two: a term in
DL describes a set of individuals, while a term in the algebra describes a set of sets of
individuals. A concept in DL deﬁnes a set of individuals, which corresponds to a role in
the algebra; a “role” in DL deﬁnes a binary relation between individuals. DL supports
operators :;u and t, which stand for complement of concepts, intersection of concepts
and union of concepts, respectively. If we interpret a unit term in our algebra as a set of
individuals1, then unit terms may be viewed as a strict subset of terms in DL. But in general
case, there is no operator in DL that corresponds to operators +; and 
 in our algebra.
Hence, computational complexity problems studied in this chapter are not directly related
to those in DL.
6.2 Access Control in Workﬂow Systems
Bertino et al. [5] introduced a language to express workﬂow authorization constraints
as clauses in a logic programming language. The language supports a number of predeﬁned
relations for constraint speciﬁcation. Bertino et al. [5] also proposed searching algorithms
to assign users to complete a workﬂow. This work does not support user-deﬁned binary
1A unit term in our algebra describes a set of singletons.110
relations, nordoesitformallystudycomputationalcomplexityoftheworkﬂowsatisﬁability
problem. Tan et al. [7] studied the consistency of authorization constraints in workﬂow
systems. The model in [7] supports six predeﬁned binary relations: f=;6=;<;;>;g,
but not user-deﬁned relations. Atluri and Huang [4] proposed a workﬂow authorization
model that focuses on temporal authorization. This model does not support constraints
about users performing different steps in a task. In [8], Warner and Atluri considered
authorization constraints that span multiple instances of a workﬂow. Their model supports
predeﬁned relations with emphasis on inter-instance constraints. Inter-instance problems
in workﬂow systems is an interesting research area. The model in [8] does not support
user-deﬁned relations. Finally, Kang et al. [46] investigated access control mechanisms for
inter-organizational workﬂow. Their workﬂow model authorizes steps to roles and supports
dynamicconstraints. However, theydonotexplicitlypointouthowconstraintsarespeciﬁed
and what kinds of constraints are supported besides separation of duty. Their paper mainly
focuses on infrastructure design and implementation.
The workﬂow authorization model proposed by Crampton [6] is probably the one that
is most closely related to R2BAC. The model in [6] supports user-deﬁned binary rela-
tions; however, it does not support quantiﬁers in constraints, so that constraints of the form
h(9X;s)i cannot be expressed in that model. Crampton [6] also studied the workﬂow sat-
isﬁability problem and presented a polynomial time algorithm for their model. However,
the algorithm is incorrect.2 Each constraint in [6] relates two steps in an workﬂow. The
algorithm (Figure 2 in [6]) tries to gradually reduce the set of users that can be applied to
each step. One ﬁrst calculates the set of authorized users for each individual step, and then
for each constraint that involves steps s1 and s2, one remove from the sets for steps s1 and
s2 those users that cannot be paired with a user satisfying the constraint. If no set can be re-
duced further and no set is empty, the algorithm declares that a workﬂow is satisﬁable. The
problem with this algorithm is that, while it ensures that each individual constraint can be
satisﬁed, it does not ensure the combination of them can. For a counter example, consider
a workﬂow with 4 steps and 3 users, where every user is authorized to perform every step.
2We have veriﬁed the bug with the author of [6].111
The constraints are such that no two steps can be performed by the same user. Obviously, a
valid execution assignment would not exist. However, the algorithm would return true. As
we have pointed out in Theorem 4.2.6, the workﬂow satisﬁability problem is NP-hard in
general for any workﬂow model that supports user-inequality constraints. Since the model
in [6] supports such type of constraints, a polynomial time algorithm for the satisﬁability
problem in their model could not exist.
None of the work mentioned above has given the computational complexity results
of the Workﬂow Satisﬁability Problem, whereas we give a clear characterization using
parameterized complexity. Also, the resiliency problem in workﬂows has not been studied
before in the literature.
6.3 Delegation in Access Control
Delegationhasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromtheresearchcommunity. In [9,10],
BarkaandSandhuproposedaframeworkforrole-baseddelegationmodels(RBDM),which
identiﬁes a number of characteristics related to delegation. Example characteristics are (1)
monotonicity: grant is a monotonic delegation operation, while transfer is non-monotonic;
(2) totality: whether one can delegate only a portion of the permissions of a role rather than
the entire role; (3) levels of delegation: the number of times delegatees may further delegate
the received privileges. Many characteristics identiﬁed by RBDM are used in delegation
models proposed later.
There exist a wealth of delegation models in literature [11–17]. L. Zhang et al. [13] pre-
sented arole-based delegation modelcalled RDM2000. Their model supportsthe speciﬁca-
tion of delegation authorization rules to impose restrictions on which roles can be delegated
to whom. They proposed a language to specify and enforce rules regarding how users del-
egate their roles and how delegated roles can be revoked. Furthermore, they have designed
and implemented a web-based application as a prototype of their delegation framework.
In RDM2000, the unit of delegation is a role. X. Zhang et al. [12] proposed a role-based
delegation model called PBDM, which supports both role and permission level delegation.112
Theirmodelcontrolsdelegation operationsthroughthenotionofdelegatable rolessuchthat
only permissions assigned to these roles can be delegated to others. Another model that
supports permission-level delegation was proposed by Wainer and Kumar in [14]. Their
model also supports constraints (or rules) that determine whether a user can receive a cer-
tain right through delegation.
A delegation operation can either be a grant or a transfer operation. Most exiting
work either focuses on grant or does not explicitly distinguish the two types of operations.
In [17], Crampton and Khambhammettu proposed a delegation model that supports both
grant and transfer. Furthermore, they proposed to use administrative scope in role hierarchy
to determine delegation authorization rules.
Atluri and Warner [15] studied how to support delegation in workﬂow systems. They
extended the notion of delegation to allow conditional delegation, where conditions can be
basedontime, workloadandtaskattributes. Onemayspecifyrulestodetermineunderwhat
condition a delegation operation should be performed. For example, Alice may specify a
rule to delegate a task t to Bob when she has ﬁve or more tasks assigned. Such rules may
result in cycles (e.g. u1 delegates t to u2, who further delegates t to u3, who delegates t
back to u1). To address this issue, they studied the delegation consistency problem which
determines whether it is possible to satisfy all rules in the system.
All the above work mainly focus on the modeling and management of delegation, while
our dissertation focuses on the security impact of delegation on access control systems.
Noneoftheaboveworkproposesaformalnotionofsecurityregardingdelegationorstudies
mechanisms to enforce security in access control systems with delegation support.
In [47], Shaad observed that delegation and revocation features of a system may be
used to circumvent separation of duty properties. He gave an example to illustrate an
attack conducted by a single user. In his example, there is a separation of duty policy
which requires that no single user may ﬁrst access an object o using privilege auth1 and
then access o again with privilege auth2. The system he designed enforces such a policy by
allowing a user to access o only if the user does not have both auth1 and auth2 at the time
of access. Let Alice be a malicious user having both auth1 and auth2. Alice ﬁrst transfers113
auth2 to another user Bob so as to temporarily lose auth2. Next, she accesses o with auth1
and then revokes auth2 from Bob to regain the privilege. Finally, Alice transfers auth1
to Bob and then accesses o again using auth2. In this case, the separation of duty policy
is circumvented. This example differs from our examples in Section 5.1.1 in a couple of
ways:
1. The attack in [47] is conducted by a single user (Alice), as the delegatee (Bob) is not
actively involved. In contrast, our examples are on multi-user collusion, where all
principles are actively involved in the attack.
2. Theattackin[47]reliesonaspeciﬁcwayinwhichseparationofdutyisimplemented.
In particular, it is assumed that the system does not maintain any historical record.
But this is not the case in most of the existing workﬂow authorization systems [5–
8], as these systems keep track of which users have performed which steps so as
to enforce constraints. In contrast, our examples apply to workﬂow authorization
systems in existing literature.
In general, the example in [47] has a very different nature from our examples in Sec-
tion 5.1.1. Shaad’s paper [47] is about an access control framework and the interaction
between delegation and security policies is not the main focus of the paper. Problems such
as collusion and enforcement mechanisms for security, which are studied in our disserta-
tion, are not discussed in [47].
6.4 Other Related Work on Policy Analysis
In [48], Li and Tripunitara proposed the notion of security analysis in RBAC. They
formally deﬁned the notions of RBAC states, state transition rules and a family of secu-
rity analysis problems. An example security analysis problem is whether a certain set of
users can gain a certain set of permissions in a state that is reachable from the initial state.
However, in workﬂow systems, possessing the set of necessary permissions is not sufﬁcient
for the users to complete a workﬂow, as there may be constraints on the relations of users114
performing different steps. For instance, if there is a constraint requiring Step 1 and Step 2
be performed by different users, then even if Alice has permissions to perform both steps,
she is not able to complete both of them by herself. Li and Tripunitara did not consider
workﬂows and constraints in [48]. Hence, the security regarding delegation in workﬂow
systems is beyond the security analysis problems proposed in [48].
In [49], Stoller et al also applied parameterized complexity theory to computational
problems on access control policy analysis. They studied policies in Administrative RBAC
(ARBAC), while we focused on workﬂow authorization systems, especially in the R2BAC
model in Chapter 4. Policies in ARBAC are role-based, while security constraints in
R2BAC are based on binary relations between users. The parameterized complexity re-
sults in [49] and those in Chapter 4 of this dissertation cannot be easily reduced to each
other.115
7 SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we have proposed an algebra as a novel policy-speciﬁcation language,
resiliency policy as a new family of access control policies, and R2BAC as a new access
control model for workﬂows. We have also studied a number of fundamental policy-
analysis problems, such as the workﬂow satisﬁability problem and the security of dele-
gation. The contributions of this dissertations are summarized as follows.
 We have proposed a novel algebra that enables the speciﬁcation of high-level security
policies that combine qualiﬁcation requirements with quantity requirements. Our
algebra contains six operators and is expressive enough to specify many natural high-
level security policies. We have studied the algebraic properties of the algebra, as
well as several computational problems related to the algebra.
 We have formally deﬁned resiliency policies, which require an access control system
to be resilient to the absence of users. We have studied computational problems on
checking whether an access control state satisﬁes a resiliency policy. We have also
studied the consistency between resiliency policies and separation of duty policies.
 We have proposed the role-and-relation-based access control (R2BAC) model for
workﬂow authorization systems. In R2BAC, in addition to a user’s role memberships,
the user’s relationships with other users help determine whether the user is allowed
to perform a certain step in a workﬂow.
 We have studied fundamental problems in workﬂow authorization systems, such as
determining whether a set of users can complete a workﬂow and checking whether
a workﬂow is resilient to the absence of users. In particular, we have applied tools
from parameterized complexity theory to better understand the complexities of the
workﬂow satisﬁability problem.116
 We have studied the impact of delegation on the security of workﬂow authorization
systems. We have formally deﬁned the notion of security with respect to delegation
and proposed mechanisms to enforce delegation security in workﬂow authorization
systems. We have also discussed how to use delegation to meet resiliency require-
ments.LIST OF REFERENCES117
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Appendix A Proofs in Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Theorems in Section 2.1
Proof of Lemma 2.1.1
Given a node N in T, let (N) be the sub-term of  represented by the sub-tree rooted
at N. In the following, we prove by induction that for every node N, if LT(N) 6= ;, then
LT(N) satisﬁes (N).
Base case: When N is a leaf node, by Deﬁnition 2.1.4, LT(N) is either ; or it satisﬁes
(N). Since LT(N) 6= ;, LT(N) satisﬁes (N).
Inductive case: Assume that the statement holds for both children N1 and N2 of N and
LT(N) 6= ;.
 When N represents u: According to Deﬁnition 2.1.4, LT(N) = LT(N1) = LT(N2).
Since LT(N) 6= ;, LT(N1) and LT(N2) are non-empty. By inductive assumption,
LT(N1) and LT(N2) satisfy (N1) and (N2), respectively. Since (N) = (N1)u
(N2), by Deﬁnition 2.1.3, LT(N) satisﬁes (N).
 When N represents t: According to Deﬁnition 2.1.4, LT(N) = LT(N1) or LT(N) =
LT(N2). Without loss of generality, assume that LT(N) = LT(N1). Since LT(N) 6=
;, LT(N1) is non-empty. By inductive assumption, LT(N1) satisﬁes (N1). Since
(N) = (N1) t (N2), by Deﬁnition 2.1.3, LT(N) satisﬁes (N).
 When N represents : According to Deﬁnition 2.1.4, LT(N) = LT(N1) [ LT(N2),
and since LT(N) 6= ;, LT(N1) and LT(N2) are also non-empty. By inductive
assumption, LT(N1) and LT(N2) satisfy (N1) and (N2), respectively. Since
(N) = (N1) u (N2), by Deﬁnition 2.1.3, LT(N) satisﬁes (N).
 When N represents 
: This is very similar to the above case.122
Proof of Theorem 2.1.2
Clearly, if there exists a satisfaction tree of  with root labeled X, then X satisﬁes .
Now we show the other direction. If a userset X satisﬁes  under hU;URi, we construct
a satisfaction tree for . First of all, we construct the syntax tree T of  and label its root
with X. We then recursively label other nodes in T in a top-down manner. Let N be an
inner node labeled with a non-empty userset. We label the children N1 and N2 of N in the
following manner.
 When N represents u: We label N1 and N2 with LT(N). This satisﬁes the rules
speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 2.1.4. Since LT(N) satisﬁes (N) and (N) = (N1) u
(N2), we have LT(N1) = LT(N) satisﬁes (N1) and LT(N2) = LT(N) satisﬁes
(N2).
 When N represents t: Since LT(N) satisﬁes (N) and (N) = (N1) t (N2),
either LT(N) satisﬁes (N1) or LT(N) satisﬁes (N2). Without loss of generality,
assume that LT(N) satisﬁes (N1). We label N1 with LT(N) and N2 with ;. We also
label all the nodes in the sub-tree rooted at N2 with ;. This satisﬁes the rules speciﬁed
in Deﬁnition 2.1.4.
 When N represents : Since LT(N) satisﬁes (N) and (N) = (N1)  (N2),
according to Deﬁnition 2.1.3, we have non-empty sets X1 and X2 such that LT(N) =
X1 [ X2 and X1 satisﬁes (N1) and X2 satisﬁes (N2). We label N1 with X1 and
N2 with X2. Since LT(N) = X1 [ X2, the labeling satisﬁes the rules speciﬁed in
Deﬁnition 2.1.4.
 When N represents 
: we label it in ways similar to the above case.
According to the above, when X satisﬁes , we can construct a satisfaction tree whose
root is labeled with X.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.3 on Algebraic Properties
1. The operators t;u;
; are commutative and associative.
This is straightforward from Deﬁnition 2.1.3.123
2. The operator t distributes over u.
If a userset X satisﬁes (1 t(2 u3)), then either X satisﬁes 1, or X satisﬁes both
2 and 3. It follows that X satisﬁes ((1 t 2) u (1 t 3)).
If X satisﬁes ((1 t2)u(1 t3)), then X satisﬁes (1 t2) and (1 t3). There
are only two cases: (1) X satisﬁes 1; and (2) X satisﬁes both 2 and 3. In either
case, X satisﬁes (1 t (2 u 3)).
The operator u distributes over t.
If X satisﬁes (1 u (2 t 3)), then X satisﬁes both 1 and (2 t 3), which means
X satisﬁes either 2 or 3. It follows that X satisﬁes ((1 u 2) t (1 u 3)).
If X satisﬁes ((1 u 2) t (1 u 3)), then either (1) X satisﬁes (1 u 2) or (2) X
satisﬁes (1 u 3). In both cases, X satisﬁes 1; furthermore, X satisﬁes either 2 or
3. It follows that X satisﬁes (1 u (2 t 3)).
3. The operator  distributes over t.
If X satisﬁes (1  (2 t 3)), then there exist X1 and X2 such that X1 [ X2 = X,
X1 satisﬁes 1, and X2 satisﬁes (2 t 3). By Deﬁnition 2.1.3, X2 satisﬁes 2 or 3.
In the former case, X satisﬁes (1  2), which implies that X satisﬁes ((1 2)t
(1  3)), as desired. The argument is analogous if X2 satisﬁes 3 but not 2.
If X satisﬁes ((1 2)t(1 3)), then either X satisﬁes (1 2) or X satisﬁes
(1  3). Without loss of generality, assume that X satisﬁes (1  2), then there
exist X1;X2 such that X1 [ X2 = X, X1 satisﬁes 1 and X2 satisﬁes 2. Therefore,
X2 satisﬁes (2 t 3), and consequently, X satisﬁes (1  (2 t 3)) as desired.
4. The operator 
 distributes over t.
If X satisﬁes (1 
 (2 t 3)), X can be partitioned into two disjoint sets X1 and
X2 such that X1 satisﬁes 1 and X2 satisﬁes 2 or 3. In this case, by deﬁnition, X
satisﬁes (1 
 2) or (1 
 3), which means X satisﬁes ((1 
 2) t (1 
 3)).
For the other direction, if X satisﬁes ((1
2)t(1
3)), it satisﬁes either (1
2)
or (1 
 3). Without loss of generality, assume that X satisﬁes (1 
 2). Then, X
can be partitioned into two disjoint sets X1 and X2 such that X1 satisﬁes 1 and X2124
satisﬁes 2. By deﬁnition, X2 satisﬁes (2 t 3). Therefore, X satisﬁes (1 
 (2 t
3)).
5. No other ordered pair of operators have the distributive property.
We show a counterexample for each case. In the following, Ur = fuj(u;r) 2 URg.
(a) The operator  does not distribute over u.
If X satisﬁes (1  (2 u 3)), then X also satisﬁes ((1  2) u (1  3)).
However, the other direction of implication does not hold. Counterexample: Let
Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g, and Ur3 = fu2g, then fu1;u2g satisﬁes ((r1 r2)u
(r1  r3)), but does not satisfy (r1  (r2 u r3)).
(b) The operator u does not distribute over . Neither direction holds.
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = Ur3 = fu1g and Ur2 = Ur4 = fu2g, let 1 =
(r1r2), then fu1;u2g satisﬁes (1u(r3r4)), but does not satisfy ((1ur3)
(1 u r4)).
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g, and Ur3 = fu2g, then
fu1;u2g satisﬁes ((r1 u r2)  (r1 u r3)), but does not satisfy (r1 u (r2  r3)).
(c) The operator t does not distribute over .
If X satisﬁes (1 t (2  3)), then X satisﬁes ((1 t 2)  (1 t 3)).
However, the other direction of implication does not hold. Counterexample: Let
Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g and Ur3 = fu1g, then fu1;u2g satisﬁes ((r1 t r2) 
(r1 t r3)), but does not satisfy (r1 t (r2  r3)).
(d) The operator t does not distribute over 
. Neither direction holds.
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g and Ur3 = fu1g, then fu1;u2g
satisﬁes ((r1 t r2) 
 (r1 t r3)) , but does not satisfy (r1 t (r2 
 r3)).
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = Ur2 = Ur3 = fu1g, then fu1g satisﬁes (r1 t (r2 

r3)), but does not satisfy ((r1 t r2) 
 (r1 t r3)).
(e) The operator 
 does not distribute over u.
If X satisﬁes (1 
 (2 u 3)), then X satisﬁes ((1 
 2) u (1 
 3)).125
However, the other direction of implication does not hold. Counterexample: Let
Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g and Ur3 = fu2g, then fu1;u2g satisﬁes ((r1 
 r2) u
(r1 
 r3)), but does not satisfy (r1 
 (r2 u r3)).
(f) The operator u does not distribute over 
. Neither direction holds.
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu1g and Ur3 = fu2g, then fu1;u2g
satisﬁes ((r1 u r2) 
 (r1 u r3)), but does not satisfy (r1 
 (r2 u r3)).
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = Ur3 = fu1g and Ur2 = Ur4 = fu2g, and let 1 =
(r1r2), then fu1;u2g satisﬁes (1u(r3
r4)), but does not satisfy ((1ur3)

(1 u r4)).
(g) The operator  does not distribute over 
. Neither direction holds.
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = fu1;u4g, Ur2 = fu2g and Ur3 = fu3g, then
fu1;u2;u3;u4g satisﬁes ((r1  r2) 
 (r1  r3)), but does not satisﬁes (r1 
(r2 
 r3)).
Counterexample: Let Ur1 = fu1g, Ur2 = fu1g and Ur3 = fu2g, then fu1;u2g
satisﬁes (r1  (r2 
 r3)), but does not satisfy ((r1  r2) 
 (r1  r3)).
(h) The operator 
 does not distribute over .
If X satisﬁes (1 
 (2  3)), then X satisﬁes ((1 
 2)  (1 
 3)).
However, the other direction of implication does not hold. Counterexample: Let
Ur1 = fu1;u2g, Ur2 = fu2g and Ur3 = fu1g, then fu1;u2g satisﬁes ((r1 
r2)
(r1 
 r3)), but does not satisfy (r1 
 (r2  r3)).
6. (1 u 2)+  (
+
1 u 
+
2 ).
If a userset X satisﬁes (1 u 2)+, then for every u 2 X, fug satisﬁes (1 u 2) and
thus satisﬁes 1 and 2. Hence, X satisﬁes 
+
1 and 
+
2 , which means that X satisﬁes
(
+
1 u 
+
2 ).
If X satisﬁes (
+
1 u 
+
2 ), then X satisﬁes both 
+
1 and 
+
2 . For every u 2 X, fug
satisﬁes both 1 and 2. Hence, X satisﬁes (1 u 2)+.
7. DeMorgan’s Law: :(1 u 2)  (:1 t :2), :(1 t 2)  (:1 u :2)
The proof is straightforward by deﬁnition of :;u and t.126
A.2 Proofs of Theorems in Section 2.3
In the following proofs, (opk) denotes k copies of  connected together by opera-
tor op and (opn
i=1ri) denotes (r1 op:::op rn). Given R = fr1;:::;rmg, (opR) denotes
(r1 op:::op rm).
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3.1, Lemma 2.3.2, and Theorem 2.3.4
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
To prove that TSAT over terms built using only roles, :, u, and t is NP-hard, we
reduce the NP-complete SAT problem to it. Given a propositional logic formula e, let
fv1;:::;vng be the set of propositional variables that appear in e. Construct a term 
by substituting every occurrence of vi (i 2 [1;n]) in e with the atomic term ri, every
occurrence of :vi (i 2 [1;n]) with :ri, and replacing logical AND with u and logical OR
with t. The result is a unit term. By Deﬁnition 2.1.3, a term without ;
 and + can be
satisﬁed by singletons only. If  is satisﬁable, then there exists a conﬁguration hU;URi
and a user u such that fug satisﬁes . We can construct a truth assignment T in which vi is
TRUE if and only if (u;ri) 2 UR. It is clear that e evaluates to TRUE under T. Similarly, if
there exists a truth assignment T such that e evaluates to TRUE under T, we can construct
UR in which u is a member of ri if and only if vi is TRUE in T. In that case, fug satisﬁes
 under hU;URi. Therefore, e is satisﬁable if and only if  is satisﬁable.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
To prove that TSAT over terms built using only explicit sets of users, u, t, and  is
NP-hard, we reduce the NP-complete SET COVERING problem to it. In the SET COVER-
ING problem, we are given a ﬁnite set U = fu1;:::;ung, a family F = fU1;:::;Umg of
subsets of U, and an integer k no larger than m, and we ask whether there is a sub-family
F 0  F of sets whose union is U and jF 0j  k.
We view each element in U as a user. For every j 2 [1;m], we construct a term
j =
J
ffuig j ui 2 Ujg; that is, j = fuj1g  fuj2g    fujxg, where Uj =127
fuj1;uj2;:::;ujxg. It is clear that j can only be satisﬁed by Uj. Finally, we construct a
term  = ((
J
k(
Fm
i=1 i)) u (
Jn
i=1fuig)). Since (
Jn
i=1fuig) can be satisﬁed only by U,
U is the only userset that may satisfy .
We now demonstrate that  is satisﬁable if and only if there are no more than k sets in
family F whose union is U. On the one hand, if  is satisﬁable, then it must be satisﬁed by
U. In this case, U satisﬁes (
J
k(
Fm
i=1 i)), which means that there exist k sets U0
1;:::;U0
k
such that
Sk
i=1 U0
i = U and each U0
i satisﬁes (
Fm
i=1 i). Since i can be satisﬁed only by
Ui 2 F, we have U0
j 2 F for every j 2 [1;k]. The answer to the SET COVERING problem
is thus “yes”. On the other hand, without loss of generality, assume that
Sk
i=1 Ui = U.
We have, for every i 2 [1;k], Ui satisﬁes i and thus satisﬁes (
Fm
i=1 i). Therefore, U
satisﬁes (
J
k(
Fm
i=1 i)). Since U also satisﬁes (
Jn
i=1fuig), U satisﬁes ((
J
k(
Fm
i=1 i)) u
(
Jn
i=1fuig)).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3
First, assume that a userset X satisﬁes  under hU;URi. According to Theorem 2.1.2,
there exists a satisfaction tree T of  under hU;URi and LT(Nr) = X. Now, we show that
if jXj > jj, then there must exist X0  X such that X0 satisﬁes  under hU;URi and
jX0j  jj. In the following, we construct a satisfaction tree T 0 of  based on T.
Initially, X0 = ;. For every leaf node Ni of T, if LT(Ni) 6= ;, then we arbitrarily select
u 2 LT(Ni) and add u to X0. Since the number of leaves in T is no larger than jj, we have
jX0j  jj. Also, X0  X because LT(Ni)  LT(Nr) = X according to Deﬁnition 2.1.4.
Next, for every node N in T, we relabel N with LT0(N) such that LT0(N) = LT(N)\X0.
When the relabeling is done, we acquire a new tree T 0. In particular, the root of T 0 is labeled
with X \ X0 = X0. Now, we show that T 0 is a satisfaction tree by proving that it satisﬁes
the conditions in Deﬁnition 2.1.4. Given a node N in T, we denote (N) as the sub-term
of  that is represented by the sub-tree rooted at N. When LT(N) = ;, LT0(N) = ;. In
the following, we only discuss the cases when LT(N) 6= ;.
 When N is a leaf node: If (N) is a unit term, then LT(N) must be a singleton and
theonlyuserinLT(N)musthavebeenaddedtoX0. Thus, wehaveLT0(N) = LT(N)128
which satisﬁes (N). Otherwise, (N) is in the form of 
+
1 . LT(N) satisfying 
+
1
indicates that every user in LT(N) satisﬁes 1. Since at least one user in LT(N) has
been added to X0, LT0(N) = LT(N)\X0 is a non-empty subset of LT(N). Therefore,
LT0(N) satisﬁes 
+
1 .
 WhenN representsu: BecauseLT(N) = LT(N1), wehaveLT0(N) = LT(N)\X0 =
LT(N1) \ X0 = LT0(N1). Similarly, LT(N) = LT(N2) implies that LT0(N) =
LT0(N2).
 When N represents t: If LT(N) = LT(N1), we have LT0(N) = LT(N) \ X0 =
LT(N1) \ X0 = LT0(N1). Otherwise, if LT(N) = LT(N2), we can prove similarly
that LT0(N) = LT0(N2). Therefore, LT0(N) = LT0(N1) or LT0(N) = LT0(N2).
 When N represents : Because LT(N) = LT(N1) [ LT(N2), we have LT0(N) =
LT(N) \ X0 = (LT(N1) [ LT(N2)) \ X0 = (LT(N1) \ X0) [ (LT(N2) \ X0) =
LT0(N1) [ LT0(N2).
 When N represents 
: Similar to the above, we have LT(N) = LT0(N1) [ LT0(N2).
Also, LT(N1) \ LT(N2) = ; indicates that LT0(N1) \ LT0(N2) = ;.
Therefore, T 0 is a satisfaction tree for . And since the root of T is labeled with X0, X0
satisﬁes  according to Theorem 2.1.2.
According to the above argument, if  is satisﬁable, then there exists a set X0 of no
more than jj users and a conﬁguration hU;URi, such that X0 satisﬁes  under hU;URi.
Users not in X0 can be removed from the conﬁguration without affecting the satisfaction of
. Also, those roles in UR that do not appear in  can be removed too. Since there are no
more than jj roles in  and there are no more than jj users in X0, we have jURj  jj2.
Therefore, the lemma holds.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.4
Since we have already proved that certain subcases of TSAT are NP-hard, to prove the
theorem, we just need to show that the problem is in NP. Given a term , a nondeterminis-
tic Turing machine may guess a conﬁguration hU;URi, a userset X, and a satisfaction tree
T whose root is labeled with X. According to Lemma 2.3.3, the size of X and hU;URi is129
bounded by jj2. Also, according to Theorem 2.1.2, X satisﬁes  if and only if there is a
satisfaction tree of  whose root is labeled with X. There are no more than 2jj   1 nodes
in T and the size of the set labeling a node is bounded by jXj. Therefore, the size of T is
polynomial in the size of input. The Turing machine may verify whether T is a satisfaction
tree by following the rules speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 2.1.4. It is clear that the veriﬁcation can
be done in polynomial time by following the structure of T. Therefore, TSAT is in NP.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.7, Lemma 2.3.8, and Theorem 2.3.9
Proof of Lemma 2.3.7
Proof by induction on the structure of term .
Base case: When  = r or  = All, we have C() = f1g  f1;2;:::;jjg. Otherwise,
when  is in the form of 
+
1 where 1 is a unit term, according to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have
C() = fiji 2 [1;1)g = W [ fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g, where W = f1;2;:::;jjg.
Inductive case: When  is in the form of (1 op 2), assume that the lemma holds
for 1 and 2. Let W1 denote a subset of f1;2;:::;j1jg and W2 denote a subset of
f1;2;:::;j2jg. We have the following three cases:
Case 1: Both C(1) and C(2) are ﬁnite. Let C(1) = W1 and C(2) = W2. Since
jj = j1j + j2j, it follows from Deﬁnition 2.3.1 that C()  f1;2;:::;jjg, because for
any c1 2 C(1) and c2 2 C(2), c1 + c2  j1j + j2j = jj.
Case 2: Exactly one of C(1) and C(2) is an inﬁnite set. Without loss of generality,
assume that C(1) = W1 and C(2) = W2 [ fj2j + 1;j2j + 2;:::g. We compute C()
according to op :
 op = t: C() = C(1) [ C(2) = W1 [ W2 [ fj2j + 1;j2j + 2;:::g =
W1[W2[fj2j+1;:::;jjg[fjj+1;jj+2;:::g, inwhichW1[W2[fj2j;:::;jjg
is a subset of f1;2;:::;jjg.
 op = u: C() = C(1)\C(2) is a subset of W1, which is a subset of f1;2;:::;jjg.130
 op = :
C() =fi j 9c1 2 W1 9c2 2 W2 [max(c1;c2)  i  c1 + c2]g
[ fmax(min(W1);j2j + 1);max(min(W1);j2j + 1) + 1;:::g
=fi j 9c1 2 W1 9c2 2 W2 [max(c1;c2)  i  c1 + c2]g
[ fmax(min(W1);j2j + 2;:::;jjg [ fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g
Note that fi j 9c1 2 W1 9c2 2 W2 [max(c1;c2)  i  c1 + c2]g [
fmax(min(W1);j2j + 1);:::;jjg is a subset of f1;2;:::;jjg, as c1 + c2 
j1j + j2j = jj.
 op = 
:
C() =fc1 + c2jc1 2 W1 ^ (c2 2 W2 _ c2 2 [j2j;1))g
=fc1 + c2jc1 2 W1 ^ c2 2 W2g
[ fmin(W1) + j2j + 1;min(W1) + j2j + 2;:::g
=fc1 + c2jc1 2 W1 ^ c2 2 W2g
[ fmin(W1) + j2j + 1;:::;jjg [ fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g
Note that fc1 + c2jc1 2 W1 ^ c2 2 W2g [ fmin(W1) + j2j;:::;jj]g is a subset of
f1;2;:::;jjg.
Case 3: Both C(1) and C(2) are inﬁnite sets, where C(1) = W1[fiji 2 [j1j;1)g
and C(2) = W2 [ fiji 2 [j2j;1)g. The argument is similar to Case 2. We omit the
details here.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.8
When  = All or  = r or  = 
+
1 , C() can be computed in constant time according
to Deﬁnition 2.3.1.
There are jj   1 binary operators in . Hence, to prove the lemma, we just need to
prove that, given C(1) and C(2), C() can be computed in time polynomial in the size
of jj, where  = (1 op 2).131
According to Lemma 2.3.7, we may represent the characteristic set of a term  as a
tuple. Let W  f1;:::;jjg. When C() = W, we represent C() as a tuple hjj;W;0i;
when C() = W [ fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g, we represent C() as a tuple hjj;W;1i. In
other words, the last element (either 0 or 1) of the tuple indicates whether C() contains
fjj + 1;jj + 2;:::g or not.
Given C(1) and C(2), we represent them as tuples hj1j;W1;f1i and hj2j;W2;f2i,
where f1;f2 2 f0;1g. Now, we show that computing the tuple-representation hjj;W;fi
of C() can be done in polynomial time. Note that jj = j1j + j2j. We just need to
determine W and f.
 Case f1 = f2 = 0: According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, it is clear that f = 0. Computing
W from W1 and W2, by following Deﬁnition 2.3.1, involves set union/intersection or
computing the sums of pairs of elements, which can be done in O(j1j  j2j).
 Case f1 = 0 and f2 = 1: According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, if op = u, then f = 0;
otherwise, f = 1. Computing W from W1 and W2 [ fj2j + 1;:::;jjg can be done
in O(j1j  jj).
 Case f1 = 1 and f2 = 0: Similar to the above.
 Case f1 = 1 and f2 = 1: According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have f = 1. Computing
W from W1[fj1j+1;:::;jjg and W2[fj2j+1;:::;jjg can be done in O(jj2).
In summary, computing C() takes polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.9
Given a term , let C0() be the set of all integers k’s such that there is a userset of size
k that satisﬁes  under some conﬁguration. We would like to prove that C0()  C().
We prove this by induction on the structure of .
Base case: when  = All,  is satisﬁed by any userset that is singleton; when  = r,
 is satisﬁed by a singleton containing a user who is a member of r. Hence, we have
C0(All) = C0(r) = f1g. According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, C0()  C().
Inductive case: assume that C0()  C() when jj < k, where jj is the number of
atomic terms in . When jj = k, we have:132
 Case  = 1 t 2: It follows from the deﬁnition of satisfaction (Deﬁnition 2.1.3)
that C0(1 t 2) = C0(1) [ C0(2). By inductive assumption, C0(1)  C(1) and
C0(2)  C(2). According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have C0()  C().
 Case  = 1u2: It follows from Deﬁnition 2.1.3 that C0(1u2)  C0(1)\C0(2).
In the following, we prove that C0(1 u 2)  C0(1) \ C0(2), where 1 and 2 are
free of negation and explicit sets of users.
Assume that X1 is a size-k userset that satisﬁes 1 under conﬁguration hU;UR1i
and X2 is a size-k userset that satisﬁes 2 under conﬁguration hU;UR2i. Since 1
and 2 do not contain explicit sets of users, the names of users are not important.
Hence, we can assume that X1 = X2. Also, since 1 does not contain negation, X1
still satisﬁes 1 even if we assign more roles to users in X1. Therefore, X1 satisﬁes
1 under hU;UR1 [ UR2i. Also, X1 (which is equivalent to X2) satisﬁes 2 under
hU;UR1 [ UR2i. Therefore, X1 satisﬁes 1 u 2. Since jX1j = k, we have k 2
C0(1 u 2). Hence, C0(1 u 2)  C0(1) \ C0(2).
In summary, we have C0(1 u 2) = C0(1) \ C0(2). By inductive assumption,
C0(1)  C(1) and C0(2)  C(2). According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have
C0()  C().
 Case  = 
+
0 : It follows from the computation of C0(All);C0(r);C0(1 t 2) and
C0(1 u 2) that C0(0) = f1g, where 0 is a unit term free of explicit sets of users
and negation. Given a conﬁguration hU;URi and a singleton fu1g such that fu1g
satisﬁes 0, we create u2;:::;un such that ui (i 2 [2;n]) is assigned to precisely the
same set of roles as u1. In this case, fu1;:::;ung satisﬁes 
+
0 . In other words, 
+
0
may be satisﬁed by n users for any n  1. That is to say, C0(
+
0 ) = fi j i 2 [1;1)g.
According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have C0()  C().
 Case  = 1 2: Let X be a userset that satisﬁes (1 2). There exist X1 and X2
such that X1 satisﬁes 1, X2 satisﬁes 2, and X1 [ X2 = X. By the deﬁnition of C0,
there exist c1 2 C0(1) and c2 2 C0(2) such that jX1j = c1 and jX2j = c2. Hence,
max(c1;c2)  jXj  c1 + c2.133
Given c1 2 C0(1) and c2 2 C0(2), there exist X1 and X2 such that X1 satisﬁes
1 under hU1;UR1i, X2 satisﬁes 2 under hU2;UR2i, jX1j = c1 and jX2j = c2.
For any integer k 2 [max(c1;c2);c1 + c2], we may name users in such a way that
jX1 \ X2j = c1 + c2   k. In this case, X = X1 [ X2 satisﬁes (1  2) under
hU1 [ U2;UR1 [ UR2i and jXj = k.
In summary, C0(1  2) = f i j 9 c1 2 C0(1) 9 c2 2
C0(2)[ max(c1;c2)  i  c1 + c2 ]g. By inductive assumption, C0(1)  C(1) and
C0(2)  C(2). According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1, we have C0()  C().
 Case  = 1 
 2: On the one hand, userset X satisﬁes (1 
 2) if and only if
there exist X1 and X2 such that X1 [ X2 = X, X1 \ X2 = ; and X1;X2 satisfy
1;2 respectively. By deﬁnition of C0, we have jX1j 2 C0(1) and jX2j 2 C0(2).
Therefore, jXj = (jX1j + jX2j) 2 f c1 + c2 j c1 2 C0(1) ^ c2 2 C0(2) g.
On the other hand, given any c1 2 C0(1) and c2 2 C0(2), by deﬁnition of C0, there
exist X1 and X2 that satisfy 1 and 2 under hU1;UR1i and hU1;UR1i respectively,
such that jX1j = c1 and jX2j = c2. Name the users in such a way that X1 \ X2 = ;.
We have X = X1 [ X2 satisﬁes (1 
 2) under hU1 [ U2;UR1 [ UR2i, where
jXj = jX1j + jX2j = c1 + c2.
In summary, C0(1 
 2) = f c1 + c2 j c1 2 C0(1) ^ c2 2 C0(2) g. By inductive
assumption, C0(1)  C(1) and C0(2)  C(2). According to Deﬁnition 2.3.1,
we have C0()  C().
In conclusion, we have C0()  C() and Theorem 2.3.9 holds.
A.3 Proofs of Theorems in Section 2.4
In the following proofs, (opk) denotes k copies of  connected together by opera-
tor op and (opn
i=1ri) denotes (r1 op:::op rn). Given R = fr1;:::;rmg, (opR) denotes
(r1 op:::op rm).134
A.3.1 The Five Intractability Subcases of UTS
Lemma A.3.1 UTS ht;i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET COVERING problem [25]. In the
SET COVERING problem, wearegivenaﬁnitesetS = fe1;:::;eng, afamilyofS’ssubsets
F = fS1;:::;Smg, and an integer k < m, and we ask whether there exists a sub-family of
sets F 0  F whose union is S and jF 0j  k. Given such an instance, our reduction maps
each element in S to a user and to a role. We construct a conﬁguration hU;URi such that
U = fu1;:::;ung and UR = f(ui;ri) j i 2 [1;n]g, and a term  = (
J
k(
Fm
i=1(
J
Ri))),
where Ri is a set of roles such that rj 2 Ri if and only if ej 2 Si.
We now demonstrate that U satisﬁes  under hU;URi if and only if there exist k sets
in F whose union is S. On the one hand, assume that U satisﬁes , by deﬁnition. U has k
subsets U1;:::;Uk such that
Sk
i=1 Ui = U and every Ui satisﬁes (
Fm
i=1(
J
Ri)). Ui satisﬁes
(
Fm
i=1(
J
Ri)) if and only if Ui satisﬁes a certain (
J
Rxi), where xi 2 [1;m]. From the
construction of Rxi, Ui satisﬁes (
J
Rxi) if and only if Ui = fua j ea 2 Sxig. Since
Sk
i=1 Ui = U, we have
Sk
i=1 Sxi = S. The answer to the set covering problem is “yes”.
On the other hand, assume that there are k sets in F whose union is S. Without loss of
generality, we assume that
Sk
i=1 Si = S. In this case, we divide U into k sets U1;:::;Uk
such that Ui = fuj j ej 2 Sig. Since
Sk
i=1 Si = S, we have
Sk
i=1 Ui = U. Furthermore,
since Ui = fuj j ej 2 Sig, from the construction of Ri, we have Ui satisﬁes (
J
Ri) for
every i 2 [1;k]. Therefore, U satisﬁes  = (
J
k(
Fm
i=1(
J
Ri))).
Lemma A.3.2 UTS hu;i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET COVERING problem [25]. Given
S = fe1;:::;eng, a family of S’s subsets F = fS1;:::;Smg, and an integer k < m, our
reduction maps each element ej 2 S to a role rj and each Si 2 F to a user ui. We construct
a conﬁguration hU;URi such that U = fu1;:::;umg and UR = f(ui;rj) j ej 2 Sig, and
a term  = (((
J
k All) u (
Jn
i=1 ri))  (
J
m All)).
We now demonstrate that U satisﬁes  under hU;URi if and only if there exist k sets
in family F whose union is S. On the one hand, assume that U satisﬁes . Since (
J
m All)135
can be satisﬁed by any nonempty userset with no more than m users, U always satisﬁes
(
J
m All) and it satisﬁes  if and only if there is U0  U such that U0 satisﬁes ((
J
k All) u
(
Jn
i=1 ri)). U0 satisfying (
J
k All) indicates that jU0j  k, while U0 satisfying (
Jn
i=1 ri)
indicates that users in U0 together have membership of all roles in fr1;:::;rng. Without
loss of generality, suppose U0 = fu1;:::;utg, where t  k. Because (ui;rj) 2 UR if and
only if ej 2 Si, the union of fS1;:::;Stg is S. The answer to the SET COVERING problem
is “yes”.
On the other hand, assume that k subsets in F cover S. Without loss of generality,
we assume that
Sk
i=1 Si = S. From the construction of UR, users u1;:::;uk together
have membership of all roles in fr1;:::;rng. In this case, fu1;:::;ukg satisﬁes (
Jn
i=1 ri).
Also, fu1;:::;ukgsatisﬁes(
J
k All). Hence, fu1;:::;ukgsatisﬁes((
J
k All)u(
Jn
i=1 ri)).
(
J
m All) is also satisﬁed by U. Therefore, U satisﬁes .
Lemma A.3.3 UTS h;
i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete DOMATIC NUMBER problem [25].
Given a graph G(V;E), the Domatic Number problem asks whether V can be partitioned
into k disjoint nonempty sets V1;V2;:::;Vk, such that each Vi is a dominating set for G. V 0
is a dominating set for G = (V;E) if for every node u in V   V 0, there is a node v in V 0
such that (u;v) 2 E.
Given a graph G = (V;E) and a threshold k, let U = fu1;u2;:::;ung and R =
fr1;r2;:::;rng, where n is the number of nodes in V . Each user in U corresponds to a
node in G, and v(ui) denotes the node corresponding to user ui. UR = f(ui;rj) j i =
j or (v(ui);v(uj)) 2 Eg. Let  = (
N
k(
Jn
i=1 ri)).
A dominating set in G corresponds to a set of users that together have membership of
all the n roles. U satisﬁes  under hU;URi if and only if U can be divided into k pairwise
disjoint sets, each of which has role membership of r1;r2;:::;rn. Therefore, the answer to
the Domatic Number problem is “yes” if and only if U satisﬁes  under hU;URi.136
Lemma A.3.4 UTS h
;ti is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET PACKING problem [25], which
asks: Given a ﬁnite set S = fe1;:::;eng, a family of S’s subsets F = fS1;:::;Smg,
and an integer k, whether there are k pairwise disjoint elements (which are sets) in F?
Without loss of generality, we assume that Si 6 Sj when i 6= j. (If Si  Sj, one can
remove Sj without affecting the answer.) Let U = fu0;u1;:::;ung, R = fr1;:::;rng and
UR = f(ui;ri) j 1  i  ng. Note that u0 is a user that is not assigned to any role. We
then construct a term  = ((
N
k (
Fm
i=1 (
N
Rj))) 
 nonempty), where Rj = fri j ei 2 Sjg
and nonempty = (All t (All 
 All) t  t (
N
m All)).
We show that U satisﬁes  under hU;URi if and only if there are k pairwise disjoint
elements in family F. As the only member of ri is ui, the only userset that satisﬁes i =
(
N
Rj) is Uj = fui j ei 2 Sjg. Hence, a userset X satisﬁes 0 = (
Fm
i=1 i) if and only if
X equals to some Uj.
Without loss of generality, assume that S1;:::;Sk are k pairwise disjoint sets. Then,
U1;:::;Uk are k pairwise disjoint sets of users. U1 satisﬁes 1, and thus satisﬁes 0. Sim-
ilarly, we have Ui satisﬁes 0 for every i from 1 to k. Furthermore, since u0 62 Ui for any
i 2 [1;k], we have
Sk
i=1 Ui  U. Hence, U can be divided into two nonempty subset
Sk
i=1 Ui and U0 = U  
Sk
i=1 Ui such that
Sk
i=1 Ui satisﬁes (
N
k (
Fm
i=1 (
N
Rj))) and U0
satisﬁes nonempty. In other words, U satisﬁes .
On the other hand, suppose that U satisﬁes . Then, U has a strict subset U0 with
u0 62 U0, such that U0 can be divided into k pairwise disjoint sets ^ U1;:::; ^ Uk, such that each
^ Ui satisﬁes 0. In order to satisfy 0, ^ Ui must satisfy a certain ai and hence be equivalent to
Uai, where ai 2 [1;m]. The assumption that ^ U1;:::; ^ Uk are pairwise disjoint indicates that
Ua1;:::;Uak are also pairwise disjoint. Therefore, their corresponding sets Sa1;:::;Sak
are pairwise disjoint. The answer to the SET PACKING problem is “yes”.
Lemma A.3.5 UTS hu;
i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET COVERING problem, which asks:
Given a family F = fS1;:::;Smg of subsets of a ﬁnite set S = fe1;:::;eng and an integer137
k no larger than m, whether there is a subfamily of sets F 0  F whose union is S and
jF 0j  k?
Given S and F, let U = fu1;u2;:::;umg, R = fr1;r2;:::;rng and UR = f(ui;rj) j
ej 2 Sig. Let  = ((un
i=1
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

) 
 (
N
m k All)). We now demonstrate that
U satisﬁes  under hU;URi if and only if there are k sets in family F whose union is S.
Without loss of generality, assume that k < m.
First, assume that U satisﬁes . Since (
N
m k All) can be satisﬁed by any userset with
m   k users, U satisﬁes  if and only if there is a size-k subset U0 of U that satisﬁes
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

for every i 2 [1;n]. This means that users in U0 together have member-
ship of all roles in fr1;:::;rng. Suppose U0 = fua1;:::;uakg, where ai 2 [1;m]. Because
(ui;rj) 2 UR if and only if ej 2 Si, the union of fSa1;:::;Sakg is S. The answer to the
Set Covering problem is “yes”.
Second, without loss of generality, assume that
Sk
i=1 Si = S. From the construction of
UR, users u1;:::;uk together have membership of r1;:::;rn. In this case, fu1;:::;ukg
satisﬁes
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

for every i 2 [1;n]. Since k < m, fu1;:::;ukg is a
strict subset of U. Therefore, U can be divided into two nonempty subset fu1;:::;ukg
and U   fu1;:::;ukg such that fu1;:::;ukg satisﬁes (un
i=1
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

) and
U   fu1;:::;ukg satisﬁes (
N
m k All). In other words, U satisﬁes .
A.3.2 Proof that UTS Is in NP
Lemma A.3.6 UTS h:;+;t;u;;
i is in NP.
Proof Given a term , a conﬁguration hU;URi and a userset X, according to Theo-
rem 2.1.2, X satisﬁes  if and only if there exists a satisfaction tree of  whose root is
labeled with X. A non-deterministic Turing machine may guess a satisfaction tree T of
 such that the root of T is labeled with X. From the proof of Theorem 2.3.4, the size
of T is polynomial in the size of  and verifying whether T is a satisfaction tree can
be done in polynomial time by following the rules in Deﬁnition 2.1.4. Therefore, UTS
h:;+;t;u;;
i is in NP.138
A.3.3 The Tractable Cases
Lemma A.3.7 UTS for 4CF terms is in P.
Proof Given a 4CF term  = (P1    Pn), where for each k such that 1  k  n, Pk
is a 3CF term of the form (k;1 
 k;2 
  
 k;mk), and each k;j is a 1CF term. Let tk;j
be the base (which is a unit term) of k;j. Tk = ftk;1;tk;2;:::;tk;mkg is a multiset of the
base of the 1CF terms in Pk.
Given a userset X = fu1;:::;ung and conﬁguration hU;URi, we present an algorithm
that determines whether X satisﬁes  under hU;URi.
Step 1 The ﬁrst step checks that each Pk is satisﬁed by some subset of X. For each k such
that 1  k  n, do the following. Construct a bipartite graph G(X;Tk), in which one
partition consists of users in X and the other consists of all the tk;j’s in Tk; and there is an
edge between u 2 X and tk;j if and only if fug satisﬁes tk;j. Compute a maximal matching
of the graph G(X;Tk), if the size of the matching is less than mk, returns “no”, as this
means that X does not contain a subset that satisﬁes Pk; thus X does not satisfy .
Step 2 The second step checks that each user in X can be “consumed” by some unit term
in . Let G(A;B) denote the bipartite graph in which one partition, A, consists of users in
X, and the other partition, B, consists of all the tk;j’s in T1 [ T2 [  [ Tn. Furthermore,
for any unit term t that occurs as t+ in , we make sure that B has at least jXj copies of t
by adding additional copies of t if necessary. There is an edge between u 2 A and t 2 B
if and only if fug satisﬁes t. Compute a maximal matching of the graph G(X;T), if the
matching has size less than jXj, returns “no”.
Step 3 Return “yes”.
It is not difﬁcult to see that if the algorithm returns “no”, then X does not satisfy . We
now show that if the algorithm returns “yes”, then X satisﬁes . If the algorithm returns
“yes”, then for each k, the graph G(X;Tk) has a matching of size mk. Let Xk be the set
of users involved in the matching. Xk satisﬁes Pk. Let X0 = X1 [ X2 [  [ Xn. If
X0 = X, then clearly X satisﬁes . If X0  X, then ﬁnd a user u in X n X0, and do the
following: Find the term t that is matched with u in the maximal matching computed in139
step 2. Such a term must exist, since the matching has size jXj. Without loss of generality,
assume that t appears in P1, and X1 contains a user w that is matched with t; then change
X1 by replacing w with u. Clearly, the new X1 still satisﬁes P1. Compute X0 again, and
if X0  X, ﬁnd another user in X n X0 and repeat the previous process. Note that X0 will
grow if w appears in some other Xk. Also observe that, the newly added matching between
u and t will never be removed again in future, because no other user is matched with t in the
maximal matching computed in step 2; as a result, u will always remain in X0. Therefore,
after each step, one new user will be added to X0 and will never be removed. After at most
jXj steps, we will have X0 = X.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.5.1
Proofs of the P results in Theorem 2.5.1
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma, which will be useful.
Lemma A.4.1 The following properties hold.
1. A userset X satisﬁes a unit term t if and only if X is a singleton and the only user in
X satisﬁes t.
2. A userset X satisﬁes a term t+, where t is a unit term, if and only if every user in X
satisﬁes t.
3. If a userset X satisﬁes a term  that is built using only :;+;u;t, then every user in
X satisﬁes .
4. A userset X is safe with respect to a 1CF term  if and only if there exists a user in
X that satisﬁes t.
Proof Properties 1 and 2 follow from the deﬁnition of term satisfaction. Observe that a
unit term can be satisﬁed only by a singleton.
Property 3. The term  can be decomposed into subterms in 1CF form, connected using
u and t. By deﬁnition, X satisﬁes 1 u2 if and only if X satisﬁes both 1 and 2, and X
satisﬁes 1 t 2 if and only if X satisﬁes either 1 or 2. Identify all 1CF subterms that X140
satisﬁes, it follows from Properties 1 and 2 that each user in X satisﬁes all these subterms.
Therefore, each user satisﬁes .
Property 4. For the “if” direction, if X contains a user u that satisﬁes t, then fug
satisﬁes the term , and thus X is safe with respect to . For the “only if” direction, if X
is safe with respect to , then X contains a subset X0 that satisﬁes . Any user in X0 must
satisfy t according to Properties 1 and 2.
Lemma A.4.2 SAFE h:;+;t;i is in P.
Proof A userset X is safe with respect to (1 t 2) if and only if either X is safe with
respectto1 orX issafewithrespectto2. Furthermore, X issafewithrespectto(12)
if and only if X is safe with respect to both 1 and 2. Therefore, one can determine
whether U is safe with respect to , which is built using only the operators in f:;+;t;g,
by following the structure of the term until reaching subterms in 1CF. From Property 4 of
Lemma A.4.1, checking whether U is safe with respect to such a term amounts to checking
whether there exists a user in U that satisﬁes t, which can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma A.4.3 SAFE h:;+;t;ui is in P.
Proof Given a term  which is built using only operators in f:;+;t;ug, we prove that
a userset X is safe with respect to  if and only if there exists a user u 2 X such that u
satisﬁes . The “if” direction follows by deﬁnition. For the “only if” direction: Suppose
that X contains a nonempty subset X0 that satisﬁes , then by Property 3 of Lemma A.4.1,
every user in X0 satisﬁes ; thus X must contain a user that satisﬁes . Therefore, to
determine whether X is safe with respect to , one can, for each user in X, check whether
the user satisﬁes . Checking whether one user satisﬁes a term using only operators in
f:;+;t;ug can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma A.4.4 SAFE h:;+;
i is in P.
Proof Given a term  which does not contain any binary operator but 
, we show that
determining whether a userset X is safe with respect to  under a conﬁguration hU;URi141
can be reduced to the maximum matching problem on bipartite graphs, which can be solved
in O(MN) time, where M is the number of edges and N is the number of nodes in G [50].
Let s be the number of 1CF terms in  and t = jXj. Since 
 is associative,  can
be equivalently expressed as (1 
 2 
  
 s), where each i is a 1CF term . Let
X = fu1;:::;utg. We construct a bipartite graph G(V1 [ V2;E), where each node in V1
corresponds to a 1CF term in  and each node in V2 corresponds to a user in X. More
precisely, V1 = fa1;:::;asg, V2 = fb1;:::;btg, and (ai;bj) 2 E if and only if fujg
satisﬁes i. The resulting graph G has s+t nodes and O(st) edges, and can be constructed
in time polynomial in the size of G. Solving the maximal matching problem for G takes
time O((s + t)st).
We now show that X is safe with respect to  if and only if the maximal matching in
the graph G has size s. If the maximal matching has size s, then each node in V1 matches
to a certain node in V2, which means that the s 1CF terms in  are satisﬁed by s distinct
users in X; thus X contains a subset that satisﬁes . If X is safe with respect to , by
deﬁnition, there exist s disjoint subsets X1;:::;Xs such that Xi (i 2 [1;s]) satisﬁes i and
Ss
j=1 Xj  X. From our construction of G, we may match a node corresponding to a user
in Xi to the node corresponding to i. In this case, a maximal matching of size s exists.
Proving the NP-completeness results in Table 2.2
Lemma A.4.5 SAFEhu;i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET COVERING problem [25]. In the
SET COVERING problem, we are given a family F = fS1;:::;Smg of subsets of a ﬁnite
set S = fe1;:::;eng and an integer k no larger than m, and we ask whether there is a
subfamily of sets F 0  F whose union is S and jF 0j  k.
Given S and F, we construct a conﬁguration hU;URi such that (ui;rj) 2 UR if and
only if ej 2 Si. Let U = fu1;:::;umg and  = ((
J
k All) u (
Jn
i=1 ri)).
We now demonstrate that U is safe with respect to  under hU;URi if and only if there
are no more than k sets in family F whose union is S.142
First, ifU issafewithrespectto, bydeﬁnition, asubsetU0 ofU satisﬁesboth(
J
k All)
and(
Jn
i=1 ri). U0 satisfying(
J
k All)indicatesthatjU0j  k, whileU0 satisfying(
Jn
i=1 ri)
indicates that users in U0 together have membership of ri for every i 2 [1;n]. Without loss
of generality, suppose U0 = fu1;:::;utg, where t  k. Since (ui;rj) 2 UR if and only
if ej 2 Si, the union of fS1;:::;Stg is S. The answer to the SET COVERING problem is
“yes”.
Second, without loss of generality, assume that
Sk
i=1 Si = S. From the construction
of UR, users u1;:::;uk together have membership of ri for every i 2 [1;n], which indi-
cates that fu1;:::;ukg is safe with respect to (
Jn
i=1 ri). Also, any non-empty subset of
fu1;:::;ukg satisﬁes (
J
k All). Hence, U is safe with respect to .
Lemma A.4.6 SAFEh;
i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete DOMATIC NUMBER problem [25].
Given a graph G(V;E), the Domatic Number problem asks whether V can be partitioned
into k disjoint sets V1;V2;:::;Vk, such that each Vi is a dominating set for G. V 0 is a dom-
inating set for G = (V;E) if for every node u in V   V 0, there is a node v in V 0 such that
(u;v) 2 E.
Given a graph G = (V;E) and an integer k, let U = fu1;u2;:::;ung and R =
fr1;r2;:::;rng, where n is the number of nodes in V . Each user in U corresponds to a
node in G, and v(ui) denotes the node corresponding to user ui. Let UR = f(ui;rj) j i =
j or (v(ui);v(uj)) 2 Eg and  = (
N
k(
Jn
i=1 ri)).
A dominating set in G corresponds to a set of users who together have membership of
all the n roles. U is safe with respect to  if and only if U has a subset U0 that can be
divided into k pairwise disjoint sets, each of which have role membership of r1;r2;:::;rn.
Therefore, the answer to the Domatic Number problem is “yes” if and only if U is safe with
respect to .
Lemma A.4.7 SAFEh
;ti is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET PACKING problem [25], which
asks, given a family F = fS1;:::;Smg of subsets of a ﬁnite set S = fe1;:::;eng and an143
integer k, whether there are k pairwise disjoint sets in family F. Without loss of generality,
we assume that Si 6 Sj if i 6= j.
Given S and F, let U = fu1;:::;ung, R = fr1;:::;rng and UR = f(ui;ri) j 1 
i  ng. We then construct a term  = (
N
k (
Fm
i=1 (
N
Rj))), where Rj = fri j ei 2 Sjg.
We show that U is safe with respect to  under hU;URi if and only if there are k pairwise
disjoint sets in family F.
As the only member of ri is ui, the only userset that satisﬁes i = (
N
Rj) is Uj = fui j
ei 2 Sjg. A userset X satisﬁes 0 = (
Fm
i=1 i) if and only if X equals to some Uj.
First, without loss of generality, assume that S1;:::;Sk are k pairwise disjoint sets.
Then, U1;:::;Uk are k pairwise disjoint sets of users. U1 satisﬁes 1, and thus satisﬁes 0.
Similarly, Ui satisﬁes 0 for every i from 1 to k. Since Ui  U, U is safe with respect to .
Second, suppose U is safe with respect to . Then, U has a subset U0 that can be divided
into k pairwise disjoint sets ^ U1;:::; ^ Uk, such that ^ Ui satisﬁes i. In order to satisfy 0, ^ Ui
must satisfy a certain ai and hence be equivalent to Uai. The assumption that ^ U1;:::; ^ Uk
are pairwise disjoint indicates that Ua1;:::;Uak are also pairwise disjoint. Therefore, their
corresponding sets Sa1;:::;Sak are pairwise disjoint. The answer to the Set Packing prob-
lem is “yes”.
Lemma A.4.8 SAFE hu;
i is NP-hard.
Proof We use a reduction from the NP-complete SET COVERING problem, which asks,
given a family F = fS1;:::;Smg of subsets of a ﬁnite set S = fe1;:::;eng and an integer
k no larger than m, whether there is a subfamily of sets F 0  F whose union is S and
jF 0j  k.
Given S and F, let U = fu1;u2;:::;umg, R = fr1;r2;:::;rng and UR = f(ui;rj) j
ej 2 Sig. Let  = (un
i=1
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

). We now demonstrate that U satisﬁes 
under hU;URi if and only if there are k sets in family F whose union is S.
If U is safe with respect to , by deﬁnition, a subset U0 of U satisﬁes
 
ri 

 N
k 1 All

for every i 2 [1;n], which indicates users in U0 together have membership of ri for every
i 2 [1;n]. For any i 2 [1;n], U0 satisfying (ri 
 (
N
k 1 All)) indicates that jU0j = k.144
Suppose U0 = fua1;:::;uakg. Because (ui;rj) 2 UR if and only if ej 2 Si, the union of
fSa1;:::;Sakg is S. The answer to the SET COVERING problem is “yes”.
On the other hand, without loss of generality, assume that
Sk
i=1 Si = S. From the
construction of UR, users u1;:::;uk together have membership of ri for every i 2 [1;n],
which indicates that fu1;:::;ukg satisﬁes i for every i 2 [1;n]. Hence, fu1;:::;ukg
satisﬁes  and U is safe with respect to .
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2.5.2
Lemma A.5.1 SSCh:;+;t;u;;
i is in coNP
NP.
Proof We show that the complement of SSCh:;+;t;u;;
i is in NP
NP. Because
SAFE is in NP (see Table 2.2), an NP oracle can decide whether a userset is safe with
respect to a term. We construct a nondeterministic Oracle Turing Machine M that accepts
an input consisting of a state hU;UR;UPi and a policy sphP;i if and only if hU;UR;UPi
is not safe with respect to sphP;i. M nondeterministically selects a set U of users in
hU;UR;UPi. If U does not cover P, then M rejects. Otherwise, M invokes the NP
oracle to check whether U is safe with respect to . If the oracle answers “yes”, then M
rejects; otherwise, M accepts, as it has found a userset that covers P but is not safe with
respect to , which violates the static safety policy. The construction of M shows that the
complement of SSCh:;+;t;u;;
i is in NP
NP. Hence, SSCh:;+;t;u;;
i is in
coNP
NP.
Lemma A.5.2 SSCht;i is coNP-hard.
Proof We reduce the coNP-complete VALIDITY problem for propositional logic to
SSCht;i. Given a propositional logic formula ' in disjunctive normal form, let
fv1;:::;vng be the set of propositional variables in '.
WecreateastatehU;UR;UPiwithnpermissionsp1;p2;:::;pn, 2nusersu1;u0
1;u2;u0
2;
:::; un;u0
n, and 2n roles r1;r0
1;r2;r0
2;:::;rn;r0
n. We have UP = f(ui;pi);(u0
i;pi) j 1 
i  ng and UR = f(ui;ri);(u0
i;r0
i) j 1  i  ng. We also construct a term  from the145
formula ' by replacing each literal vi with ri, each literal :vi with r0
i, each occurrence of
^ with  and each occurrence of _ with t.
Note that X is safe with respect to 1 t 2 if and only if X is safe respect to either 1
or 2, and X is safe with respect to 1  2 if and only if X is safe respect to both 1 and
2. Thus the logical structure of  follows that of '.
We now show that the formula ' is valid if and only if hU;UR;UPi is safe with respect
to the policy sphfp1;p2;:::;png;i. On the one hand, if the formula ' is not valid, then
there is an assignment I that makes it false. Using that assignment, we construct a userset
X = fui j I(vi) = trueg [ fu0
i j I(vi) = falseg. X covers all permissions in P, but X
is not safe with respect to . On the other hand, if hU;UR;UPi is not safe with respect to
sphfp1;p2;:::;png;i, then there exists a set X of users that covers P but X is not safe
with respect to . In order to cover all permissions in P, for each i 2 [1;n], at least one
of ui;u0
i is in X. Without loss of generality, assume that for each i, exactly one of ui;u0
i is
in X. (If both ui;u0
i are in X, we can remove either one, the resulting set is a subset of X
and still covers P.) Then we can derive a truth assignment I from X by setting vi to true if
ui 2 X and to false if u0
i 2 X. Then the formula evaluates to false, because X is not safe
with respect to .
Lemma A.5.3 SSChu;i is NP-hard.
Proof There is a straightforward reduction from SAFEhu;i to SSChu;i. Given a
term  using only operators u or , in order to check whether a userset X is safe with
respect to , we can construct a policy sphP;i and a state hU;UR;UPi such that X is the
only set of users in the state that covers P. In this case, X is safe with respect to  if and
only if the state we constructed satisﬁes sphP;i. Since SAFEhu;i is NP-hard (see
Table 2.2), SSChu;i is NP-hard.
Lemma A.5.4 SSCh
i is coNP-hard.
Proof We can reduce the NP-complete SET COVERING problem to the complement of
SSCh
i. In SET COVERING, we are given a family F = fS1;:::;Smg of subsets of a146
ﬁnite set S = fe1;:::;eng and an integer k, where k is an integer smaller than m and n.
We are asking whether there is a subfamily of sets F 0  F whose union is S and jF 0j  k.
Given an instance of the Set Covering problem, construct a state hU;UR;UPi such that
UR = f(ui;ri) j i 2 [1;m]g and UP = f(ui;pj) j ej 2 Sig. Construct a safety policy
sphP;i, where P = fp1;:::;png and  = (
N
k+1 All).  is satisﬁed by any set of no less
than k + 1 users.
First, if hU;UR;UPi is safe, no k users together have all permissions in P. In this case,
since ui corresponds to Si, there does not exist k sets in family F whose union is S. The
answer to the Set Covering problem is “no”.
Second, if hU;UR;UPi is not safe, there exist a set of no more than k users together
have all permissions in P. Accordingly, the answer to the Set Covering problem is “yes”.
Since the SET COVERING problem is NP-complete, we conclude that the complement
of SSCh
i is NP-hard. Hence, SSCh
i is coNP-hard.
Tractable cases of SSC:
Lemma A.5.5 SSCh:;+;u;ti is in P.
Proof Givenatermwithoperators:;+;u andt, constructanotherterm0 byremoving
+ in . For example, if  = ((r1 u r2)+ t r
+
3 ), then 0 = ((r1 u r2) t r3). When only
operators :;+;u and t are allowed, if a set U of users satisﬁes , then there exists U0  U
such that U0 satisﬁes 0. This indicates that U is safe with respect to  if and only if U is
safe with respect to 0. Therefore, in order to show that SSCh:;+;u;ti is tractable, it
sufﬁces to prove that SSCh:;u;ti is in P.
A term 0 with operators :;u and t may be satisﬁed only by singleton. A state
hU;UR;UPi is safe with respect to sphfp1;:::;pmg;0i, if and only if for any set U
of users who together have all permissions in fp1;:::;pmg, there exists a user u 2 U
such that fug satisﬁes 0. This is equivalent to checking whether there exists a permis-
sion pi (i 2 [1;m]) such that for every user u having pi, fug satisﬁes 0. The following
algorithm performs such a check.147
isSafe(P, 0, UR, UP)
begin
For each pi in fp1;:::;pmg do
flag = true;
For each u such that (u;pi) 2 UP do
If u does not satisfy 0 then
flag = false;
break;
EndIf;
EndFor;
If flag then return true;
EndFor;
return false;
end
The worst-case time complexity of the above algorithm is O(m  jUj  t), where t
is the time taken to check whether a singleton satisﬁes a term with operators :;u and t,
which is polynomial in the size of input according to Theorem 2.4.1.
Lemma A.5.6 SSC h:;+;i is in P.
Proof The general form of terms built using only :;+ and  is (1    n), where
i is of the form r, :r, r+ or (:r)+, where r is a role. Given a term  with operators :;+
and , construct another term 0 by removing + in . It is clear that if a set U of users
satisﬁes , then there exists U0  U such that U0 satisﬁes 0. This indicates that U is safe
with respect to  if and only if U is safe with respect to 0. Therefore, in order to show that
SSC h:;+;i is tractable, it sufﬁces to prove that SSC h:;i is in P.
Given a policy sphfp1;:::;pmgi, without loss of generality, assume that 0 = (1 
  n), where i = r or :r. The following algorithm checks whether hU;UR;UPi is
safe with respect to 0.148
isSafe(P, 0, UR, UP)
begin
  = f1; ::: ng;
For each pi in fp1;:::;pmg do
Gpi = ;
For each u such that (u;pi) 2 UP do
Gpi = Gpi [
f i 2 0 j u does not satisfy i;g
EndFor;
  =   \ Gpi
EndFor;
if (  == ;) return true
else return false
end
In the above algorithm, Gpi stores the set of sub-terms in 0 such that, for every j 2
Gpi, there exists a user who has pi but does not satisfy j. At the end of the algorithm,
on the one hand, if   contains a sub-term i, it means that for every permissions pj in
fp1;:::;png, there exists a user upj such that upj has permission pj but does not satisfy i.
In this case, the set of users fup1;:::;upng have all permissions in fp1;:::;png but does
not satisfy i, and hence does not satisfy 0. On the other hand,   = ; indicates that if
users in U have all permissions in fp1;:::;png then every sub-term i in 0 is satisﬁed by
a certain user in U. Therefore, there exists U0  U such that U0 satisﬁes 0.
The worst-case time complexity of the above algorithm is O(m  jUj  t), where t is
the time taken to check whether a singleton satisﬁes a term with operators : and , which
is polynomial according to Theorem 2.4.1.149
Appendix B Proofs in Chapter 4
B.1 Proofs in Section 4.2
Proof to Lemma 4.2.3: WSP is NP-hard in R2BAC, if the workﬂow uses constraints of
the form h6= (s1;s2)i.
Proof To prove the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the NP-complete GRAPH K-
COLORABILITY problem to this problem. In the GRAPH K-COLORABILITY problem, we
are given a graph G(V;E) and an integer k, and are asked whether we can assign no more
than k colors to vertices in V such that every vertex has one color and vertices ni and nj
have different colors whenever (ni;nj) 2 E.
Given a graph G(V;E), we construct a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an access
control state  = hU;UR;Bi such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between steps
in S and vertices in V . Let U = fu1; ;ukg, where each ui 2 U corresponds to a color.
Construct UR and SA in such a way that every user in U is authorized to perform every
step in S. For every (ni;nj) 2 E, construct a constraint h6= (si;sj)i, which requires that
si and sj must be performed by different users. If G is k-colorable, then we can construct
a plan P such that sj is performed by ui if and only if nj is assigned the ith color. Since
no pair of adjacent vertices have the same color, no pair of steps restricted by a constraint
is assigned to the same user in P. Hence, P satisﬁes all constraints and is a valid plan.
Similarly, if there is a valid plan P for W in , we can ﬁnd a way to color G with no more
than k colors based on plan P. In general, G is k-colorable if and only if W is satisﬁable.
Proof to Lemma 4.2.4: WSP is NP-hard in R2BAC, if the workﬂow uses constraints of
the form h= (s;9X)i.150
Proof To prove the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the NP-complete HITTING SET
problem to this problem. In the HITTING SET problem, we are given a set Z and a family
F = fZ1; ;Zmg of subsets of Z and are asked whether there exists a size-k subset H of
Z such that, for every Zi 2 F, H \ Zi 6= ;.
We construct a workﬂow W = hS [ A;;SA;Ci and an access control state  =
hU;UR;Bi such that the answer to the HITTING SET problem is “yes” if and only if W is
satisﬁable under . Let U = fui j ei 2 Zg be a set of users. Let S = fs1; ;skg be a set
of k steps. Construct UR and SA in such a way that every step in S is authorized to all users
in U. Furthermore, let A = fa1; ;amg be a set of m steps and S\A = ;. Construct UR
and SA in such a way that ui is authorized to perform aj if and only if ei 2 Zj. Intuitively,
S corresponds to H and each step ai 2 A corresponds to Zi 2 F. Finally, construct a set
C = fc1; ;cmg of m constraints, where ci = h= (ai;9S)i.
On the one hand, assume that P is a valid plan. Let H = fei j 9sj(ui;sj) 2 Pg. For
every ai 2 A, let uj be the user such that (uj;ai) 2 P. P being valid indicates that uj
is authorized to perform ai. From our construction, we have ej 2 Zi. Furthermore, for
every i 2 [1;m], h= (ai;9S)i being satisﬁed indicates that there exists sl 2 S such that
(uj;sl) 2 P. And (uj;sl) 2 P indicates that ej 2 H. Therefore, we have H \ Zi = ej. In
general, for every Zi 2 F, H \Zi 6= ;. The answer to the HITTING SET problem is “yes”.
On the other hand, assume that the answer to the HITTING SET problem is “yes”. We
now construct a plan P that satisﬁes the workﬂow. Without loss of generality, assume
that H = fe1; ;ekg. We initialize P to ; and add (ui;si) to P for every i 2 [1;k].
Recall that si is authorized to every user in U. For every Zj 2 F, add (ui;aj) to P when
H \ Zj = ei. ei 2 Zj implies that ui is authorized to perform aj. Furthermore, for every
cj 2 C (remind that cj = h= (aj;9S)i), (ui;aj) 2 P and (ui;si) 2 P indicate that cj is
satisﬁed. Therefore, P is a valid plan.
Proof to Theorem 4.3.2: WSP is in FPT in R2BAC, if = and 6= are the only binary
relations used by constraints in the workﬂow.
Proof Given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an access control state  = hU;UR;Bi,
let k be the number of steps in W. The description of the algorithm is as follow.151
1. For every step si 2 S, compute the set AU(si) of users who are authorized to perform
si according to UR and SA.
2. Process every constraint c in the form of h= (s1;s2)i. Let U0 = AU(s1)\AU(s2) be
the set of users who are authorized to perform both s1 and s2. If U0 = ;, then c is not
satisﬁable and neither nor W. Otherwise, we set AU(s1) and AU(s2) to be U0.
3. Let C0 be the set of all constraints in C that are in the form of h= (s;9X)i. We
construct a search tree as follow.
Label the root of the tree with C0 and UA = fAU(si) j si 2 Sg. Choose a constraint
c from C0. Without loss of generality, assume that c = h= (s0;9fs1; ;smg)i (m 
k   1). s0 must be performed by the same user as s1, or s2, , or sm. We create
m children of the root corresponding to these m possibilities. Let U0;1 = AU(s0) \
AU(s1). If U0;1 = ;, then the ﬁrst child of the root is marked as “invalid” and will
not be further processed, because it is impossible to ﬁnd a user who is authorized to
perform both s0 and s1. Otherwise, the ﬁrst child is labeled with C0   fcg and UA1,
where UA1 is the same as UA except that AU(s0) and AU(s1) are set to be U0;1.
Intuitively, the set of constraints labeling a node represents the remaining constraints,
while the set UA labeling a node represents the user-step authorization that satisﬁes
those constraints that have been processed. The other m   1 children of the root are
processed similarly. We then recursively process the children of the children of the
root and so on until all nodes in the tree have been processed. We then say that the
search tree is fully-developed.
In a fully-developed search tree, a leave node that is not marked as “invalid” (in this
case, it must have been labeled with an empty set of constraints) is called “alive”. If
there is no “alive” leave node in the search tree, then it is impossible to satisfy all
constraints in C0 and thus W is not satisﬁable.
Notethattherearenomorethank2k 1 differentconstraintsintheformofh= (s;9X)i
as s and X can take at most k and 2k 1 different values, respectively 1. Therefore,
1The 2k 1 upper-bound is loose and can be improved, but it sufﬁces to prove the result we want.152
the depth of the fully-developed search tree is no more than k2k 1. Furthermore, the
number of children of each node is bounded by k   1. Hence, the size of the fully-
developed search tree is bounded by (k  1)k2k 1. Processing each node in the search
tree involves computing no more than k   1 intersections and can be done in O(kn).
4. For each “alive” leave node v in the search tree, we check whether all constraints
using 6= can be satisﬁed with the user-step authorization UA labeling v. According
to Lemma 4.3.1, this can be done in O(kk+1n), where n is the size of the entire input
to the problem. If the answer is “yes” for any “alive” leave node, the workﬂow W is
satisﬁable; otherwise, W is not satisﬁable.
In general, the above algorithm ﬁnishes in O(f(k)n) where f(k) = kk+1(k   1)k2k 1.
Hence, the problem is in FPT.
Proof to Theorem 4.3.3: WSP is W[1]-hard in R2BAC if user-deﬁned binary relations are
used in constraints.
Proof We show that WSP is W[1]-hard even if the workﬂow only has constraints in the
form of h(s1;s2)i, where  is a user-deﬁned binary relation. Because h(s1;s2)i can be
equivalently represented as h(s1;9fs2g)i, the problem is W[1]-hard even if the workﬂow
only has constraints in the form of h(s;9X)i.
We reduce INDEPENDENT SET to WSP. In INDEPENDENT SET, we need to determine
whether there is a size-k independent set in graph G(V;E). An independent set of G is a
set of vertices V 0 such that V 0  V and no pair of vertices in V 0 are adjacent to each other
in G. INDEPENDENT SET with parameter k is W[1]-complete.
Given an integer k and a graph G(V;E) where V = fv1; ;vmg, we construct a
workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an access control state  = hU;UR;Bi, where U =
fu1; ;umg. There is a one-to-one correspondence between users in U and vertices in
V . S = fs1; ;skg and s1    sk. Let UR = f(ui;r) j i 2 [1;m]g and SA =
f(r;si) j i 2 [1;k]g. In other words, every user in U is authorized to perform every step
in S. B contains one binary relation , and  = f(ui;uj) j i 6= j ^ (vi;vj) 62 Eg.
Intuitively, (ui;uj) 2  if and only if ui 6= uj and the vertices corresponding to the two153
users are not adjacent to each other in G. For every i 2 [2;k], we construct i 1 constraints
ci;1; ;ci;i 1 such that ci;j = h(si;sj)i where j 2 [1;i   1].
Next, we show that G has a size-k independent set if and only if W is satisﬁable under
.
On the one hand, without loss of generality, assume that fv1; ;vkg is an independent
set of G. By deﬁnition of independent set, we have (vi;vj) 62 E, for any i;j 2 [1;k] and
i 6= j. We construct a plan P = f(ui;si) j i 2 [1;k]g. For any i;j 2 [1;k] and i 6= j,
(vi;vj) 62 E implies that (ui;uj) 2 . Therefore, no constraint is violated by P and P is a
valid plan.
On the other hand, assume that there is a valid plan P for W. From the construction
of , the k steps in W must be performed by k different users. Without loss of generality,
assume that P = f(ui;si) j i 2 [1;k]g. Since no constraint is violated by P, we have
(ui;uj) 2  for any i;j 2 [1;k] and i < j. Let V 0 = fv1; ;vkg. For any pair of vertices
(vi;vj) where i;j 2 [1;k] and i < j, (ui;uj) 2  implies that (vi;vj) 62 E. Hence, V 0 is a
size-k independent set of G.
Finally, we show that the above reduction is a ﬁxed-parameter reduction. In our re-
duction, the parameter k of the INDEPENDENT SET instance has the same value as the
number of steps in the corresponding WSP instance. Furthermore, the number m of users
in the workﬂow is the same as the number of vertices in the graph.  can be generated in
quadratic time to the size of G. There are no more than k2=2 constraints in the workﬂow,
and UR contains m items while SA contains k items. In general, the WSP instance can
be generated from the INDEPENDENT SET instance in O(n2 + k2), where n is the size of
graph G. Hence, the reduction is a ﬁxed-parameter reduction.
Proof to Theorem 4.3.4: WSP in R2BAC is in W[2].
Proof We reduce WSP to the weighted satisﬁability problem of decision circuits of weft
2 (denoted as WCS[2]). In the following, we encode an WSP instance into a boolean
expression that can be represented as a decision circuit of weft 2. And the answer to the
WSP instance is “yes” if and only if the answer to the WCS[2] instance is “yes”.154
Given a workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci and an access control state  = hU;UR;Bi, let
S = fs1; ;skg and U = fu1; ;ung. We construct kn variables vi;j where i 2 [1;k]
and j 2 [1;n]. Intuitively, setting vi;j to true corresponds to assigning user uj to si.
Let AU(s) be the set of authorized users for step s. For every si 2 S, we construct a
clause Hsi =
W
uj2AU(si) vi;j, which indicates that si must be performed by an authorized
user. The length of such a clause is no more than n and there are k such clauses. Note that a
weight-k truth assignment that satisfy all the k clauses (i.e. Hs1; ;Hsk) must set exactly
one vi;j to true for every i 2 [1;k], which indicates that every step is assigned to exactly
one user.
For every constraint c 2 C, we construct clauses for c as follows. Given a set F =
ff1; ;fmg of clauses, we deﬁne
W
F as f1 _  _ fm and
V
F as f1 ^  ^ fm.
 When c = h(si1;si2)i: Let F = fvi1;j1 ^ vi2;j2 j uj1 2 AU(si1) ^ uj2 2 AU(si2) ^
(uj1;uj2) 2 g. We construct a clause Hc =
W
F, which indicates that si1 and si2
must be performed by a pair of authorized users that satisﬁes .
 When c = h(s;9X)i: Without loss of generality, assume that c =
h(s0;9fs1; ;smg)i. For every i 2 [1;m], let Fi = fv0;j1 ^ vi;j2 j uj1 2 AU(s0) ^
uj2 2 AU(si) ^ (uj1;uj2) 2 g. We construct a clause Hc =
W
F1 _  _
W
Fm,
where
W
Fi indicates that s0 and si must be performed by a pair of authorized users
that satisﬁes .
Let F = fHsi j si 2 Sg [ fHc j c 2 Cg. H =
V
F is a clause encoding the WSP
instance in the sense that H has a weight-k satisfying truth assignment if and only if W is
satisﬁable under . H can be represented by a decision circuit using a large “^” gate that
connects a number of large “_” gates that connect either a number of variables or a number
of small “^” gates, each of which connects two variables. The decision circuit is thus a
weft 2 decision circuit.
In the above reduction, the number of step in the WSP instance is the same as the weight
k of the corresponding WCS[2] instance. There are k Hs clauses, each of which has length
no more than n, where n is the size of the WSP instance. And there are n Hc clauses, each155
of which has length no more than kn2. Hence, the construction of the decision circuit can
be done in O(kn3). Therefore, the above reduction is a ﬁxed-parameter reduction and WSP
is in W[2].
B.2 Proofs in Section 4.4.1
Proof to Theorem 4.4.3: CRCP is PSPACE-complete.
Proof The two-person game of decremental resiliency has the following two properties,
which indicates that it can be solved in PSPACE.
1. The number of rounds is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the input. In particu-
lar, the game must come to a conclusion after at most k rounds, where k is the number
of steps in the workﬂow.
2. Given an intermediate state, which consists of a partial plan, the set of remaining users
and the set of unﬁnished steps, there is a polynomial-space algorithm that constructs
all possible combinations of actions of the two users in the next round, and determines
if the game is over.
To show PSPACE-hardness, we reduce the PSPACE-complete QUANTIFIED SATIS-
FIABILITY (or QSAT) problem to CRCP. In the QSAT, we are given a boolean expression
 in conjunction normal form (CNF), with boolean variables x1; ;xm. Is it true that
there is a truth value for x1 such that for both truth value of x2 there exists a truth value for
x3, and so on up to xm,  is satisﬁed by the overall truth assignment? In other words,
9x18x29x3 Qxm?
where Q is “exists” if m is odd, or “for all” if m is even. Without loss of generality, we
assume that m is odd.
The QSAT problem can be modeled as a two-person game, in which Player 1 and
Player 2 control the truth assignment of variables in fxi j i 2 [1;m] ^ i is oddg and
fxj j j 2 [1;m]^j is eveng, respectively. Player 1 tries to satisfy , while Player 2 tries to
prevent this.156
Given a QSAT instance 9x18x29x3 9xm where  = 1 ^  ^ k, we construct a
CRCP instance. The detailed construction of the CRCP instance is given in Figure B.1.
Next, we prove that the answer to the CRCP instance is “yes” if and only if the answer
to the QSAT instance is “yes”. In the constructed workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, S consists
of three parts A, B and D. Steps in A determine truth values of variables x1; ;xm.
Intuitively, assigning user ui (or vi) to ai represents setting xi to “true” (or “false”). Steps
in B correspond to the k clauses in . Steps in D are used to restrict the behaviors of the
two players.
We need to to prove the following four claims.
1. For every even number i 2 [1;m], Player 2 should remove either ui or vi right after
the execution of ai 1. In other words, Player 2 controls the user-step assignment for
steps in fai j ai 2 A ^ i is eveng.
2. For every step ai 2 A, Player 1 should assign either ui or vi to ai, when Player 2 plays
optimally.
3. If Player 1 plays optimally, then steps in D can always be completed.
4. If both players play optimally, all steps in B can be completed if and only if the truth
assignment of boolean variables x1; ;xm corresponding to the user-step assign-
ment of steps in A satisﬁes .
If Claim 1 and Claim 2 are true, then Player 1 and Player 2 control the truth assignment
of variables in fxi j i 2 [1;m]^i is oddg and fxj j j 2 [1;m]^j is eveng, respectively. If
Claim 3 and Claim 4 are true, then the workﬂow instance can be completed if and only if 
is satisﬁed by the truth assignment. In general, the answer to the CRCP instance is “yes” if
and only if the answer to the QSAT instance is “yes”.
The proofs to the four claims are listed as follows.
Proof to Claim 1: First of all, since the total number of absent users is bounded by t,
Player 2 should not remove any of those users with t + 1 copies. Users in fui;vi j i 2
[1;m] ^ i is eveng are unique and are the only users with less than than t + 1 copies.157
Secondly, given an even number i, if Player 2 removes both ui and vi, then there must
exist an even number j 2 [1;m] such that both uj and vj are available throughout the game,
as Player 2 can remove at most (m   1)=2 users. In this case, Player 1 can assign u0 to
all remaining even steps in A as well as all steps in B, and then assign uj to d1 and vj to
d2. Such an assignment complete the workﬂow without violating any constraint. Player 1
wins. Therefore, Player 2 should remove either ui or vi for every even number i.
Finally, we would like to point out that Player 2 should remove ui or vi before the
execution of ai, where i is a even number. If Player 2 does this after the execution of ai,
then Player 1 gains advantage by being able to choose between ui and vi for ai. However,
removing ui or vi after ai does not affect future user-step assignment, as it is pi and qi rather
than ui and vi that will be performing steps in B.
Proof to Claim 2: The statement is true when i is odd, since ui and vi are the only users
authorized to perform ai. In the following, we only discuss the case when i is even.
From Claim 1, when Player 2 plays optimally, he/she removes either ui or vi for every
even number i 2 [1;m]. Given an even number i, without loss of generality, assume that
Player 2 removes ui. In this case, Player 1 may either assign vi or u0 to ai. If, by contra-
diction, Player 1 assigns u0 to ai, then according to constraint h1(d1;8Aeven)i, Player 1
cannot assign v0 to d1 as (v0;u0) 2 1. Thus, Player 1 has to choose a certain uj or vj for d1,
where j is even. By the time d1 is to be executed, either uj or vj must have been removed
by Player 2. Without loss of generality, assume that uj is available and is thus assigned to
d1. According to h2(d2;d1)i, Player 1 has to assign vj to d2, but vj is not available. Hence,
d2 cannot be completed and Player 1 losses. Therefore, Player 1 must not assign u0 to ai
when Player 2 plays optimally. The only choice for Player 1 is to assign vi to ai.
Proof to Claim 3: We have shown that if Player 2 does not follow the strategy in Claim
1, then Player 1 can complete all steps in the workﬂow. When both players play optimally,
according to Claim 1 and Claim 2, only users in fui;vi j i 2 [1;m]g are assigned to steps
in A. In this case, Player 1 can assign v0 to d1 and u0 to d2 without violating any constraints.
Proof to Claim 4: From Claim 1 and Claim 2, when both players play optimally, only
users in fui;vi j i 2 [1;m]g are assigned to steps in A. For any bj 2 B, according to158
constraint h0(bj;9A)i, u0 cannot be assigned to bj, as (u0;ui);(u0;vi) 62 0. Furthermore,
pi and qi correspond to ui and vi respectively according to 0. From the construction of
SA and UR, pi (or qi) is authorized to perform bj if and only if setting xi to true (or false)
satisﬁes clause j. Hence, Player 1 can assign a user to bj if and only if the truth assignment
determined by the user-step assignment of steps in A satisﬁes j. In general, all steps in B
can be completed if and only if j is satisﬁed for every j 2 [1;k], which indicates that  is
satisﬁed.
Proof to Theorem 4.4.4: DRCP is PSPACE-complete.
Proof The proof that DRCP is in PSPACE is similar to the case of CRCP. In the fol-
lowing, we only prove that the problem is PSPACE-hard.
We reduce the PSPACE-complete QUANTIFIED SATISFIABILITY (or QSAT) prob-
lem to DRCP. Given a QSAT instance 9x18x29x3 9xm where  = 1 ^  ^ k, we
construct a DRCP instance. The detailed construction of the DRCP instance is given in
Figure B.2.
We need to prove that the answer to the DRCP instance is “yes” if and only if the
answer to the QSAT instance is “yes”. In the constructed workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, S
consists of two parts A and B. Steps in A determine truth values of variables x1; ;xm.
Intuitively, assigning user ui (or vi) to ai represents setting xi to “true” (or “false”). Steps
in B correspond to the k clauses in .
First of all, it is clear that Player 2 should remove one user in each round. However,
since there are two copies of ui and vi for odd number i 2 [1;m], and two copies of
pj and qj for j 2 [1;k], Player 2’s action only affects the user-step assignment of ai for
even number i 2 [1;m]. Therefore, Player 1 and Player 2 has control over the user-step
assignment of odd number steps in A and even number steps in A, respectively. A user-step
assignment for steps in A represents a truth assignment for variables x1; ;xm.
Secondly, according to relation , pi and qi correspond to ui and vi respectively. Ac-
cording to the construction of SA and UR, pi (or qi) is authorized to perform bj if and only
if setting xi to true (or false) satisﬁes clause j. Due to the constraint h(bj;9A)i, Player 1159
can assign a user to bj if and only if the truth assignment determined by user-step assign-
ment in A satisﬁes j. Therefore, Player 1 can complete all steps in B if and only if the
truth assignment satisﬁes .
In general, Player 1 can always win the game if and only if the answer to the QSAT
instance is “yes”.160
Input: 9x18x29x3 9xm, where  = 1 ^  ^ k
Output: A workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, an integer t = (m   1)=2, an access control state
 = hU;UR;f0;1;2gi
Construction of W and :
 Steps and Step-Authorization:
S = A [ B [ D
We have A = fa1; ;amg, B = fb1; ;bkg, D = fd1;d2g, and a1    am 
d1  d2  b1    bk
SA = f(rai;ai) j ai 2 Ag [ f(rbi;bi) j bi 2 Bg [ f(rd1;d1);(rd2;d2)g
 Conﬁguration:
U = fui;vi;pi;qi j i 2 [1;m]g [ fu0;v0g
For every odd number i in [1;m], there are t+1 copies of ui and vi. For every j 2 [1;m],
there are t + 1 copies of pj and qj. There are t + 1 copies of u0 and v0 as well.
UR =f(ui;rai);(vi;rai) j i 2 [1;m] ^ i is oddg
[ f(ui;rai);(vi;rai);(u0;rai) j i 2 [1;m] ^ i is eveng
[ f(u0;rbi) j i 2 [1;m]g [ 1 [  [ k
[ f(v0;rd1)g [ f(ui;rd1);(vi;rd1) j i 2 [1;m] ^ i is eveng
[ f(u0;rd2)g [ f(ui;rd2);(vi;rd2) j i 2 [1;m] ^ i is eveng
Construction of i: Let Li be the set of literals in clause i. (pj;rbi) 2 i if and only if
there exists a literal l 2 Li such that l = xj; and (qj;rbi) 2 i if and only if there exists
a literal l 2 Li such that l = :xj.
 Constraints:
C = fh0(bi;9A)i j i 2 [1;k]g [ fh1(d1;8Aeven)i;h2(d2;d1)ig
where Aeven = fai j i is eveng. We have
– 0 = f(pi;ui);(qi;vi) j i 2 [1;m]g [ f(u0;u0)g
– 1 = f(v0;u0)g
– 2 = f(ui;vi);(vi;ui) j i is eveng [ f(u0;v0)g.
Figure B.1. Generating a CRCP instance for a QSAT instance.161
Input:
9x18x29x3 9xm, where  = 1 ^  ^ k
Output:
A workﬂow W = hS;;SA;Ci, an integer t = 1, an access control state  = hU;UR;fgi
Construction of W and :
 Steps and Step-Authorization:
S = A [ B
We have A = fa1; ;amg, B = fb1; ;bkg, and a1    am  b1    bk
SA = f(rai;ai) j ai 2 Ag [ f(rbi;bi) j bi 2 Bg
 Conﬁguration:
U = fui;vi;pi;qi j i 2 [1;m]g
For every odd number i in [1;m], there are 2 copies of ui and vi. For every j 2 [1;m],
there are 2 copies of pj and qj.
UR = f(ui;rai);(vi;rai) j i 2 [1;m]g [ 1 [  [ k
Construction of i: Let Li be the set of literals in clause i. (pj;rbi) 2 i if and only if
there exists a literal l 2 Li such that l = xj; and (qj;rbi) 2 i if and only if there exists
a literal l 2 Li such that l = :xj.
 Constraints:
C = fh(bi;9A)i j i 2 [1;k]g
where  = f(pi;ui);(qi;vi) j i 2 [1;m]g
Figure B.2. Generating a DRCP instance for a QSAT instance.VITA162
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